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Mitchell v. Wisconsin

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Supreme Court of the United States
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
Term: 2018
Important Dates
Argument: April 23, 2019
Decided: June 27, 2019
Outcome
Vacated and remanded
Vote
5-4
Majority
Chief Justice John G. RobertsStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoBrett Kavanaugh
Concurring
Clarence Thomas
Dissenting
Ruth Bader GinsburgSonia SotomayorElena KaganNeil Gorsuch

Mitchell v. Wisconsin is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on April 23, 2019, during the court's 2018-2019 term.[1] The court vacated and remanded the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, holding that "when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant."[2]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A Sheboygan police officer arrested Gerald P. Mitchell for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and subsequently determined Mitchell needed to be taken to the hospital. The police officer read Mitchell a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was incapacitated and did not indicate understanding or consent. The officer instructed the hospital staff to conduct a blood test, which revealed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. Mitchell moved to suppress the blood test, arguing it was taken without a warrant. The state argued that under the implied consent laws, Mitchell gave his permission to the blood test by operating the vehicle on a state road. A jury convicted him of the charges. Mitchell appealed the conviction and the court of appeals certified his case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the certification and upheld the search but did not have a majority for the rationale upholding it.
  • The issues: Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
  • The outcome: The court vacated and remanded the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, holding that "when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant."[2]

  • You can review the lower court's opinion here.[3]

    Timeline

    • June 27, 2019: U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • April 23, 2019: Oral argument
    • January 11, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
    • October 1, 2018: Petition filed with the U.S. Supreme Court
    • July 3, 2018: The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the court of appeals' certification and upheld the search but did not have a majority for the rationale upholding it

    Background

    On May 30, 2013, a Sheboygan police officer arrested Gerald P. Mitchell for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. During the drive to the police station, the officer noticed Mitchell was lethargic and took him to the hospital instead. In the emergency room, the officer read Mitchell the Informing the Accused form, which gives the statutory opportunity to withdraw his consent to a blood draw. Mitchell was too incapacitated to answer. The police officer instructed the hospital staff to draw Mitchell's blood, which revealed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Mitchell was then charged with driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

    Prior to his trial, Mitchell moved to suppress the blood test results, alleging that the blood draw violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The State of Wisconsin contended that by driving his vehicle on a Wisconsin highway, he implicitly consented to the blood draw under a subsection of Wisconsin's implied consent law. The State also argued that because he was unconscious, he was presumed not to have withdrawn his consent. The circuit court denied Mitchell's motion, concluding that the officer had probable cause to believe that Mitchell was driving while intoxicated, and therefore, the blood draw was legal. A jury convicted Mitchell of the charges.

    Mitchell appealed his conviction based on the argument that the blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." The court of appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The state Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell's convictions, but did not have a majority for the rationale for upholding it.[3]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[4]

    Questions presented:
    • Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

    Outcome

    Decision

    In a 5-4 opinion, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, holding that "when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant." Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the court.[2]

    Opinion

    Justice Alito was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kavanaugh. In his opinion, Justice Alito wrote:[2]

    When a breath test is impossible, enforcement of the drunk-driving laws depends upon the administration of a blood test. And when a police officer encounters an unconscious driver, it is very likely that the driver would be taken to an emergency room and that his blood would be drawn for diagnostic purposes even if the police were not seeking BAC information. In addition, police officers most frequently come upon unconscious drivers when they report to the scene of an accident, and under those circumstances, the officers’ many responsibilities—such as attending to other injured drivers or passengers and preventing further accidents—may be incompatible with the procedures that would be required to obtain a warrant. Thus, when a driver is unconscious, the general rule is that a warrant is not needed.[5]

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Thomas wrote:[2]

    Today, the plurality adopts a difficult-to-administer rule: Exigent circumstances are generally present when police encounter a person suspected of drunk driving—except when they aren’t . . . The plurality’s presumption will rarely be rebutted, but it will nevertheless burden both officers and courts who must attempt to apply it.[5]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.

    In her dissent, Sotomayor wrote:[2]

    The plurality’s decision rests on the false premise that today’s holding is necessary to spare law enforcement from a choice between attending to emergency situations and securing evidence used to enforce state drunk-driving laws. Not so. To be sure, drunk driving poses significant dangers that Wisconsin and other States must be able to curb. But the question here is narrow: What must police do before ordering a blood draw of a person suspected of drunk driving who has become unconscious? Under the Fourth Amendment, the answer is clear: If there is time, get a warrant.[5]

    Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

    In his dissent, Gorsuch wrote:[2]

    We took this case to decide whether Wisconsin drivers impliedly consent to blood alcohol tests thanks to a state statute. That law says that anyone driving in Wisconsin agrees—by the very act of driving—to testing under certain circumstances. But the Court today declines to answer the question presented. Instead, it upholds Wisconsin’s law on an entirely different ground—citing the exigent circumstances doctrine. While I do not doubt that the Court may affirm for any reason supported by the record, the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine in this area poses complex and difficult questions that neither the parties nor the courts below discussed. Rather than proceeding solely by self-direction, I would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted and waited for a case presenting the exigent circumstances question.[5]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Audio



    Transcript

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes