Abood v. Detroit Board of Education: Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 17:40, 17 August 2021

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Abood v. Detroit Board of Education | |
Term: 1976 | |
Important Dates | |
Argument: November 9, 1976 Decided: May 23, 1977 Overruled by Janus v. AFSCME, (2018) | |
Outcome | |
Michigan Court of Appeals vacated | |
Majority | |
Chief Justice Warren Burger • William Brennan • Potter Stewart • Byron White • Thurgood Marshall • Harry Blackmun • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens |
On May 23, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its ruling in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, holding that non-union public employees could be required to pay labor union fees for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes, as a condition of employment. The court ruled that the union fees were not a violation of the petitioner's First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also ruled that unions could not use non-member dues for ideological or political purposes.[1]
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling in this case when it issued its ruling in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (Janus v. AFSCME). The court held that public sector unions cannot require non-member employees to pay agency fees covering the costs of non-political union activities.
Background
In 1969, D. Louis Abood and other Detroit public school teachers were unwilling to pay dues to the Detroit Federation of Teachers union as a condition of their employment. The fees funded the union's activities that included collective bargaining, contract administration, grievance adjustment, and political lobbying. The teachers opposed public sector collective bargaining, and they accused the union of engaging in political activities that they opposed. The teachers argued that the agency shop fee arrangement between the union and the Detroit Board of Education was a violation of their First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights and wanted it to be declared invalid.[2]
The Michigan Court of Appeals "upheld the constitutionality of the agency-shop clause, and, although recognizing that the expenditure of compulsory service charges to further 'political purposes' unrelated to collective bargaining could violate appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, held that since the complaints had failed to allege that appellants had notified the Union as to those causes and candidates to which they objected, appellants were not entitled to restitution of any portion of the service charges."[2]
Audio
- Audio of oral argument: Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
Outcome
Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously held that non-union public employees could be required to pay labor union fees for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes, as a condition of employment. The court ruled that the union fees were not a violation of the petitioner's First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also ruled that unions could not use non-member dues for ideological or political purposes. The justices wrote, "Insofar as the service charges are used to finance expenditures by the Union for collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes, the agency-shop clause is valid."[1]
Opinion
Justice Potter Stewart authored the opinion of the court. Addressing the First Amendment issue in the case, Stewart wrote,
“ | Although public employee unions' activities are political to the extent they attempt to influence governmental policymaking, the differences in the nature of collective bargaining between the public and private sectors do not mean that a public employee has a weightier First Amendment interest than a private employee in not being compelled to contribute to the costs of exclusive union representation. A public employee who believes that a union representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from expressing his viewpoint, but, besides voting in accordance with his convictions, every public employee is largely free to express his views, in public or private, orally or in writing, and, with some exceptions not pertinent here, is free to participate in the full range of political and ideological activities open to other citizens.
The principles that under the First Amendment an individual should be free to believe as he will and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State, prohibit appellees from requiring any of the appellants to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a public schoolteacher.[3] |
” |
Text of the opinion
- Read the full opinion here.
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "Abood v. Detroit Board of Education" Opinion, May 23, 1997
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Legal Information Institute, "D. Louis ABOOD et al., Appellants, v. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION et al." accessed February 23, 2019
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.