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Howell v. Howell

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Supreme Court of the United States
Howell v. Howell
Reference: 15-1031
Issue: Military benefits
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: March 20, 2017
Decided: May 15, 2017
Outcome
Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded
Vote
8-0 to reverse and remand
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan
Concurring
Thomas


Howell v. Howell is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Arizona Supreme Court. On May 15, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.

In the case, the court held that a state court could not require a disabled veteran to compensate a divorced spouse for the loss in the divorced spouse’s portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by a veteran's decision to take disability benefits. Those benefits, under federal law, require a veteran to forfeit an equivalent amount of retirement pay. Here the Supreme Court held that the veteran was not obligated to reimburse his former spouse for the reduction in pay to which she was entitled as part of a divorce decree.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A former veteran elected to take VA disability benefits which, by law, reduced the equitable portions of military retirement pay (MRP) that were distributed to both the veteran and to his ex-wife. The ex-wife sued, claiming a vested property interest under state law and seeking an amount that she would have received prior to the reduction resulting from the veteran's VA election. The veteran argued federal law prevented such a ruling, but the Arizona Supreme Court held that the federal law in question, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), did not preempt a state court's ruling in favor of the veteran's ex-wife.
  • The issue: Can a state court order a veteran who elects to take disability payments after a divorce proceeding to reimburse his or her ex-spouse for the reduction in the ex-spouse's share of MRP or is such an order preempted by the USFSPA?
  • The outcome: On May 15, 2017, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.


    • In brief: Beginning in 1992, and pursuant to their 1991 divorce agreement, John and Sandra Howell received equitable amounts of John's military retirement pay (MRP). In 2005, John elected to take VA disability payments effective from July 1, 2004, which, under federal law, reduced the amount of disposable MRP that could be divided between John and Sandra once VA benefits were reduced from John's MRP. Sandra sued in 2013 seeking her equitable portion of the MRP prior to the reduction for VA benefits. An Arizona family court granted her request back to December 1, 2011. A court of appeals upheld the ruling. John argued on appeal that a federal law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), preempted the state court's ruling because VA disability payments are not considered divisible assets. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that argument and upheld the lower court's award to Sandra. Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017.

    You can review the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion here.[1]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case

    Background

    In 1991, John and Sandra Howell divorced in the state of Arizona. As part of their divorce agreement, Sandra was entitled to and awarded 50% of John's military pension beginning when he retired from the Air Force. John retired in 1992 and both he and his wife received 50% of John's military retirement pay (MRP). In 2005, however, Sandra's award was reduced because John received a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) waiver for disability payments. Federal law provides that a veteran cannot collect VA disability benefits unless the veteran waives an equivalent amount of money received as MRP. John elected a VA waiver that was effective from July 1, 2004. This reduced the amount, but not the percentage, of MRP that was awarded to Sandra Howell, as John collected the entirety of the VA disability benefits; the remaining MRP was then divided equally between the Howell's once the VA benefit was deducted from John's MRP.[1]

    In 2013, Sandra filed a motion which sought to force the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to divide John's MRP as it was provided in the 1991 divorce agreement - that is, equally and without consideration of the VA waiver - and she sought judgment against John for an amount equivalent to the reductions in MRP to which she argued she was entitled from July 1, 2004. John moved to dismiss the request under state law, but the court refused that request; the court held that Sandra had established a vested property right and that John's election to take VA disability benefits could not deprive her of that right. Sandra was awarded $3,813, an amount equivalent to her portion of the MRP reductions after December 1, 2011. The court held that she was not able to collect any damages prior to that date. The court further held that John was responsible for ensuring that Sandra receive her full 50% portion of John's MRP without regard for his disability.[1]

    On appeal, John raised the argument that a federal law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), preempted the lower court's authority to order John to repay Sandra for her reduction in MRP. The court of appeals rejected that argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal, but the Arizona Supreme Court opted to review the argument. The court acknowledged "although generally we refuse to consider arguments newly raised on appeal, this is a prudential rule, and we have made exceptions to consider issues of public importance that are likely to recur. ... Such reasons exist here. Also, the federal preemption issue is a legal one and the parties have fully briefed it. For these reasons, we consider John's arguments."[1]

    John argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mansell v. Mansell governed in this case. In Mansell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that although the USFSPA gives state courts permission to divide disposable MRP in a divorce proceeding, state courts are prohibited from dividing MRP that has been waived in order to receive disability payments. The Arizona Supreme Court, however, held that John's reading of Mansell was incorrect. According to the court's opinion,[1]

    “

    We agree that the family court cannot divide MRP that has been waived to obtain disability benefits either at the time of the decree or thereafter. But unlike the situation in Mansell, that did not occur here. Sandra was awarded fifty percent of the MRP years before John unilaterally elected to receive disability pay in lieu of a portion of the MRP. The 2014 Order did not divide the MRP subject to the VA waiver, order John to rescind the waiver, or direct him to pay any amount to Sandra from his disability pay. Under these circumstances, the family court did not violate the USFSPA or Mansell because it did not treat the MRP subject to the VA waiver as divisible property.

    Although requiring John to reimburse Sandra diminishes the overall income increase he received when he elected the VA waiver (he retains the tax benefits of disability payments), we are not persuaded that the USFSPA prohibits this result. As the Mansell Court recognized, '[b]ecause domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law ... Congress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state authority in this area.' ... The Court will not find federal preemption, therefore, absent evidence that it is 'positively required by direct enactment.'

    Nothing in the USFSPA directly prohibits a state court from ordering a veteran who makes a post-decree VA waiver to reimburse the ex-spouse for reducing his or her share of MRP. Absent such direct prohibition, we decline to find federal preemption. [2]

    		”

    John appealed the Arizona Supreme Court's substantive ruling on a federal law to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Petitioner's challenge

    John Howell, the petitioner, challenged the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court that the USFSPA permits a state court to order a veteran who elects to take disability payments after a divorce proceeding to reimburse his or her ex-spouse for the reduction in the ex-spouse's share of MRP.

    Certiorari granted

    On February 16, 2016, John Howell, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Arizona Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Howell's certiorari request on December 2, 2016. Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017.

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "Whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act preempts a state court's order directing a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse's portion of the veteran's military retirement pay, where that reduction results from the veteran's post-divorce waiver of retirement pay in order to receive compensation for a service-connected disability."[3]



    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[4]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[5]

    Outcome

    Decision

    Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. The court held that a state court could not require a disabled veteran to compensate a divorced spouse for the loss in the divorced spouse’s portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by a veteran's decision to take disability benefits. Those benefits, under federal law, require a veteran to forfeit an equivalent amount of retirement pay. Here the Supreme Court held that the veteran was not obligated to reimburse his former spouse for the reduction in pay to which she was entitled as part of a divorce decree.[6]

    Opinion

    In his opinion for the court, Justice Breyer framed the question and answer thusly, "Can the State subsequently increase, pro rata, the amount the divorced spouse receives each month from the veteran’s retirement pay in order to indemnify the divorced spouse for the loss caused by the veteran’s waiver? The question is complicated, but the answer is not. Our cases and the statute make clear that the answer to the indemnification question is 'no.'"[6]

    Justice Breyer noted that the court's opinion in Mansell v. Mansell was dispositive in this case. He wrote,[6]

    “

    In Mansell, the Court held that federal law completely pre-empts the States from treating waived military retirement pay as divisible community property. ... Yet that which federal law pre-empts is just what the Arizona family court did here. ... The Arizona Supreme Court, the respondent, and the Solicitor General try to distinguish Mansell. But we do not find their efforts convincing ...

    We see nothing in this circumstance that makes the reimbursement award to Sandra any the less an award of the portion of military retirement pay that John waived in order to obtain disability benefits. And that is the portion that Congress omitted from the Act’s definition of 'disposable retired pay,' namely, the portion that federal law prohibits state courts from awarding to a divorced veteran’s former spouse. ... That the Arizona courts referred to Sandra’s interest in the waivable portion as having 'vested' does not help. State courts cannot 'vest' that which (under governing federal law) they lack the authority to give. ...

    Neither can the State avoid Mansell by describing the family court order as an order requiring John to 'reimburse' or to 'indemnify' Sandra, rather than an order that divides property. The difference is semantic and nothing more ... Regardless of their form, such reimbursement and indemnification orders displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress. All such orders are thus pre-empted.[2]

    		”

    As a result of the court's opinion, the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

    Concurring opinions

    Justice Clarence Thomas authored a one-paragraph opinion in the case concurring in part and in the judgment. He wrote,[6]

    “

    I join all of the opinion of the Court except its brief discussion of 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption. ... As I have previously explained, '[t]hat framework is an illegitimate basis for finding the pre-emption of state law.' ... In any event, that framework is not necessary to support the Court’s judgment in this case. [2]

    		”

    Dissenting opinions

    There were no dissenting opinions filed in this case.


    The opinion

    Filings

    The U.S. Supreme Court granted Howell's certiorari request on December 2, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' briefs

    • John Howell, the petitioner, filed a merits brief on January 17, 2017.
    • Sandra Howell, the respondent, filed a merits brief on February 16, 2017.

    Amicus curiae briefs

    The following groups filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioner, John Howell:

    • Brief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and Operation Firing for Effect

    The United States of America filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the respondent, Sandra Howell:

    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • John Howell, the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on February 16, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The United States of America filed an amicus curiae brief in support of granting certiorari.

    • Brief of the United States of America

    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Supreme Court of Arizona, In re the marriage of Sandra Howell and John Howell, filed December 2, 2015
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    3. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Howell v. Howell, December 2, 2016
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Howell v. Howell, argued March 20, 2017
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Howell v. Howell, argued March 20, 2017
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Supreme Court of the United States, Howell v. Howell, decided May 15, 2017
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