News from Delaware
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State trooper found to have violated 8 year old's Fourth Amendment rights
Court: Delaware Supreme Court
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| By Samantha Ward
In 2008, Delaware State Trooper David Pritchett, employed as a student resource officer at Shields Elementary, used an eight-year-old boy to elicit a confession from another elementary student; the boy's mother reacted badly to the circumstances and filed suit on behalf of her son, claiming "her son endured emotional distress, battery, false imprisonment and his civil rights were violated during his meeting with the student resource officer."[5]
Pritchett was questioning a child, referred to as "AB" for privacy purposes, about one dollar that was taken from an autistic child on a school bus. AB refused to confess to the theft. In what appears to be a bait-and-switch, Pritchett then spoke privately with Anthony Hunt, the eight year old boy at the heart of this lawsuit who also sat next to the autistic boy on the bus. Pritchett told Anthony he was not in any trouble, he was going to take him (Anthony) into a room with AB, and Anthony should deny any involvement when questioned by Pritchett in front of AB. However, once in the room, Pritchett used a stern voice and told both boys that if one of them did not confess to the theft, they would both be arrested and sent to a youth detention facility. Pritchett further stated that the boys would not see their siblings again once this happened. Anthony started crying and AB finally confessed.[6]
When Anthony's mother learned of the incident she was not amused. She removed her son from the school and filed a lawsuit against the Cape Henlopen School District, Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland, Delaware State Police and Trooper David Pritchett.[5] The school district settled with the mother. Judge William L. Witham Jr. of the Kent County Superior Court granted summary judgment in Pritchett's favor. Anthony's mother appealed the ruling and, on June 25, 2013, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded all but the battery claim back to Superior Court, finding that there was "sufficient evidence that [Pritchett] violated [Anthony's] civil rights."[5]
Writing for the court, Justice Carolyn Berger opined,
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Pritchett should have known that it was unreasonable to seize [Anthony] and intentionally frighten him, in order to teach another student a lesson.[5][6][3]
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Pritchett unreasonably seized Anthony based on the following facts, according to the Supreme Court panel:
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"He [Anthony] was called to the Vice Principal’s office and was escorted there by a teacher’s aide. Outside the office, Pritchett met [Anthony] and walked with him into the reading lab. Pritchett was in uniform, carrying a gun, handcuffs, and other indicia of police authority. Pritchett then met with AB and [Anthony] in the reading lab for close to one hour. For some period of time, the door to the reading lab was closed. [Anthony] was eight years old. Pritchett never told [Anthony] that he could leave the reading lab, and Pritchett admitted that he did not expect [Anthony] to leave. Based on these facts, a reasonable child would not believe he was free to leave the room."[6][3]
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The court found the seizure was inherently unreasonable, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment, because Pritchett never suspected Anthony of taking the money. He used Anthony as a pawn to elicit a confession from another boy and never intended to question Anthony as to any involvement in the theft.[6]
The court found further that Pritchett, a government employee, could not claim qualified immunity as a defense in this case. The doctrine shields government employees from claims arising under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.[7] The Delaware Supreme Court found that Pritchett could not rely on this defense because of his purpose in seizing Anthony. The court's opinion stated that it was possible "that Pritchett was interrogating [Anthony] for the purpose of scaring him, so that AB would be shamed into confessing. Pritchett should have known that it was unreasonable to seize [Anthony] and intentionally frighten him, in order to teach another student a lesson.”[6]
The case will go back to the Kent County Superior Court for trial or other disposition. |
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News from Indiana
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Surrogate mother is legal mother in cases of anonymous egg donors, Indiana Court of Appeals rules
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
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| By Alma Cook
The Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled that a surrogate mother may not disestablish maternity of her birth child except indirectly, by establishing it as the biological child of another woman.[8]
