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Currier v. Virginia

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Supreme Court of the United States
Currier v. Virginia
Term: 2017
Important Dates
Argument: February 20, 2018
Decided: June 22, 2018
Outcome
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Vote
5 - 4
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Neil Gorsuch
Concurring
Anthony Kennedy
Dissenting
Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan


Currier v. Virginia is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on February 20, 2018. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The issue in this case was the application of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.[1] Specifically, the issue was whether a defendant who was charged with multiple crimes, consented to sever those charges into sequential trials, and who was acquitted at the first trial can rely on that acquittal to prevent the second trial.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Michael Currier was charged with three crimes, all stemming from the same incident. He and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges into two separate trials. He was acquitted of two of the charges at the first trial. He then argued that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, his acquittal protected him against facing the second trial. The district court allowed the second trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not protect Currier from the second trial.
  • The issue: "Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal."[2]
  • The outcome: On a vote of 5 - 4, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia.[3]


    • In brief: Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, all based on the same incident. He and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges in two trials, with the burglary and grand larceny charge tried together first and the possession charge tried separately. After he was acquitted of the burglary and grand larceny charges, he moved to prevent the prosecution from going forward with the second trial. He argued that, based on his acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the prosecution from going forward with the second trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply..[1]

    You can review the lower court's opinion here.[1]

    Background

    Legal question

    This was a case about the scope of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No person shall...be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Generally, the protection means that no one can be tried more than once for the same offense. More specifically, "The clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."[4][5]

    In relying on the Double Jeopardy Clause's protections, Currier relied on "the collateral estoppel protection component of the clause."[4]

    “ 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Preventing prosecutorial abuse and overreaching lies at the root of the constitutionalization of the collateral estoppel doctrine.[4][6] ”

    Case background

    Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. All three charges stemmed from the same burglary incident, during which Currier allegedly helped to steal a safe that contained guns (among other items). The burglary and larceny charges were related to the theft of the safe; the possession charge was related to Currier's alleged handling of the guns inside the stolen safe. The prosecution and defense agreed to sever the trials, trying Currier on the burglary and grand larceny charges in one trial, and trying Currier on the felon in possession of a firearm charge in a subsequent trial. The reason was that the possession charge required the prosecution to introduce evidence of Currier's criminal history, which could have prejudiced the jury as to the burglary and larceny charges.[7][1]

    At the first trial, the jury acquitted Currier on both the burglary and grand larceny charges. Following the acquittals, the prosecutor moved to begin the second trial for the felon in possession of a firearm charge. Currier objected, arguing that his acquittal on the two related charges precluded the second trial. He argued that since he had been acquitted of participating in the theft, the fact of his participation in the theft (and therefore his possession of the guns) could not be re-litigated via a second trial. The prosecution acknowledged that its theory of the crime in the second trial would be very similar to the theory it had offered the jury in the first trial. The trial court judge disagreed, allowing the second trial to go forward. Currier was subsequently convicted on the possession charge.

    Panel opinion

    The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar Currier's second trial, affirming the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals. It chose not to write its own opinion but to adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals.[1]

    The court of appeals reasoned that, in this case, the trials were severed to protect Currier, not so that the prosecutor could gain any advantage. Given that motivation, the court concluded, the reasons that underpin the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to preclude the second trial:

    “ The point of separate trials here was to benefit the defendant by avoiding the undue prejudice that would occur upon mention of the defendant's felonious past to a jury. The purpose of the Bill of Rights as a whole is to protect the citizenry from abusive practices by the government. The specific abuse the Double Jeopardy Clause aims to prevent—including its collateral estoppel facet—is the practice of unfair and abusive reprosecutions. That concern is not present when a trial proceeds on a charge that was severed from a combined original group of charges and the charge was severed with the defendant's consent and for his benefit. Accordingly...we conclude that the trial court correctly found that collateral estoppel principles do not apply in this situation.[4][6] ”


    The court ruled that Currier was not entitled to rely on the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent the second trial.[4][1]

    Petitioner's challenge

    The petitioner challenged the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The petitioner argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded him from facing trial on a charge when he had been acquitted of related charges stemming from the same incident.[2]

    Certiorari granted

    On May 8, 2017, the petitioner initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The U.S. Supreme Court granted petitioner's request for certiorari on October 16, 2017. Argument in the case was held on February 20, 2018.[2]

    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal."[2]

    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[8]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[9]

    Outcome

    Decision

    On a vote of 5 - 4, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia.[3]

