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Haaland v. Brackeen

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Supreme Court of the United States
Haaland v. Brackeen
Term: 2022
Important Dates
Argued: November 9, 2022
Decided: June 15, 2023
Outcome
affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded in part
Vote
7-2
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett • Ketanji Brown Jackson
Concurring
Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito

Haaland v. Brackeen is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 15, 2023, during the court's October 2022-2023 term. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on November 9, 2022. It was consolidated with Cherokee Nation v. Brackeen, Texas v. Haaland, and Brackeen v. Haaland.

In a 7-2 opinion, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded in part the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, holding that ICWA is consistent with the Article I authority of Congress. The Court also rejected the petitioners' claim that ICWA violates the 10th Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine. Regarding the petitioners' equal protection and nondelegation claims, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims because the petitioners did not have the legal standing to present these challenges in court.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), governing the removal of out-of-home placement of American Indian children, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented:
    "1. Whether various provisions of ICWA—namely, the minimum standards of Section 1912(a), (d), (e), and (f ); the placement-preference provisions of Section 1915(a) and (b); and the recordkeeping provisions of Sections 1915(e) and 1951(a)—violate the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.
    "2. Whether the individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge ICWA’s placement preferences for “other Indian families,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3), and for “Indian foster home[s],” 25 U.S.C. 1915(b)(iii).
    "3.Whether Section 1915(a)(3) and (b)(iii) are rationally related to legitimate governmental interests and therefore consistent with equal protection. (II)"[2]
  • The outcome: In a 7-2 opinion, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded in part the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, holding that ICWA is consistent with the Article I authority of Congress. The Court also rejected the petitioners' claim that ICWA violates the 10th Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine. Regarding the petitioners' equal protection and nondelegation claims, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims because the petitioners did not have the legal standing to present these challenges in court.[1]


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.[3]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:


    Background

    The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) established minimum standards for Native American children removed from their families and set placement preferences for those children, with a member of the child's extended family, and a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the child's tribe at the top of the list. As well, the state must keep records of the placement.[2][3][4][5][6]

    In March 2018, the States of Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas, along with seven individuals—non-Native American couples the Brackeens, Cliffords, and Librettis; and Altagracia Socorro Hernandez, the mother of Native American Child "Baby O.", who was ultimately adopted by the Librettis—filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the ICWA. They alleged violations of Article I, the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment, the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, substantive due process, and the non-delegation doctrine. Four tribes—the Cherokee Nation, the Oneida Nation, the Quinault Indian Nation, and the Morongo Band of Mission Indians—intervened as defendants. The U.S. government and tribes moved to dismiss the complaint for a lack of standing. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions to dismiss and affirmed that the plaintiffs had standing. The court also granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs for all of their claims but for the due process claims. The court ruled that the ICWA provisions at issue were unconstitutional.[2][3]

    On appeal, the Navajo Nation was allowed to support the appellants. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Texas' judgment that the plaintiffs had standing, but reversed the grants of summary judgment. Among other things, the court held that the provisions violated the 10th Amendment for imposing duties on the states based on federal law.[2][3]

    Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)

    Section 1901

    The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 reads as follows:[4]

    “ Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people, the Congress finds-



    (1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce * * * with Indian tribes 1" and, through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs;
    (2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources;
    (3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
    (4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
    (5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.1 So in original. Probably should be capitalized.[7]

    		”

    Section 1912

    Relevant to the questions presented in this case, Section 1912(a), (d), (e), and (f) of the ICWA reads as follows::[5]

    “ (a) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings; additional time for preparation

    In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If the identity or location of the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary: Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding. ...

    (d) Remedial services and rehabilitative programs; preventive measures

    Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

    (e) Foster care placement orders; evidence; determination of damage to child

    No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

    (f) Parental rights termination orders; evidence; determination of damage to child

    No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.[7]

    		”

    Section 1915

    Relevant to the questions presented in this case, Section 1915(a), (b), and (e) of the ICWA reads as follows::[6]

    “ (a) Adoptive placements; preferences

    In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.

    (b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences

    Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account any special needs of the child. In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with-

    (i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
    (ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's tribe;
    (iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
    (iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs. ...

