Michael Hoover (Wisconsin)

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Michael Hoover
Image of Michael Hoover
Prior offices
Wisconsin Court of Appeals District III

Education

Bachelor's

University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974

Law

University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978


Michael Hoover was a judge on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Hoover was the presiding judge for District III headquartered in Wausau. He joined this court in 1997 and he retired on July 31, 2015.[1] Hoover did not seek re-election in 2015.[2]

Education

Judge Hoover received both his undergraduate degree and J.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1974 and 1978, respectively.[1]

Career

Awards and associations

  • Author/editor, Wisconsin Criminal Law Benchbook Committee
  • Instructor/speaker, Judicial Education and the State Bar
  • Former faculty, Mount Senario College [1]

Noteworthy cases

Catholic Pharmacist Contraception Case (2008)

This case drew state and national attention as Judge Michael Hoover upheld the sanctions against a Catholic pharmacist who refused to dispense contraceptive drugs on the grounds of religious conscience. Hoover ruled in favor of the decision of the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board to reprimand Neil Noesen and place limits on his license.

Neil Noesen, a Catholic, was working as a substitute pharmacist at a K-mart department store in Menomonie, Wis., in the summer of 2002, when a young college student asked him to refill a prescription for hormonal contraceptives. Noesen refused to fill the prescription for the abortifacient drug or refer to another pharmacist who would comply with the request. When the woman took her prescription to a Wal-Mart pharmacist, Noesen refused to provide the Wal-Mart pharmacist with the prescription information.

The woman lodged a complaint and the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board found Noesen had "engaged in practice which constitutes a danger to the health, welfare, or safety of a patient" and had "practiced in a manner which substantially departs from the standard of care ordinarily exercised by pharmacists and which harmed or could have harmed a patient."

Noesen argued that the Wisconsin state constitution protected his right to abstain from "impairing the fertility of a human being" which he believes is objectively evil.

Judge Hoover disagreed, ruling that Noesen "prevented all the efforts [the woman] made to obtain her medication elsewhere when he refused to complete the transfer."

"The board could therefore properly conclude that he violated a standard of care applicable to pharmacists."

Noesen's lawyer appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court as the case is awaiting to be heard. This decision extended beyond the courts as both pro-religious and anti-religious advocates clashed in their opinions. Kim Wadas, the associate director for education and healthcare for the Wisconsin Catholic Bishops' Conference called the ruling "a step in the right direction." "We were excited to see some of that language, which continued to recognize that pharmacists have a right of conscience," Wadas said. "This is something we advocate for on behalf of health professionals, especially Catholic health professionals." The same Kim Wadas also gave testimony to a Wisconsin Senate Committee on the moral liceity of directly abortifacient drugs, saying, "Catholic hospitals in Wisconsin can and do treat [rape] victims with emergency contraception."

Contrary to Wadas' supportive reaction to the decision against Noesen, however, the court rulings found that the protection of conscience does not extend to the absolute refusal to participate in the dispensing of abortifacient drugs, an act understood by Catholics to be an objectively evil one.

An administrative law judge upheld the Pharmacy Board's judgment, noting that the state pharmacy licensing regulations only allows conscientious objection if the pharmacist is willing to "ensure that there is an alternative mechanism for the patient to receive his or her medication, including informing the patient of their options to obtain their prescription." Catholic ethicists, however, hold that this constitutes "material co-operation in an objective evil."

In agreement with Wadas, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, an anti-Christian organization, also saw the ruling as a positive and important step, but specifically as one toward greater suppression of conscience rights of religious people. Lauren Smith wrote on the group's website: "It's difficult to understate this ruling's importance. Pharmacist refusals are increasingly problematic, and Noesen is one of the first rulings weighing the states' authority to protect public welfare against an individual's alleged freedom of conscience."

This ruling sparked further debate on the national level if Catholics in the healthcare professions are allowed to not dispense contraception based on their religious beliefs.[3]

Wisconsin v. Dewitt (2006)

This was a case that ruled about how bail jumping can be ruled in Wisconsin Circuit Courts. The case held [the defendant] was not obligated to sign the bond, especially if he knew he would not be posting cash bond. Thus, while not physically released, Dewitt was released as contemplated by Wis. Stat. sec. 969.02 when he fulfilled the signature bond.”

The defendant, Travis S. Dewitt, was facing seven different charges in three separate cases in Taylor County.

On January 25, 2006, the circuit court held a bond hearing for all three cases. In the misdemeanor case, he imposed a $500 signature bond; in each of the two felony cases, he imposed a $500 cash bond.

The misdemeanor bond, and one of the felony bonds, included a condition that he have no contact with Kayla Langiewicz. Dewitt signed the signature bond, but did not post the cash bonds until February 13, 2006.

Dewitt allegedly called Langiewicz nine times between the date he signed the bond, and when he was released. As a result, the state charged him with nine counts of bail jumping, based on the no contact provision in the misdemeanor case.

Dewitt ultimately entered a plea agreement, under which, among other provisions, he pleaded guilty to three counts of bail jumping.

Dewitt subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the bail jumping charges were “legally unsupportable,” and thus the plea agreement was “illusory.”

The court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The appellate court acknowledged that it could dismiss the appeal on waiver grounds, but chose to address the merits.

The bail jumping statute, sec. 946.49, provides that someone who has been released from custody, but who intentionally fails to comply with the terms of the bond is guilty of bail jumping.

However, the statute does not define “released.” The court acknowledged that the common meaning of the term contemplates physical discharge from custody.

Nevertheless, it concluded that Dewitt could violate the condition of his bond, despite never actually being “released.”

The court noted that, pursuant to sec. 969.02(3)(d), a court can release a defendant, with a condition that he return to custody after specified hours.

Therefore, the court concluded: “Because it would be absurd to conclude that conditions of release would then apply when the defendant was outside the jail, but be ‘turned off’ upon return to custody, it is evident that ‘release’ refers to the defendant posting the bond, be it signature or cash, and need not be accompanied by the defendant’s physical departure from the jailhouse.”

However, attorney William E. Schmaal, who represents Dewitt on appeal, said in an interview that he does not agree with the court’s concerns regarding sec. 969.02(3) (d). Schmaal said, “It doesn’t make sense that it is absurd to say, if he is released from jail, he can be charged, but when he is back at jail, he is not released. It is perfectly reasonable, and not absurd at all.”

Schmaal said he has not decided whether to seek review in the Supreme Court, but has recommended that his client do so.

The court also distinguished the case of State v. Orlik, 226 Wis.2d 527, 595 N.W.2d 468 (Ct.App.1999).

Orlik was charged with bail jumping for violating a no contact order while in custody. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, because he was never released from custody.

However, Orlik remained in custody because of inability to post the cash bond in that case. Dewitt, in contrast, remained in custody for other reasons.

By signing the bond, the court concluded, he committed himself to following its conditions.[4]

See also

External links

Footnotes