Courtroom Weekly: Judges weigh in on names, juries

August 15, 2013

by: the State Court Staff

Open government, Hispanic jurors, getting paid to dress for work, and more

Courtroom Weekly The latest and greatest in court cases around the nation In this issue... Featured case News from Hawaii News from New Hampshire News from South Dakota News from Tennessee News from Wisconsin

Featured case Jury duty is an 'enshrined' right in New Mexico   Court: New Mexico Supreme Court By Samantha Ward The New Mexico Supreme Court has said that jury duty is a "right enshrined in the state constitution to all people" regardless of their native language or ability to read, speak, or understand English. Michael Anthony Samora appealed his conviction on several crimes, including murder, on the basis that a juror was improperly excused from service because he was Hispanic and may have "had trouble understanding English." The prospective juror in this case indicated that he could not understand spoken English well or read or write it. Though the judge offered an interpreter initially, he nevertheless dismissed the man "after he acknowledged he was not able to understand a large portion of the court proceedings." In its ruling, the court found that jury duty is a constitutional right and, it cannot be restricted by "religion, race, language or color, or inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages." Given that nearly half of the population of New Mexico is Hispanic, the state's courts will likely face this issue in the future and will need to adapt. This means making accommodations for non-English speaking jurors. According to the opinion, every person in the justice system, from lawyer to judge, "[has] a shared responsibility to make every reasonable effort to protect the right of our non-English speaking citizens to serve on New Mexico juries." Because Samora's defense counsel did not object to the dismissal of the juror, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court deemed the issue waived and could not consider it on appeal. The court found the argument persuasive and, had his counsel objected at trial, Samora's conviction may have been reversed by the court as a result. This is not the first New Mexico ruling regarding jury duty. In 2002, the court held that "inconvenience alone doesn't suffice to excuse a juror who cannot speak, read or write English or Spanish." This time the court felt that a trial should be delayed if necessary to "secure an interpreter for a juror."

News from Hawaii Hawaii Supreme Court urges governments to uphold the "spirit" of the Sunshine Law   Court: Hawaii Supreme Court By Matt Latourelle The Hawaii Supreme Court, on August 8, ruled on the state's Sunshine Law (Hawai'i Revised Statutes Chapter 92, Part I), which seeks to enforce the openness and public accessibility of government. At issue was a series of meetings held by the Land Use Committee of the Maui County Council regarding the re-zoning of 670 acres of land for residential development. A group of Maui residents filed suit, stating that the council failed to satisfy the requirements of the Sunshine Law by "recessing and reconvening" their meetings multiple times "“without providing additional notice and opportunity to testify". The meetings regarding the development project and the relevant bills that would have to be passed in order for the project to commence were spread out over a number of years. This case, however, dealt with thirteen meetings of the Land Use Committee held in the fall of 2007, as well as four meetings held by the Maui County Council in 2008 which resulted in the passage of the bills. The council verbally rescheduled these meetings multiple times without posting new agendas or providing other public notice, which the plaintiffs argued was in opposition to the Sunshine Law. The law states that "items of reasonably major importance not decided at a scheduled meeting shall be considered only at a meeting continued to a reasonable day and time." Both the Maui Second Circuit Court and then the Intermediate Court of Appeals ruled that the council did not, in fact, violate the Sunshine Law. When the Supreme Court ruled on the case, it provided a detailed opinion which emphasized compliance with the spirit of the law. The ruling was two-fold. The court ruled that the council was in violation of the Sunshine Law, but that this did not invalidate the passage of the bills. The opinion, written by Justice Pollack, explained that the reconvening of meetings was not an issue, but that the council violated the law "by distributing written memoranda among its members outside of a duly noticed meeting, through which the members impermissibly sought a commitment to vote." The ruling also included a warning to other governmental bodies throughout the state by stating: “ [B]oards are required at all times to conduct continued meetings in a manner that conforms to the spirit and purpose of the Sunshine Law. ” The ruling is seen as a victory for proponents of open government as it sets clearer expectations for how local governments should or shouldn't conduct their meetings. Additionally, the court upheld and clarified the authority of the state's Office of Information Practices, which provides oversight to local governments to make sure they are conducting their business openly. One statement from the ruling summarized the point of the Sunshine Law: “ The Sunshine Law is essentially a procedural guarantee to protect the public’s interest in government decision-making. ” News from South Dakota Filing error in South Dakota case could result in lighter sentence for convicted rapist   Court: South Dakota Supreme Court By Ryan Cherry A divided South Dakota Supreme Court decided on August 7, 2013 that a filing error made by the prosecution could result in a lighter sentence for a defendant convicted of rape. The case was brought before the Supreme Court on appeal of a decision by Judge John L. Brown of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in Tripp County. The Circuit Court's decision resulted in a mandatory life sentence for the defendant, Gabriel Darryn Medicine Eagle, Jr., based on his status as a habitual offender. The appeal arises from a case in which Medicine Eagle was convicted of the kidnapping and rape of a 15-year old girl which occurred in September of 2000. Medicine Eagle was indicted in 2001 of the rape, but the charges were later dropped when DNA evidence could not link Medicine Eagle to the crime. The DNA evidence did, however, show that the 15-year old was intimate with an unknown, at the time, male. In 2008, when the police discovered that the unknown male was the 15-year old's boyfriend and that the two had been sexually active on the day of the rape, the police decided to re-open the case and sought to have new DNA testing performed. Upon completion of the testing, although 99.97 percent of males unrelated to the victim would be excluded from the test, Medicine Eagle could not have been excluded as a contributor to the sample. The filing error at issue involved Medicine Eagle's status as a habitual offender based on the alleged rape of a 13-year old girl. Before the trial, the prosecution filed an information which charged Medicine Eagle with being a habitual offender. After Medicine Eagle was convicted by a jury at trial, the prosecution filed an amended information which added an additional felony conviction to the charge. The amended information was later dismissed and the trial of Medicine Eagle as a habitual offender proceeded based on the original information, without objection by Medicine Eagle. After Medicine Eagle was found to be a habitual offender and was sentenced based on this finding, he filed this appeal claiming that the amended information nullified the original one. This would mean that the court did not have jurisdiction over the habitual offender portion of the trial because no information existed at the time. In an opinion drafted by Chief Justice David Gilbertson, the Supreme Court agreed with Medicine Eagle and established that the filing of amended information effectively dismissed the original information, requiring that new information be filed before proceeding. For Medicine Eagle, this decision means that he will be re-sentenced without a need for a mandatory life sentence. Justice Steven Zinter wrote a dissenting opinion which stated that the court's decision "reward[ed] Medicine Eagle for his sandbagging in the assertion of this claimed defense or objection." Since Medicine Eagle failed to raise any objection to the trial court proceeding on the original information at the time, Zinter felt that he should not be allowed to benefit from such a failure.

