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Torres v. Madrid

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Supreme Court of the United States
Torres v. Madrid
Term: 2020-2021
(Originally 2019-2020)
Important Dates
Argument: October 14, 2020
(Postponed from March 30, 2020)
Decided: March 25, 2021
Outcome
Vacated and remanded
Vote
5-3
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Brett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Neil Gorsuch • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito

Torres v. Madrid is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on October 14, 2020, during the court's October 2020-2021 term.

In a 5-3 ruling, the court vacated the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that using physical force on an individual with the intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the individual does not submit and is not subdued. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

Oral argument was initially scheduled for March 30, 2020, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. However, the U.S. Supreme Court announced on March 16 that it was postponing the 11 oral arguments originally scheduled during its March sitting. In a press release, the court said the delay was "in keeping with public health precautions recommended in response to COVID-19."[2] COVID-19 was the abbreviation for coronavirus disease 2019, caused by SARS-CoV-2.

  • Click here for more information about the court's response to the coronavirus pandemic.
  • Click here for more information about political responses to the pandemic.
HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: New Mexico state police officers Richard Williamson and Janice Madrid attempted to serve an arrest warrant on an individual at an Albuquerque apartment complex. Roxanne Torres was in the parking lot at the apartment complex. She was not the suspect the officers were pursuing. The officers approached Torres' vehicle to discover her identity. Thinking the police were carjackers, Torres got in her car and attempted to drive away. The officers shot her twice. Torres drove from the scene and was treated at a hospital for her injuries. Torres was arrested and pleaded no contest to three crimes related to the event. Torres filed a civil complaint against the officers in U.S. district court claiming they had used excessive force and violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that there had been no seizure because the detention was unsuccessful–i.e. Torres left the scene. The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, joining an existing circuit split on the legal question at issue.
  • The issue: The case concerned a claim of excessive force against police officers and whether the use of physical force to restrain a person constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
  • The questions presented: "Is an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the Eighth; Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court hold, or must physical force be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a "seizure," as the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals hold?"[3]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 10th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.[4] You can review the lower court's opinion here.[5]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    On July 15, 2014, New Mexico state police officers Richard Williamson and Janice Madrid went to an Albuquerque apartment complex to serve an arrest warrant on an individual suspected of involvement with organized crime. The officers observed two individuals standing in front of the building and next to a Toyota FJ Cruiser backed into a spot in the parking lot. The officers approached the vehicle to assess whether or not one of the individuals was the suspect. Neither person was the suspect. One of the individuals was Roxanne Torres, who had dropped off a friend at the apartment building. Torres entered the vehicle and started the engine. Torres later testified that she was unaware that Madrid and Williamson were police officers and that she thought they were carjackers. She also testified that she had been under the influence of methamphetamine during the interaction with the officers. The officers approached the vehicle to discover Torres' identity. Torres put the car into drive. Madrid and Williamson drew their firearms and ordered Torres to stop. Torres pressed the gas pedal and the officers discharged their firearms once the vehicle moved forward. Officers Madrid and Williamson testified that they fired at the driver to stop the driver from hitting Madrid with the vehicle and out of fear of injury. Torres was struck by two bullets.[4][5]

    Torres drove onto a nearby street and struck another vehicle. Torres stopped in a parking lot and exited the FJ Cruiser. Torres testified that she was still feeling the effects of the methamphetamine, laid down on the ground, and asked a bystander to call the police but did not want to wait for the police to arrive since she had an outstanding arrest warrant. Torres stole a nearby Kia Soul and drove 75 miles to a hospital in Grants, New Mexico. Torres was airlifted to a hospital in Albuquerque and was arrested on July 16, 2014. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: aggravated fleeing from a police officer, assaulting a police officer, and unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.[5]

    In October 2016, Torres filed a civil rights complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Officers Madrid and Williamson, asserting claims of excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. The court interpreted the complaint as asserting excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. The court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that since the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting the Fourth Amendment had not been violated.[5][6]

    On appeal, the 10th Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that because the officers were not able to detain Torres by using physical force, the action was not considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.[5]

    Elsewhere, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, 9th Circuit, 11th Circuit, and New Mexico Supreme Court had previously held that any attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to detain a subject with physical force was considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, like the 10th Circuit in Torres, held a differing view–that the attempt had to be successful in order to be considered a seizure. The differing rulings by the courts of appeal created a circuit split.

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[3]

    Questions presented:
    “ Is an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the Eighth; Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court hold, or must physical force be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a "seizure," as the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals hold?[7] ”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[8]



    Transcript

    Outcome

    In a 5-3 ruling, the court vacated the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that using physical force on an individual with the intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the individual does not submit and is not subdued. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.[1]

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:[1]

    “ The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable "seizures" to safeguard “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons." Under our cases, an officer seizes a person when he uses force to apprehend her. The question in this case is whether a seizure occurs when an officer shoots someone who temporarily eludes capture after the shooting. The answer is yes: The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.

    ... We largely covered this ground in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). There we interpreted the term "seizure" by consulting the common law of arrest, the 'quintessential 'seizure of the person' under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id., at 624. As Justice Scalia explained for himself and six other Members of the Court, the common law treated "the mere grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority" as an arrest, "whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee." Ibid.; see id., at 625 ...

    ... The rule we announce today is narrow. In addition to the requirement of intent to restrain, a seizure by force—absent submission—lasts only as long as the application of force. ... The fleeting nature of some seizures by force undoubtedly may inform what damages a civil plaintiff may recover, and what evidence a criminal defendant may exclude from trial. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 4). But brief seizures are seizures all the same.

