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Esteras v. United States

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Supreme Court of the United States
Esteras v. United States
Term: 2024
Important Dates
Argued: February 25, 2025
Decided: June 20, 2025
Outcome
vacated and reversed
Vote
7-2
Majority
Amy Coney BarrettChief Justice John RobertsClarence ThomasSonia SotomayorElena KaganBrett KavanaughKetanji Brown Jackson
Concurring
Sonia Sotomayor (in part and in judgment)Ketanji Brown Jackson (in part and in judgment)
Dissenting
Samuel AlitoNeil Gorsuch

Esteras v. United States is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States during the court's October 2024-2025 term. The case was argued on February 25, 2025.

The Court vacated and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding a court may not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to revoke a defendent's supervised release. Specifically, § 3553(a)(2)(A) allows the court to consider the defendent's offenses when determining their sentencing. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the majority opinion of the court. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned factors a court may consider when deciding whether to revoke an individual's supervised release term. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of

    factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?"[2]

  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

  • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Background

    Case summary

    The following are the parties to this case:[3]

    The following summary of the case was published by Oyez:[5]

    In January 2020, Edgardo Esteras began a six-year term of supervised release following imprisonment for drug trafficking offenses. Three years into his supervised release, in January 2023, his probation officer reported violations including domestic violence and firearm possession, though the related criminal charges were dismissed at the victim's request. At a violation hearing, Judge Pearson found that Esteras had possessed a firearm while on supervised release. Concerned that previous sentences had failed to deter him, she imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release with special conditions including anger management and location monitoring. Though Esteras objected to the court’s consideration of certain statutory factors related to punishment, Judge Pearson maintained that she also weighed deterrence and public safety, while acknowledging that some supervision conditions had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects.


    On appeal, Esteras challenged his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed[6]

    To learn more about this case, see the following:

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?[6]

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding a court may not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to revoke a defendent's supervised release.[1]

    Opinion

    Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the majority opinion of the court. In her opinion, Justice Barrett wrote:[1]

    A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and a term of supervised release. 18 U. S. C. §3583(a). Supervised release comes with conditions—for instance, the defendant must refrain from committing another crime. §3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” §3583(e). Conspicuously missing from this list is §3553(a)(2)(A), which directs a district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” The Sixth Circuit held that a district court may consider that factor nonetheless.

    We disagree. Congress’s decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting §3553(a)(2)(A) raises a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release. This inference is consistent with both the statutory structure and the role that supervised release plays in the sentencing process. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.[6]

    Concurring opinions

    Justice Sotomayor

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, concurring in part and the judgment. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the concurrence.

    I join all but Part II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that district courts may not rely on the retributive sentencing factor set forth in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(2)(A) to revoke supervised release. In my view, however, district courts revoking a term of supervised release should not consider retribution for any purpose.


    [...]

    Because the majority frames the question as one about retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exacting retribution for the defendant’s supervised-release violation. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward.

    [...]

    In sum, when a court considers whether a supervised-release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment (its primary task during revocation hearings), it must look only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute. As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of bounds. Although I would have made this point explicit, nothing in the Court’s opinion is inconsistent with it. Accordingly, I otherwise join the Court’s opinion.[6]


    Justice Jackson

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion, concurring in part and the judgment.

    ...Like the Court, I agree with Esteras: Courts cannot consider this omitted sentencing purpose when revoking supervised release.

    That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has taken off the table. Ante, at 7–8. Venturing into this territory is not necessary in the context of this litigation. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explains, whatever §3553(a)(2)(A) calls for when Congress has authorized its use, all that the Court properly decides today is that Congress has forbidden sentencing judges to rely on that same set of considerations in the supervised-release-revocation context.

    [...]

    Part II–B of the majority’s opinion is both unnecessary to the outcome of this litigation and inscrutable in light of how revocation sentences are actually determined and imposed. Therefore, I cannot join that Part of the opinion.[6]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.[1]

    The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that a federal district-court judge, when considering whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in mind-bending exercises. The judge must take into account “the nature and circumstances” of a defendant’s offense but is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.” 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). The judge must consider what is needed to “dete[r]” violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defendant, i.e., to cause him to lead a law-abiding life, but cannot be influenced by a desire “to promote respect for the law.” Ibid.

    The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the interpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure of the Act supports the Court’s interpretation.[6]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2024-2025

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2024-2025

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 7, 2024. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[9]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes