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Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C.

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Supreme Court of the United States
Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C.
Term: 2021
Important Dates
Argued: October 12, 2021
Decided March 3, 2022
Outcome
Reversed and remanded
Vote
8-1
Majority
Samuel Alito • Chief Justice John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Stephen Breyer • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Clarence Thomas • Elena Kagan • Stephen Breyer
Dissenting
Sonia Sotomayor

Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 3, 2022, during the court's October 2021-2022 term. The case was argued before the court on October 12, 2021.

In an 8-1 ruling, the court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the 6th Circuit erred in denying Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron's motion to intervene and defend the statewide law criminalizing the performance of the dilation and evacuation abortion method ("D&E").[1]

Justice Samuel Alito authored the court's majority opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: In 2018, Kentucky enacted a statewide law criminalizing the performance of the dilation and evacuation abortion method ("D&E"). EMW Women's Surgical Center ("EMW"), the only licensed outpatient abortion facility in Kentucky, challenged the constitutionality of the law in U.S. district court, claiming it effectively banned D&E's and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of a person's right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973). The district court ruled in EMW's favor and invalidated the law. On appeal, Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit if he could join the case to defend the law. The court rejected the request and affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the Kentucky law placed an undue burden on all individuals that it restricted. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The issues: The case concerned whether a state official may intervene in a case to defend an invalidated state law. The Kentucky law generally banned the dilation and evacuation abortion method used in the second trimester of a pregnancy.
  • The questions presented: "Whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law."[2]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.[3]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    The dilation and evacuation method of abortion ("D&E") is a standard method of abortion used in the second trimester of a pregnancy, accounting for 95% of second-trimester abortion procedures performed nationwide.[3]

    On April 10, 2018, the Kentucky House of Representatives signed House Bill 454 into law, criminalizing a physician's performance of a D&E unless the fetus dies before removal from the uterus. The law did not provide alternatives for patients seeking a D&E, nor for physicians seeking to perform the procedure. Violations of the law were classed as felony offenses for which providers may receive up to five years imprisonment and adverse licensing and disciplinary action.[3]

    Also on April 10, EMW Women's Surgical Center ("EMW"), Kentucky's only licensed outpatient abortion facility, and its two obstetrician-gynecologists Dr. Ashlee Bergin and Dr. Tanya Franklin filed a lawsuit with the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky to challenge the law's legality. EMW claimed the law was unconstitutional on its face because it effectively banned the D&E and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protecting a person's right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973). EMW argued that the law should be struck down. State officials argued that the law did not ban D&E abortions by requiring a fetal demise procedure first. EMW responded that the procedures required were not feasible as alternatives to D&Es. On May 8, 2019, the district court ruled in favor of EMW and struck down the state law, holding that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by placing an undue burden on one's right to elect an abortion prior to viability.[3]

    State officials appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. On appeal, Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron asked the court permission to join the case in order to defend the state law. The 6th Circuit rejected the request and affirmed the Western District of Kentucky's ruling, invalidating the law.[3][4]

    In October 2020, Cameron petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review, asking whether he should be allowed the join the case and for the case to be remanded to the 6th Circuit for reconsideration due to the Supreme Court's ruling in June Medical Services LLC v. Russo. On March 29, 2021, SCOTUS accepted the case and limited its review to the first question presented only.[2]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ Whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law.
    And if so, whether the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration in light of June Medical.[5]     		”


    The U.S. Supreme Court limited its review in the case to the first question presented.[2]

    Oral argument

    The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case on October 12, 2021. Matthew F. Kuhn, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Frankfort, Kentucky, argued on behalf of the petitioner. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, Esq., New York, New York, argued on behalf of the respondents.[6]

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Outcome

    In an 8-1 ruling, the court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the 6th Circuit erred in denying Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron's motion to intervene and defend the statewide law criminalizing the performance of the dilation and evacuation abortion method ("D&E"). Justice Samuel Alito authored the court's majority opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito wrote:[1]

    “ ... In considering this question, we begin with respondents’ contention that the attorney general’s motion to intervene was jurisdictionally barred. Respondents never advanced this argument below, and the Sixth Circuit did not consider it. Nevertheless, we must assure ourselves that jurisdictional requirements are met at all stages of the cases that come before us for review, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 506 (2006). ...


    ... Having concluded that neither a jurisdictional requirement nor a mandatory claims-processing rule barred consideration of the attorney general’s motion, we turn to the question whether the Court of Appeals properly denied that motion. No statute or rule provides a general standard to apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure make only one passing reference to intervention, and that reference concerns the review of agency action. See Rule 15(d); Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l, AFL–CIO v. Donovan, 771 F. 2d 1551, 1553, n. 3 (CADC 1985). Without any rule that governs appellate intervention, we have looked elsewhere for guidance. Thus we have considered the “policies underlying intervention” in the district courts, Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 217, n. 10 (1965), including the legal “interest” that a party seeks to “protect” through intervention on appeal. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). ...

