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BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

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Supreme Court of the United States
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
Term: 2020
Important Dates
Argument: January 19, 2021
Decided: May 17, 2021
Outcome
Vacated and remanded
Vote
7-1
Majority
Neil Gorsuch • Chief Justice John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Stephen Breyer • Elena Kagan • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting
Sonia Sotomayor

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore is a case that was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on January 19, 2021, during the court's October 2020-2021 term.

The court vacated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings in a 7-1 opinion, holding that the 4th Circuit erred in its holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all of the defendants' grounds for removal under §1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Samuel Alito recused himself from the case and took no part in its consideration or decision.[1][2] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland ("Baltimore") filed a claim and sought relief in state court against 26 multinational oil and gas companies, alleging that the companies contributed to and were responsible in part for climate change and that the companies' actions caused injury to Baltimore. Two of the companies filed to move the case to federal court, claiming that the issues raised concerned and were governed by federal law. Baltimore filed a motion to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted Baltimore's remand request and denied the companies' removal request. The companies appealed to the 4th Circuit and the court affirmed the district court's ruling granting Baltimore's remand request.
  • The issues: The case concerned the authority of a court of appeals to review issues in removal orders.
  • The questions presented: "Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443."[3]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.[4]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    Procedural background

    In July 2018, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland ("Baltimore") filed suit in state court against 26 multinational oil and gas companies, claiming that the companies contributed to and were responsible in part for climate change. Baltimore specifically alleged that the companies engaged in an organized, multi-faceted effort to hide the direct link between fossil fuel use and global warming, to discredit publicly available scientific evidence, and actively attempted to undermine public support for regulation of the companies' business practices, while promoting unrestricted and expanded use of the companies' fossil fuel products. Baltimore stated that it had experienced "climate change-related injuries" as a result of this conduct, citing rising sea levels, extreme precipitation, floods, heatwaves, droughts, and storms. Baltimore's complaint asserted eight causes of action founded on Maryland law.[5] Baltimore sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief, and did not seek to impose liabilities on the companies for their actions or to restrain them from engaging in the operations of their respective businesses.[4]

    Two of the companies, Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ("Chevron"), moved for the case to be removed from state court to federal court, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, under 28 U.S.C. 1441 and 28 U.S.C. 1442. Chevron argued that Baltimore's claims arose under federal law because they were governed by federal law, disputed issues of federal law under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, were preempted in total by the Clean Air Act and the foreign affairs doctrine, and were based on conduct or injuries occurring on federal areas.[6] Baltimore filed a motion to remand the case back to state court under 28 U.S.C. 1447. The district court granted Baltimore's motion for remand and rejected Chevron's claims in support of removal.[4]

    The companies appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit and filed a motion with the district court to stay the execution of the remand order to state court pending the results of the appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States also denied the companies' application for a stay. On appeal, the 4th Circuit held that it only had jurisdiction to review the district court's judgment that removal to federal court was improper under the federal officer removal statute, and affirmed the District of Maryland's ruling.[4]

    On March 31, 2020, the companies petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for review of the case.[3] On October 2, 2020, the court granted review.


    Legal definitions

    Federal laws at issue

    28 U.S.C. 1441

    The following is a quotation of United States Code, Title 28, Section 1441, also known as the general removal statute:[7]

    “ (a) GENERALLY.-Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.[8] ”
    —28 U.S.C. 1441
    28 U.S.C. 1442

    The following is a quotation of United States Code, Title 28, Section 1442, "Federal officers or agencies sued or prosecuted":[9]

    “ (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
    (1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
    (2) A property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States.
    (3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties;
    (4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for or relating to any act in the discharge of his official duty under an order of such House.

    (b) A personal action commenced in any State court by an alien against any citizen of a State who is, or at the time the alleged action accrued was, a civil officer of the United States and is a nonresident of such State, wherein jurisdiction is obtained by the State court by personal service of process, may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division in which the defendant was served with process.

    (c) Solely for purposes of determining the propriety of removal under subsection (a), a law enforcement officer, who is the defendant in a criminal prosecution, shall be deemed to have been acting under the color of his office if the officer—

    (1) protected an individual in the presence of the officer from a crime of violence;
    (2) provided immediate assistance to an individual who suffered, or who was threatened with, bodily harm; or
    (3) prevented the escape of any individual who the officer reasonably believed to have committed, or was about to commit, in the presence of the officer, a crime of violence that resulted in, or was likely to result in, death or serious bodily injury.