    ... In place of the rule that the application of force completes an arrest even if the arrestee eludes custody, the officers would introduce a single test for all types of seizures: intentional acquisition of control. This alternative rule is inconsistent with the history of the Fourth Amendment and our cases.

    ... In any event, the officers and the dissent misapprehend the history of the Fourth Amendment by minimizing the role of practices in civil cases. “[A]rrests in civil suits were still common in America" at the founding. Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76, 83 (1934). And questions regarding the legality of an arrest "typically arose in civil damages actions for trespass or false arrest.” Payton, 445 U. S., at 592. Accordingly, this Court has not hesitated to rely on such decisions when interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405 (2012); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886). We see no reason to break with our settled approach in this case.

    ... The officers and the dissent derive from our cases a different touchstone for the seizure of a person: “an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989). Under their alternative rule, the use of force becomes a seizure “only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Id., at 597 (emphasis deleted); see Brief for Respondents 12–15; post, at 6–7. This approach improperly erases the distinction between seizures by control and seizures by force. In all fairness, we too have not always been attentive to this distinction when a case did not implicate the issue. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U. S. 249, 254 (2007). But each type of seizure enjoys a separate common law pedigree that gives rise to a separate rule. See Hodari D., 499 U. S., at 624–625; A. Cornelius, The Law of Search and Seizure §47, pp. 163–164 (2d ed. 1930) (contrasting actual control with “constructive detention” by touching).

    ... The dissent argues that we advance a "schizophrenic reading of the word 'seizure.'" Post, at 7. But our cases demonstrate the unremarkable proposition that the nature of a seizure can depend on the nature of the object being seized. It is not surprising that the concept of constructive detention or the mere-touch rule developed in the context of seizures of a person–capable of fleeing and with an interest in doing so–rather than seizures of "houses, papers, and effects."

    The dissent also criticizes us for “posit[ing] penumbras” of “privacy” and “personal security” in our analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Post, at 24. But the text of the Fourth Amendment expressly guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons," and our earliest precedents recognized privacy as the “essence” of the Amendment—not some penumbral emanation. Boyd, 116 U. S., at 630. We have relied on that understanding in construing the meaning of the Amendment. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 403 (2014).

    The dissent speculates that the real reason for today’s decision is an “impulse” to provide relief to Torres, post, at 23, or maybe a desire “to make life easier for ourselves,” post, at 22. It may even be, says the dissent, that the Court “at least hopes to be seen as trying” to achieve particular goals. Post, at 25. There is no call for such surmise. At the end of the day we simply agree with the analysis of the common law of arrest and its relation to the Fourth Amendment set forth thirty years ago by Justice Scalia, joined by six of his colleagues, rather than the competing view urged by the dissent today.

    We hold that the application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued. Of course, a seizure is just the first step in the analysis. The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all or even most seizures—only unreasonable ones. All we decide today is that the officers seized Torres by shooting her with intent to restrain her movement .We leave open on remand any questions regarding the reasonableness of the seizure, the damages caused by the seizure, and the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity.

    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[7]

    		”
    —Chief Justice John Roberts

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.[1]

    In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    “ The majority holds that a criminal suspect can be simultaneously seized and roaming at large. On the majority's account, a Fourth Amendment "seizure" takes place whenever an officer "merely touches" a suspect. It's a seizure even if the suspect refuses to stop, evades capture, and rides off into the sunset never to be seen again. That view is as mistaken as it is novel.


    Until today, a Fourth Amendment “seizure” has required taking possession of someone or something. To reach its contrary judgment, the majority must conflate a seizure with its attempt and confuse an arrest with a battery. In the process, too, the majority must disregard the Constitution's original and ordinary meaning, dispense with our conventional interpretive rules, and bypass the main currents of the common law. Unable to rely on any of these traditional sources of authority, the majority is left to lean on (really, repurpose) an abusive and long-abandoned English debt-collection practice. But there is a reason why, in two centuries filled with litigation over the Fourth Amendment's meaning, this Court has never before adopted the majority's definition of a "seizure." Neither the Constitution nor common sense can sustain it.

    ... To rule as it does, the majority must endow the term "seizure" with two different meanings at the same time. It must disregard the dominant rule of the common law. It must disparage this Court's existing case law for erasing distinctions that never existed. It cannot even guarantee that its new rule will offer great efficiencies or meaningfully vindicate the penumbral promises it supposes. Instead, we are asked to skip from one snippet to another, finally landing on a long-abandoned debt-collection practice that must be reengineered to do the work the majority wishes done. Our final destination confuses a battery for a seizure and an attempted seizure with its completion. All this is miles from where the standard principles of interpretation lead and just as far from the Constitution's original meaning. And for what? A new rule that may seem tempting at first blush, but that offers those like Ms. Torres little more than false hope in the end.

    Respectfully, I dissent.[7]

    		”
    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2020-2021

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 5, 2020. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[9]

    The court issued 67 opinions during its 2020-2021 term. Two cases were decided in one consolidated opinion. Ten cases were decided without argument. Click here for more information on the court's opinions.

    The court agreed to hear 62 cases during its 2020-2021 term. Of those, 12 were originally scheduled for the 2019-2020 term but were delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Five cases were removed from the argument calendar.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Supreme Court of the United States, Torres v. Madrid, decided March 25, 2021
    2. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Press release from March 16, 2020," accessed March 16, 2020
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "19-292 TORRES V. MADRID: Questions Presented:," accessed March 25, 2021
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 SCOTUSblog, "Torres v. Madrid," accessed December 18, 2019
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, "Torres v. Madrid," accessed December 18, 2019
    6. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institution, "Qualified immunity," accessed March 25, 2021
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    8. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed October 19, 2020
    9. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court," accessed April 20, 2015
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