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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

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Supreme Court of the United States
Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate
Term: 2021
Important Dates
Argued: January 19, 2022
Decided: May 16, 2022
Outcome
affirmed
Vote
6-3
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Dissenting
Elena Kagan • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 16, 2022, during the court's October 2021-2022 term. The case was argued before the court on January 19, 2022.

The court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a 6-3 ruling, holding that a federal law limiting the monetary amount of post-election contributions a candidate can use to pay back personal campaign loans impermissibly limits political speech and violates the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the court's majority opinion. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned federal election law and political campaign finance rules and spending limits. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented:
    1. "Whether appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit.
    2. "Whether the loan-repayment limit violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."[2]
  • The outcome: The court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a 6-3 ruling, holding that a federal law limiting the monetary amount of post-election contributions a candidate can use to pay back personal campaign loans impermissibly limits political speech and violates the First Amendment.[1]


    • The case originated from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.[3]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • May 16, 2022: The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's ruling.
    • January 19, 2022: The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument.
    • September 30, 2021: The U.S. Supreme Court postponed the question of jurisdiction to a hearing of the case on the merits.[4]
    • July 2, 2021: The Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a jurisdictional statement with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • June 3, 2021: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of Sen. Cruz and the Cruz campaign.
    • March 30, 2020: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Cruz campaign's motion for partial remand and to compel discovery, assumed supplemental jurisdiction over the FEC's regulatory claims, and ordered the Cruz campaign to produce non-privileged documents related to the FEC's discovery requests.[3]

    Background

    The appellant in the case is the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The appellees in the case are Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) and his political campaign committee, Ted Cruz for Senate ("the campaign").

    On the day before the U.S. Senate general election in Texas on November 5, 2018, Sen. Cruz made two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000 to the campaign—$5,000 originated from Sen. Cruz's personal bank accounts and $255,000 originated from a loan backed by Sen. Cruz's personal assets. After the election, the campaign did not repay Sen. Cruz's personal loans during the 20-day period—established by Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)—allowing a candidate to repay loans using pre-election contributions. After the repayment period elapsed, the loan balance exceeding the BCRA's $250,000 cap on post-election contributions—$10,000—was converted into a campaign contribution. The campaign repaid Sen. Cruz $250,000 after the 20-day period with post-election contributions. The BCRA restricted the campaign from paying back the $10,000 loan balance.[3] According to SCOTUSblog, both the plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the campaign waited to repay the loan in order to challenge the law in court.[5]

    In 2019, Sen. Cruz and the campaign challenged the BCRA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the law's repayment restrictions violated the First Amendment. The FEC argued that the campaign did not have standing to sue and that it could have repaid Sen. Cruz using pre-election funds. The FEC moved to dismiss the case. A three-judge panel granted summary judgment in favor of Sen. Cruz and the campaign, concluding that Sen. Cruz had standing to sue because of the $10,000 financial injury, and that the limits put a burden on political speech.[3][5][6]

    In July 2021, the FEC appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the BCRA's limitations on post-election contributions are important to avoid quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of it.[7]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “
    1. Whether appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit.
    2. Whether the loan-repayment limit violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.[8]
    		 ”

    Oral argument

    The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on January 19, 2022.

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[9]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[10]

    Outcome

    The court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a 6-3 ruling, holding that a federal law limiting the monetary amount of post-election contributions a candidate can use to pay back personal campaign loans impermissibly limits political speech and violates the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the court's majority opinion. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:[1]

    “

    In order to jumpstart a fledgling campaign or finish strong in a tight race, candidates for federal office often loan money to their campaign committees. A provision of federal law regulates the repayment of such loans. Among other things, it bars campaigns from using more than $250,000 of funds raised after election day to repay a candidate’s personal loans. This limit on the use of post-election funds increases the risk that candidate loans over $250,000 will not be repaid in full, inhibiting candidates from making such loans in the first place. The question is whether this restriction violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech.
    ...
    The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971). It safeguards the ability of a candidate to use personal funds to finance campaign speech, protecting his freedom “to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54. This broad protection, we have explained, “reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Id., at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).

    The Government seems to agree with appellees that the loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights, at least to some extent, see Brief for Appellant 27– 32, and we reach the same conclusion. This provision, by design and effect, burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. See 52 U. S. C. §30101(9)(A)(i) (defining “expenditure” to include loans); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52. By restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans, Section 304 increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid. That in turn inhibits candidates from loaning money to their campaigns in the first place, burdening core speech.
    ...
    With those First Amendment costs in mind, we turn to whether the loan-repayment limitation is justified. The parties debate whether strict or “closely drawn” scrutiny should apply in answering that question. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. We need not resolve this dispute because, under either standard, the Government must prove at the outset that it is in fact pursuing a legitimate objective. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210. It has not done so here.
    ...
    For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Cruz and the Committee have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304 of BCRA. We also conclude that this provision burdens core political speech without proper justification. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. [8]

    		”
    —Justice Chief Justice John Roberts

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.

