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Sessions v. Morales-Santana

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Sessions v. Morales-Santana | |
Reference: 15-1191 | |
Issue: Immigration | |
Term: 2016 | |
Important Dates | |
Argued: November 9, 2016 Decided: June 12, 2017 | |
Outcome | |
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded | |
Vote | |
6-2 to affirm in part, 8-0 to reverse in part | |
Majority | |
To affirm: Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan To reverse: Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan | |
Concurring | |
Thomas (concurring in the judgment in part) • Alito (concurring in the judgment in part) |
Sessions v. Morales-Santana is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on November 9, 2016. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. On June 12, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the judgment of the Second Circuit. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito.
In this case, the court addressed provisions of immigration law, codified under 8 U.S.C. §1409, which set different requirements for children born overseas to a U.S. citizen parent and a non-citizen parent to acquire U.S. citizenship. Under the rules, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non-citizen father had citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child's birth. However, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non-citizen mother had citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child's birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. The law was later changed to a five-year requirement, not ten years.
The court held that these gender-based variations violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. However, as the court was not able to implement a new physical-presence rule governing all instances, the court noted that "Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender." In the interim, the court said that the current five-year rule for children born to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers should also apply to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.
In brief: The U.S. government sought to deport Luis Ramon Morales-Santana pursuant to his multiple felony convictions. Morales-Santana argued that he was a U.S. citizen and could not be deported. He claimed that he had derivative citizenship through his biological father, a U.S. citizen at the time of Morales-Santana's birth, and that the statutory provisions which the government believed denied recognition of his citizenship claim violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the law. Oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court was held on November 9, 2016.
You can review the Second Circuit's opinion here.[1]
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Case
Background
Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, the respondent, challenged a 2011 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen proceedings that would remove him from the United States pursuant to his multiple felony convictions. The BIA held that Morales-Santana was a lawful permanent resident, but not a citizen, of the United States. In determining that Morales-Santana was not a U.S. citizen, the BIA upheld Morales-Santana's deportation order. Morales-Santana claimed that he had derivative citizenship through his biological father, a U.S. citizen at the time of Morales-Santana's birth, and that the provisions which denied recognition of his citizenship violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the law.[1]
The provisions of law under review in this case were the requirements for derivative citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the 1952 Act). Jose Dolores Morales, the respondent's biological father, was born in 1900 in Puerto Rico and acquired U.S. citizenship through the Jones Act in 1917. Jose Morales was physically in Puerto Rico until February 27, 1919, 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he went to work in the Dominican Republic for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company. Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, the respondent, was born in the Dominican Republic. His biological mother was a Dominican national. Morales-Santana was legitimated, under statute, by his father when his father married his mother in 1970 and Morales-Santana came to the U.S. on lawful permanent resident status in 1975. Morales-Santana's father died in 1976.[1]
Under the 1952 Act,[1]
“ |
a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non-citizen father has citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child's birth ... By contrast, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non-citizen mother has citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child's birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. [2] |
” |
Under these statutory requirements, codified under 8 U.S.C. §1409, Morales-Santana's father met the obligations for transferring citizenship that applied to unwed citizen mothers but not to unwed citizen fathers. Jose Dolores Morales, Morales-Santana's father, left Puerto Rico for the Dominican Republic shortly before he turned 19 years old and, therefore, did not meet the statutory requiring a five-year physical presence in either the U.S. or a U.S. possession after the age of fourteen. Morales-Santana claimed that the different requirements for mothers and fathers under the 1952 Act discriminated on the basis of gender in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.[1][3]
In arguments before the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, the government advanced two interests to justify the distinction between mothers and fathers written into the 1952 Act: ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the United States and avoiding statelessness. Under a legal standard of review known as intermediate scrutiny, which is used by federal courts to review the constitutionality of laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, the government's classification schemes must serve actual and important government objectives, and the discriminatory mean employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.[1] The government sought an evaluation of the law under a less exacting standard of review known as rational basis, where courts will uphold the constitutionality of laws if the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The Second Circuit rejected that approach because the case on which the government's theory for rational basis review rested, Fiallo v. Bell, did not govern in this case. The court noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the deferential Fiallo standard to issues of gender discrimination under §1409, despite being asked to do so on at least three occasions.[1]