    (d) In this section, the following definitions apply:

    (1) The terms “civil action” and “criminal prosecution” include any proceeding (whether or not ancillary to another proceeding) to the extent that in such proceeding a judicial order, including a subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or issued. If removal is sought for a proceeding described in the previous sentence, and there is no other basis for removal, only that proceeding may be removed to the district court.
    (2) The term “crime of violence” has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18.
    (3) The term “law enforcement officer” means any employee described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 8401(17) of title 5 and any special agent in the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State.
    (4) The term “serious bodily injury” has the meaning given that term in section 1365 of title 18.
    (5) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, United States territories and insular possessions, and Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title 18).
    (6) The term “State court” includes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, a court of a United States territory or insular possession, and a tribal court.[8]
    		 ”
    —28 U.S.C. 1442
    28 U.S.C. 1443

    The following is a quotation of United States Code, Title 28, Section 1443, "Civil rights cases":[10]

    “ Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

    (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

    (2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.[8]

    		”
    —28 U.S.C. 1443
    28 U.S.C. 1447

    The following is a quotation of United States Code, Title 28, Section 1447, "Procedure after removal generally":[11][12]

    “ (c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.


    (d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.[8]

    		”
    —28 U.S.C. 1447

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[3]

    Questions presented:
    • "Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court where the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443."

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[13]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[14]

    Outcome

    The court vacated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings in a 7-1 opinion, holding that the 4th Circuit erred in its holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all of the defendants' grounds for removal under §1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Samuel Alito recused himself from the case and took no part in its consideration or decision.[1][2]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    “ Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under §1447(d). Pp. 4–14.


    (a) The ordinary meaning of §1447(d)’s text permits appellate review of the district court’s entire remand order when a defendant relies on §1442 or §1443 as a ground for removal. The relevant portion of §1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal.” The “order remanding a case” here rejected all of the defendants’ grounds for removal because (subject to exceptions not applicable here) the district court was not at liberty to remove the City’s case from its docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to entertain the suit. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 356; see also Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72 (“[C]ourts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction” assigned to them). And this case was removed “pursuant to” §1442 because the defendants relied on §1442 as a ground for removal when satisfying the requirements of §1446. It makes no difference that the defendants removed the case “pursuant to” multiple federal statutes. The general removal statute contemplates this possibility when it speaks of actions “removed solely under” the diversity jurisdiction statute. §1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). And §1447(d) contains no comparable language limiting appellate review to cases removed solely under §1442 or §1443. The parties’ dueling observations that Congress knows how to authorize appellate courts to review every issue in a remand order, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3595(c)(1), and that Congress also knows how to limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather than the whole “order,” see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(7), confirms the wisdom of focusing on the language Congress did employ. The City’s novel contention that the defendants never really removed the case pursuant to §1442 because no federal court here held that the statute indeed authorized removal is mistaken and has never been adopted by any court. Pp. 4– 8.

    (b) The Court’s most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, resolves any remaining doubt about the best reading of §1447(d). That case involved a dispute about the meaning of §1292(b)—a statute allowing a district court to certify “an order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a controlling question of law.” The Court held that the statute’s grant of appellate review for the “order,” meant the entire order was reviewable, not just the part of the order containing the “controlling question of law.” Id., at 205. The City suggests that the statute’s use of the word “involves” shows that the reviewable issues on appeal can be broader than the certified question. But nothing in Yamaha turned on the presence of the word “involves.” Instead, as here, the Court focused on the statute’s use of the word “order.” The Court’s decisions in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, and United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, do not support the City because both decisions were driven by concerns unique to their statutory contexts; their reasoning is not easily generalizable to other jurisdictional statutes; and neither comes nearly as close to the mark as Yamaha. The Court’s decisions in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U. S. 635, and Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336—which permitted rather than foreclosed appellate review of certain remand orders—similarly do not help the City’s cause because they say nothing about the part of §1447(d) at issue today. Finally, the City argues that, when Congress amended §1447(d) to add the exception for federal officer removal under §1442 to the existing exception for civil rights cases under §1443, Congress ratified lower court decisions that had read the prior version of §1447(d) as permitting review only of the part of the remand order addressing §1443’s civil rights removal ground. It is most unlikely that a smattering of lower court opinions could ever represent a “broad and unquestioned” judicial consensus that Congress must have been aware of and is presumed to have endorsed. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349. And it certainly cannot do so where, as here, “the text and structure of the statute are to the contrary.” Id., at 352. Pp. 8–12.

