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Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley

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Supreme Court of the United States
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley
Term: 1981
Important Dates
Argument: October 14, 1981
Decided: December 14, 1981
Outcome
Reversed
Vote
8-1
Majority
Chief Justice Warren Burger • William J. Brennan, Jr. • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens
Concurring
Thurgood Marshall • Harry Blackmun • Sandra Day O'Connor
Dissenting
Byron White


Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley was a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an ordinance to limit contributions to ballot measure committees violated the First Amendment.[1]

The case was argued before the Supreme Court during the court's October 1981-1982 term and came on appeal from the California Supreme Court.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: In 1974, voters of Berkeley, California, adopted a ballot initiative that limited individual contributions to ballot measure campaigns to $250. In 1977, Citizens Against Rent Control formed as a ballot measure committee to oppose a rent control measure. The committee accepted nine contributions over $250. The Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission penalized Citizens Against Rent Control, and the ballot measure committee sued the City of Berkeley, arguing that the contribution limits were unconstitutional. The California Superior Court and California Court of Appeal both ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law was constitutional because the limits were designed to prevent corruption in the ballot initiative process.
  • The issue: Does the First Amendment prevent the government from enacting limits on contributions to political committees formed to support or oppose a ballot measure?
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Supreme Court in an 8-1 ruling. The opinion held that Berkeley's limits on contributions to ballot measure committees violated contributors' freedom of speech and freedom of association. The opinion also differentiated ballot measure committees from candidate committees, noting that limits on candidate committees, per Buckley v. Valeo, were to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Since ballot measures are not suspect to quid pro quo corruption, according to the majority's opinion, "there is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure."
  • Why this ruling is important: According to Richard L. Hasen, a professor of law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley "precludes state and local jurisdictions from limiting financial contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures."[2]

    • Background

    In 1974, voters of Berkeley, California, adopted a ballot initiative that limited individual contributions to ballot measure campaigns to $250. In 1977, Citizens Against Rent Control formed as a ballot measure committee to oppose a rent control measure. The committee accepted nine contributions over $250 that together equaled $20,850. The Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission penalized Citizens Against Rent Control with a $18,600 fine. Citizens Against Rent Control sued the City of Berkeley, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional.[1]

    The California Superior Court declared the ordinance to be unconstitutional, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's decision. The California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed and upheld the ordinance as constitutional. The state Supreme Court concluded that the contribution limits served a compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption of the initiative and referendum process and thus did not unduly infringe upon contributors' rights of speech and association.[1]

    The majority's opinion stated, "[T]he domination of these processes by large contributors leaves other citizens with a stilled voice in the very domain of our electoral system set aside for accomplishing the popular will... When large contributors use the power of their purse to overcome the power of reason, they thwart the intended purpose of the initiative or referendum: instead of fostering participation by a greater segment of the electorate, the vision of direct democracy is transformed into a tool of narrow interests."[3]

    Citizens Against Rent Control appealed the decision of the California Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court.[1]

    Constitutional clauses

    First Amendment

    The First Amendment refers to the first section of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, the courts focused on the amendment's freedom of speech and right of association protections.

    “

    Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.[4]

    		”

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[1]

    Questions presented:
    • Does the First Amendment prevent the government from enacting limits on contributions to political committees formed to support or oppose a ballot measure?

    Outcome

    In an 8-1 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the California Supreme Court, holding that Berkeley's ordinance limits on contributions to ballot measure committees violated contributors' freedom of speech and freedom of association. Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Byron White filed a dissenting opinion.[1] ​

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote:[1]

    “

    Under the Berkeley ordinance an affluent person can, acting alone, spend without limit to advocate individual views on a ballot measure. It is only when contributions are made in concert with one or more others in the exercise of the right of association that they are restricted by § 602. ... To place a Spartan limit or indeed any limit-on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. Section 602 does not seek to mute the voice of one individual, and it cannot be allowed to hobble the collective expressions of a group. ...

    Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate: "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined... Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disasterous extent.' Buckley thus sustained limits on contributions to candidates and their committees. Federal Courts of Appeals have recognized that Buckley does not support limitations on contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures. ...

    It is clear, therefore, that § 602 does not advance a legitimate governmental interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First Amendment rights. ...

    Apart from the impermissible restraint on freedom of association, but virtually inseparable from it in this context, § 602 imposes a significant restraint on the freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish to express their views through committees. ... The contribution limit thus automatically affects expenditures, and limits on expenditures operate as a direct restraint on freedom of expression of a group or committee desiring to engage in political dialogue concerning a ballot measure.

    Whatever may be the state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate's committees, there is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure. Placing limits on contributions, which, in turn, limits expenditures, plainly impairs freedom of expression. ...

    A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of expression. The restraint imposed by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn on individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.[4]

    		”

    Dissent

    In his dissent, Justice Byron White wrote:[1]

    “

    The Berkeley ordinance does not control the quantity or content of speech. ... Any person or company may contribute up to $250. If greater spending is desired, it must be made as an expenditure, and expenditures are not limited or otherwise controlled. Individuals also remain completely unfettered in their ability to join interested groups or otherwise directly participate in the campaign. ... As we noted last term in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, the "speech by proxy'" that is achieved through contributions to a political campaign committee "is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court, in Buckley, found entitled to full First Amendment protection." ...

    But the Court goes on to assert that the ordinance furthers no legitimate public interest and cannot survive "any degree of scrutiny." Apparently the Court assumes this to be so because the ordinance is not directed at quid pro quos between large contributors and candidates for office, "the single narrow exception" for regulation that it viewed Buckley as endorsing. ...

    While it is not possible to prove that heavy spending "bought" a victory on any particular ballot proposition, there is increasing evidence that large contributors are at least able to block the adoption of measures through the initiative process. Recognition that enormous contributions from a few institutional sources can overshadow the efforts of individuals may have discouraged participation in ballot measure campaigns and undermined public confidence in the referendum process. By restricting the size of contributions, the Berkeley ordinance requires major contributors to communicate directly with the voters. If the ordinance has an ultimate impact on speech, it will be to assure that a diversity of views will be presented to the voters. ...

    Every form of regulation—from taxes to compulsory bargaining—has some effect on the ability of individuals and corporations to engage in expressive activity. We must therefore focus on the extent to which expressive and associational activity is restricted by the Berkeley ordinance. That First Amendment interests are implicated should begin, not end, our inquiry. When the infringement is as slight and ephemeral as it is here, the requisite state interest to justify the regulation need not be so high. ...

    "California's entire history demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public policy." James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). From its earliest days, it was designed to circumvent the undue influence of large corporate interests on government decision-making. ... The role of the initiative in California cannot be separated from its purpose of preventing the dominance of special interests. ...

    Perhaps, as I have said, neither the city of Berkeley nor the State of California can "prove" that elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest groups spending large sums of money, but there is a widespread conviction in legislative halls, as well as among citizens, that the danger is real. I regret that the Court continues to disregard that hazard.[4]

    		”

    Text of the opinion

    The full text of the opinion is below:[1]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 U.S. Supreme Court, "Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley," decided December 14, 1981
    2. ↑ Hasen, Richard L. "Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns." Southern California Law Review 78: 885-926
    3. ↑ Eisen, Cheryl Ryon. 1981. "Limiting Contributions to Referendum Political Committees: Taking Out the First Amendment Slide Rule and Going Back to the Supreme Court’s Drawing Board." Nova Law Review 5 (3): 421-443
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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