News from New Hampshire Canadian court ruling trumps law in New Hampshire   Court: New Hampshire Superior Court By Susan Lawrence The Quebec Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of a lower Canadian court which will prevent alleged murder suspect, Anthony Barnaby, from being extradited to New Hampshire to stand trial for a fourth time. In her July 31, 2013 decision, Judge Nicole Duval Hesler cites a letter from Barnaby’s attorney, Mark Sisti. Sisti presented a letter to the lower court stating it would be oppressive and unprecedented to force Barnaby to face a fourth trial for murder. Sisti served as Barnaby’s attorney when he was tried in 1989 and 1990. The murders took place in New Hampshire on October 2, 1988 when Charlene Ranstrom and Brenda Warner were stabbed to death. Barnaby lived below the women. A friend of his from Canada, David Caplin was staying with him at the time. Both men are members of the Micmac Tribe and grew up together on the Restigouche Indian Reservation in Quebec. While investigating the crime, police collected two steak knives, white athletic socks, a piece of two-by-four, a towel and a piece of paper as evidence. All the items were stained with blood. Blood evidence was also found in the living room and kitchen of the apartment, as well as the bedroom. Both women were found tied up, with multiple stab wounds, in the bedroom of the apartment. A blood stained denim jacket and hairs were also collected and preserved as evidence. At the time of the crime, DNA testing was not available. However, according to an affidavit filed in 2011 with the Hillsborough County Superior Court, an independent laboratory later performed DNA testing. According to the testing, hairs found on the jacket were a DNA match with Caplin. Testing of the bloodstains on the jacket indicated a match with one of the women. Tests performed on bloodstains on the socks found DNA links to both Barnaby and Caplin. Police charged Barnaby with first degree murder in October, 1988. He later confessed to the murders. Caplin was arrested for assault in Boston later in the month, after an incident not related to the New Hampshire murders. By 1989, Barnaby had withdrawn his confession, but a judge allowed his confession to be admitted as evidence during his trial. On August 29, 1989, Caplin was arrested and later taken into custody by Nashua, New Hampshire police. Barnaby’s first trial began on September 25, 1989. When asked about his confession, Barnaby claimed he wasn’t guilty and the information he gave police about the murders were just "lucky guesses". The jury deliberated for 6 days, but the case resulted in a hung jury with nine members voting to convict and three voting not guilty. During a second trial, the jury also deadlocked, 7-5. However, this time the majority voted in favor of acquitting Barnaby. Caplin was charged with two counts of first degree murder as an accomplice to the crime on June 26, 1990. Although jury selection began in his trial, the case was delayed due to disputes over testimony and evidence. Charges against Caplin were ultimately dropped in November, 1990. After Barnaby was tried for a third time, the jury hung with seven favoring conviction and five voting for acquittal. He was released from state prison on July 10, 1990. All three cases were heard in Hillsborough County Superior Court. On April 12, 2011, cold case detectives in Nashua announced they had issued arrest warrants for Barnaby and Caplin and planned to have them extradited from Canada to stand trial. During their continuing investigation, police located new witnesses. One witness, Melissa Metallic, claimed “ . . .a week or two before the killings, Barnaby told her and her then-boyfriend Dion Methot that 'he was going to kill two lesbians in Nashua that lived above him and cut them up with a chain saw. . .' ” In the affidavit, detectives also cited the new DNA evidence. A Canadian judge ordered the extradition of both men. However, Barnaby and Caplin appealed the judge's decision to the Court of Appeal in Quebec. As a result, Hesler determined forcing Barnaby to stand trial again would violate his constitutional rights because according to the judge, “ ...there isn’t any new evidence linking him to the crime. . .The prosecution is not, after all, expected to go after an accused until it finds a judge or jury willing to convict... ” Caplin, on the other hand, will be extradited to the United States and stand trial for his alleged role in the crime. News from Tennessee "Messiah" too lofty a moniker for Tennessee judge   Court: Cocke County Chancery Court, Tennessee By Jong Son A Tennessee judge has ruled that a young child’s first name must be changed from “Messiah” to “Martin.” Jaleesa Martin and the child’s father had been unable to agree on their son’s last name, so they brought the dispute before Child Support Magistrate Lu Ann Ballew at a child support hearing in Cocke County Chancery Court. In addition to settling the issue of the little boy’s last name, however, Ballew also ordered Martin to change her son’s first name because, as she later said in an interview, “ the word Messiah is a title and it’s a title that has only been earned by one person and that one person is Jesus Christ. ” Ballew declared the boy’s new name to be Martin DeShawn McCullough, a combination of his parents’ names. Ballew further explained her ruling in an interview with local NBC affiliate WBIR-TV. “I thought out into the future…[i]t could put him at odds with a lot of people,” she said, referring to Cocke County’s large Christian population. “And, at this point, he has had no choice in what his name is.” Martin said she chose the name "Messiah" because it was a “unique-sounding name” that fit well with the names of her two older children, Micah and Mason. In an interview, Martin explained, “ I was shocked. I never intended on naming my son Messiah because it means ‘God’…I didn’t think a judge could make me change my baby’s name because of her religious beliefs. ” The ACLU of Tennessee agreed with Martin, calling the judge’s ruling “unacceptable,” and has offered to assist her with her appeal of Ballew’s ruling. The group argues that Ballew is free to hold religious beliefs but should not have improperly imposed those beliefs on others by forcing the child’s name to be changed. “A parent has the right to choose their child’s name,” said Hedy Weinberg, a spokesperson for the ACLU. According to the Social Security Administration, Messiah was the 387th most popular name for male children born in 2012, with 762 young boys sharing the name banned by Judge Ballew. When asked about her thoughts on other religiously significant names, such as Jesus, Ballew responded that “that’s not relevant to this case.”