    (e) Record of placement; availability

    A record of each such placement, under State law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by the State in which the placement was made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the order of preference specified in this section. Such record shall be made available at any time upon the request of the Secretary or the Indian child's tribe.[7]

    		”

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ 1. Whether various provisions of ICWA—namely, the minimum standards of Section 1912(a), (d), (e), and (f); the placement-preference provisions of Section 1915(a) and (b); and the recordkeeping provisions of Sections 1915(e) and 1951(a)—violate the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.
    2. Whether the individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge ICWA’s placement preferences for “other Indian families,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3), and for “Indian foster home[s],” 25 U.S.C. 1915(b)(iii).
    3.Whether Section 1915(a)(3) and (b)(iii) are rationally related to legitimate governmental interests and therefore consistent with equal protection. (II)[7]     		”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[8]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[9]

    Outcome

    In a 7-2 opinion, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded in part the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, holding that ICWA is consistent with the Article I authority of Congress. The Court also rejected the petitioners' claim that ICWA violates the 10th Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine. Regarding the petitioners' equal protection and nondelegation claims, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims because the petitioners did not have the legal standing to present these challenges in court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett delivered the opinion of the court.[1][10]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote:[1]

    “

    This case is about children who are among the most vulnerable: those in the child welfare system. In the usual course, state courts apply state law when placing children in foster or adoptive homes. But when the child is an Indian, a federal statute—the Indian Child Welfare Act—governs. Among other things, this law requires a state court to place an Indian child with an Indian caretaker, if one is available. That is so even if the child is already living with a non-Indian family and the state court thinks it in the child’s best interest to stay there.

    Before us, a birth mother, foster and adoptive parents, and the State of Texas challenge the Act on multiple constitutional grounds. They argue that it exceeds federal authority, infringes state sovereignty, and discriminates on the basis of race. The United States, joined by several Indian Tribes, defends the law. The issues are complicated— so for the details, read on. But the bottom line is that we reject all of petitioners’ challenges to the statute, some on the merits and others for lack of standing. [7]

    		”
    —Justice Amy Coney Barrett

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson who joined as to Parts I and III.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    “

    In affirming the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Court safeguards the ability of tribal members to raise their children free from interference by state authorities and other outside parties. In the process, the Court also goes a long way toward restoring the original balance between federal, state, and tribal powers the Constitution envisioned. I am pleased to join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to add some historical context. To appreciate fully the significance of today’s decision requires an understanding of the long line of policies that drove Congress to adopt ICWA. And to appreciate why that law surely comports with the Constitution requires a bird’s-eye view of how our founding document mediates between competing federal, state, and tribal claims of sovereignty.[7]

    		”
    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:[1]

    “

    I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to emphasize that the Court today does not address or decide the equal protection issue that can arise when the Indian Child Welfare Act is applied in individual foster care or adoption proceedings. See ante, at 29, 32, n. 10. As the Court explains, the plaintiffs in this federal-court suit against federal parties lack standing to raise the equal protection issue. So the equal protection issue remains undecided.[7]

    		”
    —Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

    In his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “

    The Constitution confers enumerated powers on the Federal Government. Not one of them supports ICWA. Nor does precedent. To the contrary, this Court has never upheld a federal statute that regulates the noncommercial activities of a U. S. citizen residing on lands under the sole jurisdiction of States merely because he happens to be an Indian. But that is exactly what ICWA does: It regulates child custody proceedings, brought in state courts, for those who need never have set foot on Indian lands. It is not about tribal lands or tribal governments, commerce, treaties, or federal property. It therefore fails equally under the Court’s precedents as it fails under the plain text and original meaning of the Constitution. If there is one saving grace to today’s decision, it is that the majority holds only that Texas has failed to demonstrate that ICWA is unconstitutional. See ante, at 15, 17. It declines to disturb the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that ICWA is consistent with Article I, but without deciding that ICWA is, in fact, consistent with Article I. But, given ICWA’s patent intrusion into the normal domain of state government and clear departure from the Federal Government’s enumerated powers, I would hold that Congress lacked any authority to enact ICWA.[7]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Samuel Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

    In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote:[1]

    “

    I am sympathetic to the challenges that tribes face in maintaining membership and preserving their cultures. And I do not question the idea that the best interests of children may in some circumstances take into account a desire to enable children to maintain a connection with the culture of their ancestors. The Constitution provides Congress with many means for promoting such interests. But the Constitution does not permit Congress to displace long-exercised state authority over child custody proceedings to advance those interests at the expense of vulnerable children and their families. Because I would hold that Congress lacked authority to enact the challenged ICWA provisions, I respectfully dissent. [7]

    		”
    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2022-2023

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2022-2023

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 3, 2022. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[11]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 U.S. Supreme Court, “Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Brackeen et al,” “Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit”, accessed June 15, 2023
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 U.S. Supreme Court, "HAALAND V. BRACKEEN: PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI," filed September 3, 2021
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, Brackeen v. Haaland, decided April 6, 2021
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 United States Code, "25 U.S.C. § 1901," accessed March 4, 2022
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 United States Code, "25 U.S.C. § 1912," accessed March 4, 2022
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 United States Code, "25 U.S.C. § 1915," accessed March 4, 2022
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    8. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued November 9, 2022
    9. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued November 9, 2022
    10. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Supreme Court upholds Indian Child Welfare Act," accessed June 15, 2023
    11. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed January 24, 2022
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