In a nonadversarial trial last Thursday, the court sought to determine the legality of a pre-birth contract drawn between a surrogate mother, her husband, and the child's biological father. As the wife of the biological father was unable to conceive, the couple initiated a procedure in May of 2012 wherein the father's sperm was combined with an anonymously donated egg and transferred to the surrogate's uterus.[8]
In the agreement, the surrogate mother and her husband forfeited legal maternity and paternity while the biological father assumed paternity, along with "all rights and responsibilities of the child after its birth." Both these claims were initially denied by a Putnam County trial court, which wrote that until a post-birth genetic test proved that the child did not belong to the surrogate's husband, it was legally presumed to be his—and that pertaining to maternity, a statute aiming to prevent the existence of a "filius nullius" (an unclaimed child; "son of nobody") rendered the surrogate's disestablishment of maternity illegal.[8]
In the July 11 appeal, Judge Edward Najam reversed the trial court's decision to deny the biological father's request for paternity rights. However, it upheld its ruling that the surrogate was the legal mother.[8]
The biological father and his wife will now seek consent for the child's maternal adoption, and, if granted, a separate birth certificate will be issued in the new parents' names. No resistance from the surrogate mother is anticipated, as the child currently resides with the biological father.[9] |
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News from Florida
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Florida high court checks Legislature in redistricting lawsuit
Court: Florida Supreme Court
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| By Matt Latourelle
The Florida Supreme Court, on July 11, allowed a lawsuit against the state House of Representatives to proceed. The League of Women Voters (LWV) has challenged the Legislature's conduct regarding redistricting last year, claiming that they did not follow the new rules set forth by the "Fair Districts" amendments approved by voters in 2010.
Every 10 years, when updated U.S. Census data is released, the Legislature draws new districts for the state based on such data. In states across the nation, such redistricting is expected to benefit a political party that controls both houses of the Legislature, as it allows them to shift voter's districts to ensure the best chance of success for their party in the next election. In Florida, the Republicans have the majority in both houses. Thus, the "Fair Districts" amendments were passed by voters to impose new rules and limits on what the Legislature could do with redistricting. The LWV argues that the Legislature did not adhere to these new rules during the most recent redistricting process.
The new districts must be approved by the Supreme Court. Last year, the court rejected the Legislature's first map, but then approved a revised version. Additionally, Article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, explains that, "The supreme court, in accordance with its rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their views and, within thirty days from the filing of the petition, shall enter its judgment."[10] The Legislature's argument was that any lawsuits brought after this 30-day period were invalid.
The high court ruled, 5-2, that lawsuits could proceed after the 30-day review period. Justice Barbara Pariente, writing the majority opinion, explained,
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[I]f evidence were discovered that would demonstrate a
constitutional violation in the form of direct evidence of improper partisan or
discriminatory intent that could not have been reviewed during this Court’s article
III, section 16, facial review, according to the Legislature’s position there would be
no possible remedy for the constitutional violation...Simply put, the
framers and voters clearly desired more judicial scrutiny of the legislative
apportionment plan, not less.[10][3]
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Chief Justice Ricky Polston and Justice Charles Canady dissented. The lawsuit will now be allowed to proceed in the Second Circuit Court.[11][12] |
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News from Iowa
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Iowa Court of Appeals finds beating puppy with bat until death not torture
Court: Iowa Court of Appeals
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| By Ryan Cherry
In a decision sure to spark a great deal of negative response, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that hitting a dog with a bat until its death is not torture, without proper evidence to prove otherwise.[13][14] The three-judge panel, including Chief judge Larry Eisenhauer and Judges Anuradha Vaitheswaran and Mary Tabor, heard the appeal from the Iowa District Court in Scott County and filed a decision on July 10, 2013.