After determining that the intermediate standard of scrutiny applied, the Second Circuit rejected both interests advanced by the government, finding that the statute's gender-based distinction is not substantially related to the goal of ensuring a sufficient connection to the United States and "that avoidance of statelessness does not appear to have been Congress' actual purpose in establishing the physical presence requirements in the 1952 Act ... and in any event the gender-based distinctions in the 1952 Act's physical presence requirements are not substantially related to that objective."[1] The court also held that there were available gender-neutral alternatives available to the government to further these interests. Given this analysis, the Second Circuit held that Morales-Santana must be considered a U.S. citizen from the time of his birth. The BIA decision was subsequently reversed and remanded.[1]
Petitioner's challenge
Loretta Lynch challenged the Second Circuit's interpretation that requirements for establishing derivative citizenship under the 1952 Act which distinguish on the basis of gender violate the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.[4]
Certiorari granted
On March 22, 2016, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Lynch's certiorari request on June 28, 2016. Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on November 9, 2016. Lynch was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
Arguments
Questions presented
Questions presented: "The questions presented are:
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Audio
- Audio of oral argument:[5]
Transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[6]
Outcome
Decision
On June 12, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the judgment of the Second Circuit. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito.[7]
Opinion
In her opinion for the court, Justice Ginsburg addressed provisions of immigration law, codified under 8 U.S.C. §1409, which set different requirements for children born overseas to a U.S. citizen parent and a non-citizen parent to acquire U.S. citizenship. Under the rules, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non-citizen father had citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child's birth. However, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non-citizen mother had citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child's birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. The law was later changed to a five-year requirement, not ten years.
The court held that these gender-based variations violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. However, as the court was not able to implement a new physical-presence rule governing all instances, the court noted that "Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender." In the interim, the court said that the current five-year rule for children born to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers should also apply to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.[7]
As a result of the court's opinion, the judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Concurring opinions
Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the court's holding on Morales-Santana's remedy was all that was required in this case and that this was the only portion of the court's opinion regarding the Second Circuit's judgment which he could join. He wrote, "the Court today holds that we are 'not equipped to' remedy the equal protection injury that respondent claims his father suffered under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952. ... I agree with that holding ... Because respondent cannot obtain relief in any event, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the 1952 version of the INA was constitutional, whether respondent has thirdparty standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of his father, or whether other immigration laws (such as the current versions of §§1401(g) and 1409) are constitutional."[7]
Dissenting opinions
There were no dissenting opinions filed in this case.
The opinion
Filings
The court granted Lynch's certiorari request on June 28, 2016.
Merits filings
Parties' filings
- Loretta Lynch, the petitioner, filed a merits brief on August 19, 2016. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
- Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, the respondent, filed a merits brief on September 26, 2016.
- Lynch filed a reply brief on the merits on October 26, 2016. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
Amicus curiae filings
The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the respondent, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana.
- Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al.
- Brief of Equality Now et al.
- Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center et al.
- Brief of various constitutional law, federal courts, citizenship, and remedies scholars
- Brief of various history, political science, and law professors
- Brief of various population and family scholars
- Brief of various scholars on statelessness
Certiorari filings
Parties' filings
- Loretta Lynch, the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on March 22, 2016. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
- Luis Ramon Morales-Santana, the respondent, filed a brief in opposition to certiorari on May 23, 2016.
- Lynch filed a reply to the brief in opposition on June 7, 2016. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana v. Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney General, decided July 8, 2015
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Cornell University's Legal Information Institute, "8 U.S. Code § 1409 - Children born out of wedlock," accessed September 25, 2016
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, June 28, 2016
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, argued November 9, 2016
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, argued November 9, 2016
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Supreme Court of the United States, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, June 12, 2017