    In her dissent, Justice Kagan wrote:[1]

    “

    A candidate for public office extends a $500,000 loan to his campaign organization, hoping to recoup the amount from benefactors’ post-election contributions. Once elected, he devotes himself assiduously to recovering the money; his personal bank account, after all, now has a gaping half-million-dollar hole. The politician solicits donations from wealthy individuals and corporate lobbyists, making clear that the money they give will go straight from the campaign to him, as repayment for his loan. He is deeply grateful to those who help, as they know he will be—more grateful than for ordinary campaign contributions (which do not increase his personal wealth). And as they paid him, so he will pay them. In the coming months and years, they receive government benefits—maybe favorable legislation, maybe prized appointments, maybe lucrative contracts. The politician is happy; the donors are happy. The only loser is the public. It inevitably suffers from government corruption.

    The campaign finance measure at issue here has for two decades checked the crooked exchanges just described. The provision, Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, prohibited a candidate from using post-election donations to repay loans exceeding $250,000 that he made to his campaign. The theory of the legislation is easy to grasp. Political contributions that will line a candidate’s own pockets, given after his election to office, pose a special danger of corruption. The candidate has a more-than-usual interest in obtaining the money (to replenish his personal finances), and is now in a position to give something in return. The donors well understand his situation, and are eager to take advantage of it. In short, everyone’s incentives are stacked to enhance the risk of dirty dealing. At the very least—even if an illicit exchange does not occur— the public will predictably perceive corruption in post-election payments directly enriching an officeholder. Congress enacted Section 304 to protect against those harms.

    In striking down the law today, the Court greenlights all the sordid bargains Congress thought right to stop. The theory of the decision (unlike of the statute) is hard to fathom. The majority says that Section 304 violates the candidate’s First Amendment rights by interfering with his ability to “self-fund” his campaign. Ante, at 12. But the candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes. The law impedes only his ability to use other people’s money to finance his campaign—much as standard (and permissible) contribution limits do. And even that third-party restriction is a modest one, applying only to post- (not pre-) election donations to repay sizable (not small) loans. So the majority overstates the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes. At the same time, the majority understates the anticorruption values Section 304 serves. In the majority’s view, there is “scant” danger here of quid pro quo corruption; loan repayments produce only the “sort of ‘corruption’” in which contributors wield “greater influence” over candidates than they otherwise would. Ante, at 16–17, 21. Assume away all objections to that distinction, which even the majority concedes is “vague,” ante, at 16; for better or worse, it underlies this Court’s recent campaign finance decisions. Still, the conduct targeted by Section 304 threatens, if anything does, both corruption and the appearance of corruption of the quid pro quo kind. That is because the regulated transactions—as Members of Congress well knew from experience personally enrich those already elected to office. In allowing those payments to go forward unrestrained, today’s decision can only bring this country’s political system into further disrepute. [8]

    		”
    —Justice Elena Kagan

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Media coverage

    The following table lists media coverage related to the case Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate:

    October term 2021-2022

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2021-2022

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 4, 2021. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[11]

    The court agreed to hear 68 cases during its 2021-2022 term.[12] Four cases were dismissed and one case was removed from the argument calendar.[13]

    The court issued decisions in 66 cases during its 2021-2022 term. Three cases were decided without argument. Between 2007 and 2021, SCOTUS released opinions in 1,128 cases, averaging 75 cases per year.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate, decided May 16, 2022
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "21-12 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE: QUESTION PRESENTED:," accessed September 30, 2021
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Ted Cruz for Senate v. Fed. Election Comm'n, decided March 30, 2020
    4. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "ORDER LIST: 594 U.S.," September 30, 2021
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 SCOTUSblog, "Justices add five new cases to their docket from “long conference,” including Cruz campaign case," September 30, 2021
    6. ↑ U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Ted Cruz for Senate, et al. v. FEC, decided June 3, 2021
    7. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate and Senator Rafael Edward "Ted" Cruz: JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT," accessed October 7, 2021
    8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    9. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued January 19, 2022
    10. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued January 19, 2022
    11. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed February 4, 2021
    12. ↑ Consolidated cases are counted as one case for purposes of this number.
    13. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Order List: 593 U.S.," May 17, 2021
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