News from Wisconsin Tyson plant workers in Wisconsin to be paid for time spent changing clothes   Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals District IV By Alma Cook Workers of Tyson Prepared Foods Inc. are to be compensated for the time they spend putting on and taking off protective clothing, Wisconsin's District IV Court of Appeals has decided. The lawsuit, filed by six employees of the Jefferson County meat processing plant, is one of several such cases across the nation. Many meat and poultry workers have begun to formally complain that the time spent donning hair nets, vinyl gloves, safety glasses, hard hats and frocks unfairly adds up. The Jefferson County Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of Tyson, saying that the company did not owe its workers compensation for their time since the gear was nonessential to their duties. But appellate judges Brian Blanchard and JoAnne Kloppenburg overturned this decision on August 1 after consulting a variety of similar cases from the past. In the court opinion, they also examined the concept of an obligatory workplace costume change versus a convenient one: “ Imagine that an employee chooses to ride a bicycle to work, and as a result feels the need to change clothing in the workplace before beginning his or her principal activity. The change of clothing would be a mere convenience to the employee. In contrast, the employees here are obligated by Tyson to don and doff the items at issue at work for the safety of the employees and the safety of the foods they are helping to produce. ” Because the court determined that the safety of Tyson's employees and products depends on the workers' protective garments, getting dressed is considered a compensable activity. The case has been sent back to the circuit court, where more specific plans for reimbursement will be arranged. "It's a big victory for these Tyson workers," commented Douglas Phebus, the workers' attorney. He has asked for class-action status so that the decision can be applied to all workers plant-wide.

See also

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