Associate judge Cheryl E. Traum convicted Zachary Meerdink of animal torture at a bench trial which began in April of 2012; a conviction which Meerdink sought to have reversed on appeal and dismissed upon remand. The Iowa criminal statute involved states that a person is guilty of animal torture "if the person inflicts upon the animal severe physical pain with a depraved or sadistic intent to cause prolonged suffering or death."[13]
The dog killed was a 7-month-old Boston terrier that had stomach problems, numerous "accidents," and was beginning "to get aggressive and bite people," including the young sons of Jamie Holladay, Meerdink's girlfriend.[13][14] Holladay was allowing Meerdink and his dog to stay with her while Meerdink recovered from shoulder surgery.[13] The Appeals Court's decision and an article in USA Today Online seem to suggest that Meerdink was likely taking prescription pain medication at the time of the dog's death.[13][14] That day, Holladay and her sons left to run an errand and, while out, received a phone call from Meerdink asking for the location of some disinfectant to clean up the dog's accident by the door. Holladay testified that Meerdink did not seem upset on the phone when he called.[13]
When Holladay returned from the errand, Meerdink was walking toward the front door with the dog under his arm. Holladay asked Meerdink if he was alright, but did not receive a response. Holladay testified that Meerdink "had a blank look on his face" and looked like "he was out of it."[13] Upon Meerdink's return to the apartment a few minutes later, he was carrying a bat. He walked in without saying anything. Again, Holladay testified that Meerdink did not seem upset, nor happy, nor satisfied, but "looked more confused."[13] Only after Holladay asked where the dog was, did Meerdink respond that the dog was dead.
At the bench trial, Judge Traum decided not to use the definitions of the statute's "depraved or sadistic intent" as provided by either the State's or the defense's attorneys. Instead, Traum found that, upon a reading of the statute, the "act of hitting a dog in the head with a baseball bat would inflict severe physical pain and said action show[s] a depraved intent to cause the death of" the dog.[13]
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had erred by not defining "depraved" and, after review of numerous definitions and the statutes and opinions of other states, the Court of Appeals determined that a "depraved intent to cause death" is not equivalent to an "intent to cause death." Therefore, the State would need to prove that Meerdink acted with more than just the "intent to cause death," which it failed to do here. The conviction was then reversed and remanded to the trial court for dismissal.[13]
Polk County attorney John Sarcone expressed his concern for the level of proof that would now be required in future animal torture and abuse cases. Sarcone stated that "an autopsy on the animal to show the extent of the injuries" is now going to be necessary in order to bring about a conviction.[14] Tom Colvin, one of the authors of the statute at issue in this case, stated that, while the drafters had anticipated "a lot of the language was going to have to be open to interpretation," he disagrees with the judges' decision.[14] Colvin also commented on the need to change another similar law that limited the field of possible animal abusers only to people who did not own the animal. Colvin stated that an "animal is going to suffer the same whether it belonged to the person or didn't."[14] |
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News from Ohio
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Megachurch draws Christian protesters
Court: Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio
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| By Jong Son
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Charles A. Schneider has left a temporary restraining order in place, effectively barring Minutemen United from protesting in front of the Vineyard Columbus, a megachurch with 8,500 members in Columbus, Ohio.[15]
Minutemen United, a national conservative Christian group, has been protesting in front of the Vineyard Columbus for over nine months for what they perceive to be the church’s passive stance on abortion and gay marriage. The organization’s senior counsel, Jim Harrison, is calling for greater church activism on behalf of Vineyard Columbus in regards to "the culture war" on abortion and homosexuality.[16]
Reverend Rich Nathan, the senior pastor at Vineyard Columbus, filed for the temporary restraining order last week, citing Minutemen United’s use of graphic images of aborted fetuses on eight-foot tall signs and their general presence on the church’s property as being physically intrusive.[15] Nathan asserts that the Vineyard is pro-life and is against gay marriage, but sees its mission as being “broad and inclusive” by “presenting Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord in such an attractive way, through compassionate outreach…"[17]
Since the placement of the temporary restraining order, the Minutemen United demonstrators have moved across the street from the Vineyard. In the meantime, they are awaiting a determination regarding the property boundaries of the Vineyard and whether or not there exists a public easement on the Vineyard's property on which they can resume their protests. If such a public right of way exists, the Minutemen United hope to turn their protests into a First Amendment issue.[16] Vineyard Columbus, on their website, state:
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[it] is not about free speech, which Vineyard deeply respects. The demonstrators are free to say whatever they like, but not wherever they like, and not on the Vineyard’s property.[17][3]
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