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United States v. Sineneng-Smith

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Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Sineneng-Smith
Term: 2019
Important Dates
Argument: February 25, 2020
Decided: May 7, 2020
Outcome
vacated and remanded
Vote
9-0
Majority
Ruth Bader GinsburgChief Justice John G. RobertsStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorElena KaganNeil GorsuchBrett Kavanaugh
Concurring
Clarence Thomas


United States v. Sineneng-Smith is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on February 25, 2020, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.

The court vacated the decision of the 9th Circuit and remanded the case in a 9-0 ruling, holding that the 9th Circuit's "drastic departure" from the principle of party presentation, as set forth by Greenlaw v. United States, by reaching to decide a question that was not raised by the respondent in the case constituted an abuse of discretion.[1][2][3] Click here for more information.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Evelyn Sineneng-Smith was convicted on two counts of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for financial gain. The Northern District of California sentenced Sineneng-Smith to 18 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The government petitioned SCOTUS for review, arguing the 9th Circuit "invalidated an Act of Congress on its face."[4]
  • The issue: Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional.[4]
  • The outcome: The court vacated the judgment of the 9th Circuit and remanded the case in a 9-0 ruling, holding that the 9th Circuit's departure from the principle of party presentation, as set forth by Greenlaw v. United States, by reaching to decide a question that was not raised by the respondent in the case constituted an abuse of discretion.

  • You can review the lower court's opinion here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • May 7, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 9th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case.
    • February 25, 2020: Oral argument
    • October 4, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • July 12, 2019: The United States, the petitioner, filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • December 4, 2018: The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and vacated in part the Northern District of California's ruling.

    Background

    Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were individuals who came to the country without legal documentation who wished to obtain legal work authorization or become lawful permanent residents. Sineneng-Smith signed retainer agreements with her clients that said she would help the client "to obtain permanent residence through Labor Certification." The United States' Labor Certification process expired April 30, 2001, and individuals who arrived after December 21, 2000, were not eligible to apply. Sineneng-Smith continued to sign retainer agreements with clients even though she knew the program had expired.[5]

    In 2010, a grand jury indicted Sineneng-Smith on 10 counts, including three counts violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)— "encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law." Sineneng-Smith moved to dismiss the charges, arguing Subsection (iv) was "impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment" and violated the First Amendment.[5]

    A jury found Sineneng-Smith guilty of two counts of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). The Northern District of California sentenced Sineneng-Smith to 18 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.[4]

    The government petitioned SCOTUS for review, arguing the 9th Circuit "invalidated an Act of Congress on its face."[4]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Questions presented:
    • Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional.[4]

    Outcome

    In a unanimous opinion, the court vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the 9th Circuit's "drastic departure" from the principle of party presentation, as set forth by Greenlaw v. United States, by reaching to decide a question that was not raised by the respondent in the case constituted an abuse of discretion.[1][2][3]

    Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.[1]

    Opinion

    In her opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote:[1]

    This case concerns 8 U.S.C. §1324, which makes it a federal felony to "encourag[e] or induc[e] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of the law." §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). The crime carries an enhanced penalty if “done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” §1324(a)(1)(B)(i). ...


    On appeal from the §1324 convictions to the Ninth Circuit, both on brief and at oral argument, Sineneng-Smith essentially repeated the arguments she earlier presented to the District Court. See Brief for Appellant in No. 15--10614 (CA9), pp. 11–28. The case was then moved by the appeals panel onto a different track. Instead of adjudicating the case presented by the parties, the appeals court named three amici and invited them to brief and argue issues framed by the panel, including a question Sineneng-Smith herself never raised earlier: "[W]hether the statute of conviction is overbroad . . . under the First Amendment." App. 122–124. In the ensuing do over of the appeal, counsel for the parties were assigned a secondary role. The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded, in accord with the invited amici's arguments, that §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. 910 F. 3d 461, 485 (2018). The Government petitioned for our review because the judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidated a federal statute. Pet. for Cert. 24. We granted the petition. 588 U. S. ___ (2019).

    As developed more completely hereinafter, we now hold that the appeals panel departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We therefore vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remand the case for an adjudication of the appeal attuned to the case shaped by the parties rather than the case designed by the appeals panel.

    In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation. As this Court stated in Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008), "in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal . . ., we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present." Id., at 243. ...

    In short: “[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government.” United States v. Samuels, 808 F. 2d 1298, 1301 (CA8 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh'g en banc)). They "do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.” Ibid.

    The party presentation principle is supple, not ironclad. There are no doubt circumstances in which a modest initiating role for a court is appropriate. ... But this case scarcely fits that bill.[6]

    —Justice Ginsburg

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    I agree with the Court that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in reaching out to decide whether 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. In my view, however, the Court of Appeals' decision violates far more than the party presentation rule. The merits of that decision also highlight the troubling nature of this Court's overbreadth doctrine. That doctrine provides that "a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a 'substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'" United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n. 6 (2008)). Although I have previously joined the Court in applying this doctrine, I have since developed doubts about its origins and application. It appears that the overbreadth doctrine lacks any basis in the Constitution's text, violates the usual standard for facial challenges, and contravenes traditional standing principles. I would therefore consider revisiting this doctrine in an appropriate case. ...


    The overbreadth doctrine appears to be the handiwork of judges, based on the misguided “notion that some constitutional rights demand preferential treatment." Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 14). It seemingly lacks any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment, relaxes the traditional standard for facial challenges, and violates Article III principles regarding judicial power and standing. In an appropriate case, we should consider revisiting this doctrine.[6]

    —Justice Thomas

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes