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Byrd v. United States

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Supreme Court of the United States
Byrd v. United States
Term: 2017
Important Dates
Argument: January 9, 2018
Decided: May 14, 2018
Outcome
Third Circuit vacated
Vote
9 - 0 Majority = Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch
Concurring
Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Neil Gorsuch


Byrd v. United States is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on January 9, 2018. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.

The issue in this case was whether a driver of a rental car who is not the renter nor an authorized driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The issue had generated a split among federal appeals courts. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the appeal in order to address differences in interpretation among federal courts under Rule 10 of the court's rules of procedure.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Terrence Byrd pled guilty to charges of possessing heroin with intent to distribute and possessing body armor as a prohibited person.[1] Byrd was arrested after police officers found heroin and body armor in the trunk of a rental car Byrd was driving. The arresting officer had pulled Byrd over for a traffic violation. The car had been rented by Byrd's fiance, and Byrd was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. Byrd sought to suppress the evidence the officers found, arguing that the officers' search and some circumstances of the traffic stop violated his constitutional rights. The Third Circuit concluded that because Byrd was not listed as the renter nor as an authorized driver on the rental agreement, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the car and therefore could not challenge the constitutionality of the officers' search.
  • The issue: Does a driver have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he has the renter's permission to drive the car but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?
  • The outcome: In a unanimous opinion, the court vacated the Third Circuit's ruling, holding that a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he has the renter's permission to drive the car but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement.[2]


    • In brief: Following a police officer's discovery of heroin and body armor in the trunk of a rental car Byrd was driving, Byrd was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute and possessing body armor. Byrd moved to suppress the evidence found in the trunk, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. The district court concluded that because Byrd was not the car renter or an authorized driver on the rental agreement, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no standing to challenge the search.

    You can review the lower court's opinion here.[3]

    Background

    Legal question

    This was a case about the privacy rights of unlisted drivers of rental cars.

    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

    “ The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[4] ”

    Absent a warrant or probable cause, the Fourth Amendment protects against police searches where the person subjected to the search has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, unless the searched person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights, and the person does not have any standing to challenge the search on constitutional grounds. The legal question in this case was whether a person in Byrd's situation--driving a rental car with the renter's permission but without the authorization of the rental company--has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.

    Case background

    Terrence Byrd was pulled over by a police officer near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Byrd was driving a rental car, and the officer testified that he had observed Byrd in violation of a traffic passing law. At the request of the officer, Byrd turned over the rental agreement for the car and his driver's license. He was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement, and his license was an interim New York license that did not include a picture.[3]

    When the officer ran Byrd's credentials through his computer, the computer returned the name James Carter. The officer concluded that Byrd was using an alias. The officer also learned that there was an outstanding warrant in New Jersey for Byrd's arrest. A second officer joined the first. The stop was extended while the officers checked the warrant.

    The officers asked Byrd for his consent to search the car but told him they could search the car even without his consent because he was not the renter. The officers testified that Byrd consented to the search. During their search, the officers found heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car, and Byrd was subsequently arrested for possession of heroin with intent to distribute and possession of body armor as a prohibited person.[3]

    Following his arrest, Byrd asked the trial court to suppress the evidence the officers found in the trunk. Among other arguments, he challenged the validity of the search, arguing that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.[5] The district court ruled that "Byrd, as the sole occupant of a rented car, had no expectation of privacy because he was not listed on the rental agreement."[3] Byrd entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search.

    Panel opinion

    Byrd appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit. On appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit noted, "A circuit split exists as to whether the sole occupant of a rental vehicle has a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy when that occupant is not named in the rental agreement." A circuit split is created when two or more circuit courts of the United States Court of Appeals issue contrary rulings on the same legal issue. On this issue, an earlier Third Circuit court had already ruled. The panel continued, "The Third Circuit has spoken as to this issue, however, and determined such a person has no expectation of privacy and therefore no standing to challenge a search of the vehicle." The panel affirmed the district court's ruling that the search did not violate Byrd's Fourth Amendment rights because, as an unlisted driver, he did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy.[3]

    Petitioner's challenge

    Terrence Byrd, the petitioner, challenged the holding of the Third Circuit. Byrd argued that the Third Circuit erred in concluding that an unlisted driver of a rental car does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Byrd argued that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that, therefore, he may challenge the constitutionality of the search.

    Certiorari granted

    On May 11, 2017, Terrence Byrd, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Byrd's request for certiorari on September 28, 2017. Argument in the case was held on January 9, 2018.[6]

    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "A police officer may not conduct a suspicionless and warrantless search of a car if the driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car-i.e., an expectation of privacy that society accepts as reasonable. Does a driver have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he has the renter's permission to drive the car but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?"[6]

    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    Decision

    A unanimous court ruled that a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he has the renter's permission to drive the car but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement.[2]

    Opinion of the court

    Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the unanimous opinion of the court. Kennedy ruled that "as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver." Kennedy explained:

    “ There may be countless innocuous reasons why an unauthorized driver might get behind the wheel of a rental car and drive it—perhaps the renter is drowsy or inebriated and the two think it safer for the friend to drive them to their destination. True, this constitutes a breach of the rental agreement, and perhaps a serious one, but the Government fails to explain what bearing this breach of contract, standing alone, has on expectations of privacy in the car. Stated in different terms, for Fourth Amendment purposes there is no meaningful difference between the authorized-driver provision and the other provisions the Government agrees do not eliminate an expectation of privacy, all of which concern risk allocation between private parties—violators might pay additional fees, lose insurance coverage, or assume liability for damage resulting from the breach. But that risk allocation has little to do with whether one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car if, for example, he or she otherwise has lawful possession of and control over the car.[2][4] ”


    Kennedy stressed that the fact that an authorized rental car driver has Fourth Amendment rights in the car did not end the inquiry in this particular case. On remand, Kennedy instructed, the Court of Appeals was to consider 1) whether a person who procures a rental car through a third party for the purpose of committing a crime retains those rights; and 2) whether the police officers in this case had probable cause to search the car.[2]

    Concurrence by Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas joined the court's opinion in full and also wrote separately, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Thomas questioned the court's precedent underlying the decision but agreed with the majority's analysis: "Although I have serious doubts about the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test from Katz v. United States, I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly navigates our precedents, which no party has asked us to reconsider."[2]

    Concurrence by Justice Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito joined the court's opinion in full and also wrote separately. While agreeing with the court's ruling, Alito stressed the outstanding questions that remained in this particular case. He wrote,

    “ The Court holds that an unauthorized driver of a rental car is not always barred from contesting a search of the vehicle. Relevant questions bearing on the driver’s ability to raise a Fourth Amendment claim may include: the terms of the particular rental agreement, the circumstances surrounding the rental; the reason why the driver took the wheel; any property right that the driver might have; and the legality of his conduct under the law of the State where the conduct occurred. On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to reexamine the question whether petitioner may assert a Fourth Amendment claim or to decide the appeal on another appropriate ground. On this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court.[2][4] ”


    Text of the opinion

    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 18 U.S. Code § 931 makes it a crime for a person previously convicted of a violent felony to possess body armor.
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 United States Supreme Court, "Byrd v. United States Opinion," May 14, 2018
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, United States of America v. Terrence Byrd, February 10, 2017
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑ Byrd also challenged the validity of the initial stop and the extension of the stop. The district court dismissed those arguments. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment as to those two arguments. Neither the validity of the initial stop nor the extension of the stop is at issue in the United States Supreme Court case; the supreme court is only addressing whether Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy as an unlisted driver.
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Byrd v. United States Question Presented, September 28, 2017
    7. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Byrd v. United States, argued January 9, 2018
    8. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Byrd v. United States, argued January 9, 2018
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