    ... Respondents advance one additional argument on the issue of prejudice. They claim that intervention would unfairly deprive them of a “reasonable expectation” stemming from Governor Beshear’s election. Brief for Respondents 31. Respondents contend that Governor Beshear had a “history of refusing to defend abortion restrictions” and that they therefore reasonably thought that the secretary, who was appointed by the Governor, would not pursue “extraordinary forms of relief if they prevailed in their appeal.” Ibid.

    The loss of this sort of claimed expectation does not amount to unfair prejudice in the sense relevant here. Respondents may have hoped that the new Governor would appoint a secretary who would give up the defense of HB 454, but they had no legally cognizable expectation that the secretary he chose or the newly elected attorney general would do so before all available forms of review had been exhausted.

    For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene. That court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[5]

    		”
    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “ I join the opinion of the Court. I write to address another reason why respondents and their amici err in maintaining that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Attorney General Cameron’s motion to intervene. ...


    The Office of the Kentucky Attorney General was not a named “party” to the District Court’s final judgment. The attorney general, accordingly, could not notice an appeal from that judgment under Rules 3 and 4. And because the attorney general could not appeal the District Court’s judgment, Attorney General Cameron moved to intervene and pursue “the requisite method for a nonparty to become a party to a lawsuit.” Eisenstein, 556 U.S., at 933. Far from evading the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, Cameron’s motion to intervene was his only legitimate option to both comply with those Rules and participate in the appeal as a party. For this reason, as well as those given in the opinion of the Court, respondents’ jurisdictional argument fails[5]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Kagan

    Justice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer.

    In her concurring opinion, Justice Kagan wrote:[1]

    “ I agree with the Court that the Sixth Circuit should have allowed the attorney general to intervene in this suit after another state official ceased defending the challenged Kentucky law. And my reasons for reaching that conclusion partly overlap with the Court’s. But I would differently frame and respond to the serious threshold issue that respondent EMW raises. I also see no need to rely on “constitutional considerations” to resolve the intervention question before us. Ante, at 7 (opinion of the Court). ...


    ... In my view, the attorney general’s motion to intervene was not an end-run around the timely-appeal rule. And with that issue out of the way, this is a textbook case for intervention. The Sixth Circuit should have allowed the attorney general to step into the litigation to defend the challenged law.[5]

    		”
    —Justice Elena Kagan

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

    In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:[1]

    “ In every case, there must be a “point of time when litigation shall be at an end.” Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). To effectuate that endpoint, our legal system requires parties to abide by representations made in a lawsuit regardless of later regrets. In this case, the attorney general of Kentucky stipulated to his own dismissal as a party in the District Court and agreed to have another official represent Kentucky’s interests. Only years later, and after the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment, did the attorney general ask the Court of Appeals to allow him to return based on a position he had disavowed when securing his dismissal earlier in the litigation. The Court of Appeals refused his request to intervene.


    Generally, the decision whether to permit intervention in a case is left to the “sound discretion” of the court in which intervention is sought, as that court is the best positioned to assess potential inefficiencies and unfairness that might result. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). The Court acknowledges that highly deferential standard, but nonetheless bends over backward to accommodate the attorney general’s reentry into the case. I fear today’s decision will open the floodgates for government officials to evade the consequences of litigation decisions made by their predecessors of different political parties, undermining finality and upsetting the settled expectations of courts, litigants, and the public alike. I respectfully dissent.[5]

    		”
    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2021-2022

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2021-2022

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 4, 2021. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[8]

    The court agreed to hear 68 cases during its 2021-2022 term.[9] Four cases were dismissed and one case was removed from the argument calendar.[10]

    The court issued decisions in 66 cases during its 2021-2022 term. Three cases were decided without argument. Between 2007 and 2021, SCOTUS released opinions in 1,128 cases, averaging 75 cases per year.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 U.S. Supreme Court, Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., decided March 3, 2022
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 U.S. Supreme Court, "20-601 CAMERON V. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER: Questions presented," accessed March 29, 2021
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Friedlander, decided June 2, 2020
    4. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Justices to decide whether Kentucky attorney general can defend abortion law," March 29, 2021
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. - Argument transcript," October 12, 2021
    7. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed October 12, 2021
    8. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed February 4, 2021
    9. ↑ Consolidated cases are counted as one case for purposes of this number.
    10. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Order List: 593 U.S.," May 17, 2021
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