    Majority opinion

    Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the majority, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito and joined in part by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Gorsuch ruled that Currier had waived his Collateral estoppel claim by agreeing to the severed trials.[3]

    Gorsuch discussed Ashe v. United States, an earlier Supreme Court case in which a defendant was accused of robbing six players at a poker game. After being acquittal of the robbery of one of the players, the Supreme Court held, the defendant could not be tried for the robbery of a different player, since the jury in the first trial had determined the defendant was not one of the robbers. Gorsuch wrote, "Some have argued that [Ashe] sits uneasily with this Court’s double jeopardy precedent and the Constitution’s original meaning." Nevertheleess, he continued, "Ashe forbids a second trial only if to secure a conviction the prosecution must prevail on an issue the jury necessarily resolved in the defendant’s favor in the first trial." "A second trial is not precluded," he continued, "simply because it is unlikely—or even very unlikely—that the original jury acquitted without finding the fact in question.” [3]

    Gorsuch wrote that this case was distinguished from Ashe because Currier consented to the severed trials. Gorsuch concluded that a defendant's consent overcomes the Double Jeopardy precedent established in Ashe. Although Currier argued that he had no choice but to consent to the severed trials in order to avoid tainting one charge with another. Gorsuch dismissed that argument. He wrote, " Mr. Currier faced a lawful choice between two courses of action that each bore potential costs and rationally attractive benefits. It might have been a hard choice. But litigants every day face difficult decisions."[3]

    In the section of the opinion not joined by Justice Kennedy and therefore not part of the majority's ruling, Gorsuch wrote that he would have taken the ruling further, requiring that a second trial must include a crime with identical elements to the first in order to implicate the Double Jeopardy clause. He wrote, "To prevent a second trial on a new charge, the defendant must show an identity of statutory elements between the two charges against him; it’s not enough that a substantial overlap [exists] in the proof offered to establish the crimes."[3]

    Concurrence by Justice Kennedy

    Justice Kennedy joined the court majority's opinion in part and wrote separately, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. Kennedy wrote to emphasize his understanding that the court's ruling was based on Currier's consent to the severed trials:

    “ The end result is that when a defendant’s voluntary choices lead to a second prosecution he cannot later use the Double Jeopardy Clause, whether thought of as protecting against multiple trials or the relitigation of issues, to forestall that second prosecution. The extent of the Double Jeopardy Clause protections discussed and defined in Ashe need not be reexamined here; for, whatever the proper formulation and implementation of those rights are, they can be lost when a defendant agrees to a second prosecution. Of course, this conclusion is premised on the defendant’s having a voluntary choice, and a different result might obtain if that premise were absent.[3][6] ”

    Dissent by Justice Ginsubrg

    Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Ginsburg wrote, "I would hold that Currier’s acquiescence in severance of the felon-in-possession charge does not prevent him from raising a plea of issue preclusion based on the jury acquittals of breaking and entering and grand larceny." She argued, "A defendant’s consent to severance does not waive his right to rely on the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal."[3]

    “ Unlike the right against a second trial for the same offense (claim preclusion), issue preclusion prevents relitigation of a previously rejected theory of criminal liability without necessarily barring a successive trial . . . Issue preclusion bars only a subset of possible trials—those in which the prosecution rests its case on a theory of liability a jury earlier rejected. That being so, consenting to a second trial is not inconsistent with—and therefore does not foreclose—a defendant’s gaining the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal . . . The first trial established that Currier did not participate in breaking and entering the Garrisons’ residence or in stealing their safe. The government can attempt to prove Currier possessed firearms through a means other than breaking and entering the Garrisons’ residence and stealing their safe. But the government should not be permitted to show in the felon-in-possession trial what it failed to show in the first trial, i.e., Currier’s participation in the charged breaking and entering and grand larceny, after a full and fair opportunity to do so.[3][6] ”


    Text of the opinion

    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 https://ballotpedia.org/File:Currier_v._VA_VASct_Op.1160102.pdf Supreme Court of Virginia, "Currier v. Virginia" Opinion, December 8, 2017]
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Supreme Court of the United States, "Currier v. Virginia" Question Presented, October 16, 2017
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 United States Supreme Court, "'Currier v. Virginia Opinion," June 22, 2018
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 FindLaw, "Currier v. Commonwealth," accessed January 9, 2018
    5. ↑ Internal citations and quotations omitted.
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    7. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named COA
    8. ↑ [https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2017/16-1348 Supreme Court of the United States, Currier v. Virginia, argued February 20, 2018
    9. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Currier v. Virginia, argued February 20, 2018
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