    (c) The City’s policy arguments do not alter the result because “even the most formidable” policy arguments cannot “overcome” a clear statutory directive, Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 56, n.4. While the City argues that allowing exceptions to the bar on appellate review of remand orders will impair judicial efficiency, that is the balance that Congress struck for cases removed pursuant to §1442 or §1443. And allowing full appellate review may actually help expedite some cases. The City’s contention that the Court’s reading of §1447(d) will invite defendants to frivolously add §1442 or §1443 to their other grounds for removal has already been addressed by other statutes and rules, such as §1447(c), which permits a district court to order a party to pay the costs and expenses of removal, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)–(c), which authorizes courts to sanction frivolous arguments. The Court declines to consider the merits of the defendants’ removal grounds and remands for the Fourth Circuit to consider those matters in the first instance. Pp. 12–14. ...

    ... The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it was powerless to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under §1447(d). In light of that error, the defendants ask us to consider some of those additional grounds ourselves. That task, however, does not implicate the circuit split that we took this case to resolve and we believe the wiser course is to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve in the first instance. See Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. ___, ___, (2021) (slip op., at 5, n. 4). The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[8]

    		”
    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.[1]

    In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:[1]

    “ Civil defendants in state court may remove a case to federal district court by asserting one or more bases for federal jurisdiction. If the district court concludes that the case was improperly removed, it issues an order remanding the case back to state court. For more than a century, the rule has been that such remand orders are generally not subject to appellate review. See In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 453–454 (1890). This rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1447(d), “reflects Congress’s longstanding policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 238 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).


    Originally, there were no exceptions to §1447(d)’s bar on appellate review. See §1447(d) (1946 ed., Supp. III). Then, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created appellate jurisdiction over “‘order[s] remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443,’” the civil rights removal statute. §901, 78 Stat.266, 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) (1964 ed.). In 2011, Congress extended this exception to cases removed pursuant to §1442, the federal officer removal statute. See §1447(d) (2012 ed.).

    The Court today holds that a defendant who invokes either §1442 or §1443 when removing a case to federal court is entitled to appellate review of not just those grounds, but also any other grounds for removal the defendant asserts. I disagree. That interpretation lets defendants sidestep §1447(d)’s bar on appellate review by shoehorning a §1442 or §1443 argument into their case for removal. In other words, it lets the exception swallow the rule. Furthermore, when Congress amended §1447(d) to permit appellate review of decisions under §1442, every Court of Appeals to have addressed the question interpreted §1447(d) to permit appellate review of arguments under §1443 only, not of other arguments for removal addressed in the same order. If Congress wanted to disturb that consensus, it would have said so. I respectfully dissent. ...

    ... Section 1447(d) places “broad restrictions on the power of federal appellate courts to review district court orders remanding removed cases to state court.” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995). After today’s decision, defendants can sidestep these restrictions by making near-frivolous arguments for removal under §1442or §1443. Congress, of course, can amend §1447(d) to make even clearer that appellate review of a district court remand order extends to only §1442 or §1443. Because I believe §1447 already bears that meaning, I respectfully dissent.[8]

    		”
    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2020-2021

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2020-2021

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 5, 2020. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[15]

    The court issued 67 opinions during its 2020-2021 term. Two cases were decided in one consolidated opinion. Ten cases were decided without argument. Click here for more information on the court's opinions.

    The court agreed to hear 62 cases during its 2020-2021 term. Of those, 12 were originally scheduled for the 2019-2020 term but were delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Five cases were removed from the argument calendar.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Supreme Court, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, decided May 17, 2021
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 SCOTUSblog, "Justices add seven new cases to docket, including major voting-rights dispute," October 2, 2020
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Supreme Court of the United States, "BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore: petition for a writ of certiorari," accessed October 2, 2020
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., decided March 6, 2020
    5. ↑ Casetext, "Md. Code, Com. § 13-101," accessed Ocotber 5, 2020
    6. ↑ United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., decided June 13, 2005
    7. ↑ Casetext, "28 U.S.C. § 1441" accessed October 5, 2020
    8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    9. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "28 U.S. Code § 1442. Federal officers or agencies sued or prosecuted," accessed October 2, 2020
    10. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "28 U.S. Code § 1443. Civil rights cases," accessed October 2, 2020
    11. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "28 U.S. Code § 1447. Procedure after removal generally," accessed October 2, 2020
    12. ↑ Casetext, "28 U.S.C. § 1447," accessed October 5, 2020
    13. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed January 20, 2021
    14. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," accessed January 20, 2021
    15. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court," accessed April 20, 2015
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