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Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina

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Supreme Court of the United States
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina
Term: 2022
Important Dates
Argued: October 31, 2022
Decided: June 29, 2023
Outcome
reversed
Vote
6-3
Majority
Chief Justice John RobertsClarence ThomasSamuel AlitoNeil GorsuchBrett KavanaughAmy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Clarence ThomasNeil GorsuchBrett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Ketanji Brown JacksonSonia SotomayorElena Kagan

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 29, 2023, during the court's October 2022-2023 term. The case was argued before the court on October 31, 2022.

When the Supreme Court granted review in the case on January 24, 2022, the case was consolidated with Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard. On July 22, 2022, the cases were no longer consolidated. Click here to learn more about the case's background.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) challenged the admissions programs of the University of North Carolina, and argued that the university's use of race as a factor in admissions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment.[1][2] SFFA asked the Supreme Court to overrule its 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger that upheld the use of race-conscious admissions programs so long as they were narrowly tailored for a compelling interest.[1] Click here to learn more about the cases' background details.
  • The issue: The case concerned the legality of institutions of higher education using race as a factor in admissions decisions.
  • The questions presented:
    1. "Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions?
    2. "Can a university reject a race-neutral alternative because it would change the composition of the student body, without proving that the alternative would cause a dramatic sacrifice in academic quality or the educational benefits of overall student-body diversity?"[3]
  • The outcome : The court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit in a 6-3 ruling, holding that "Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."[4] Justice Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court.

  • Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. Click here to review the lower court's opinion.[1]

    Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina came on a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.[2] The case being considered was decided by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, which can be found here.[5]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in the case:

    Background

    Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA), the plaintiff in both consolidated cases, challenged the legality of the race-conscious admissions programs used by institutions of higher education that receive federal funding. SFFA alleged that these programs violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment.

    Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

    The case law on race-conscious admissions programs is governed by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, which found that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program did not violate the 14th Amendment or Title VI.[6] There, the court upheld the use of such race-conscious programs so long as the use of race is "narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests."[6] The court in Grutter established that a narrowly-tailored program must be flexible and non-mechanical, and it cannot use a quota system. It must also make a good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives. Additionally, the program cannot "unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups," and the program must be limited in duration.[6]

    In the opinion's conclusion, the court stated:[6]

    In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Consequently, petitioner's statutory claims based on Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also fail.[7]

    Factual and procedural background

    See also: Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina

    In the case at issue in this appeal, SFFA asked the Supreme Court to overturn its decision in Grutter and rule on whether the University of North Carolina's (UNC) policies violate Title VI and the U.S. Constitution. Because UNC is a public university, it is subject to the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.[2]

    In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina, SFFA appealed to the Supreme Court on November 11, 2021, directly from the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit ruled, using a process known as a writ of certiorari before judgment. The Middle District of North Carolina decided in favor of the legality of UNC's admissions program.[2]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[3]

    Questions presented:
    1. Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions?
    2. Can a university reject a race-neutral alternative because it would change the composition of the student body, without proving that the alternative would cause a dramatic sacrifice in academic quality or the educational benefits of overall student-body diversity?[7]

    Oral argument

    The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 31, 2022.

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[8]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[9]

    Outcome

    In a 6-3 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit, holding that "Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."[4] Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the court.[4]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:[4]

    For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. Both programs lack sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereotyping, and lack meaningful end points. We have never permitted admissions programs to work in that way, and we will not do so today.

    At the same time, as all parties agree, nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise. See, e.g., 4 App. in No. 21–707, at 1725– 1726, 1741; Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 10. But, despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today. (A dissenting opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the majority opinion.) “[W]hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows,” and the prohibition against racial discrimination is “levelled at the thing, not the name.” Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867). A benefit to a student who overcame racial discrimination, for example, must be tied to that student’s courage and determination. Or a benefit to a student whose heritage or culture motivated him or her to assume a leadership role or attain a particular goal must be tied to that student’s unique ability to contribute to the university. In other words, the student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an individual—not on the basis of race.

    Many universities have for too long done just the opposite. And in doing so, they have concluded, wrongly, that the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges bested, skills built, or lessons learned but the color of their skin. Our constitutional history does not tolerate that choice.

    [7]

    —Justice Chief Justice John Roberts

    Concurring opinion: Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[4]

    The great failure of this country was slavery and its progeny. And, the tragic failure of this Court was its misinterpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments, as Justice Harlan predicted in Plessy. We should not repeat this mistake merely because we think, as our predecessors thought, that the present arrangements are superior to the Constitution.

    The Court’s opinion rightly makes clear that Grutter is, for all intents and purposes, overruled. And, it sees the universities’ admissions policies for what they are: rudderless, race-based preferences designed to ensure a particular racial mix in their entering classes. Those policies fly in the face of our colorblind Constitution and our Nation’s equality ideal. In short, they are plainly—and boldly—unconstitutional. See Brown II, 349 U. S., at 298 (noting that the Brown case one year earlier had “declare[d] the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional”).

    While I am painfully aware of the social and economic ravages which have befallen my race and all who suffer discrimination, I hold out enduring hope that this country will live up to its principles so clearly enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: that all men are created equal, are equal citizens, and must be treated equally before the law. [7]

    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Concurring opinion: Gorsuch

    Justice Neil Gorsuch also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:[4]

    In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress took vital steps toward realizing the promise of equality under the law. As important as those initial efforts were, much work remained to be done—and much remains today. But by any measure, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stands as a landmark on this journey and one of the Nation’s great triumphs. We have no right to make a blank sheet of any of its provisions. And when we look to the clear and powerful command Congress set forth in that law, these cases all but resolve themselves. Under Title VI, it is never permissible “‘to say “yes” to one person . . . but to say “no” to another person’” even in part “‘because of the color of his skin.’” Bakke, 438 U. S., at 418 (opinion of Stevens, J.). [7]

    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Concurring opinion: Kavanaugh

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh also filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:[4]

    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON disagree with the Court’s decision. I respect their views. They thoroughly recount the horrific history of slavery and Jim Crow in America, cf. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 395–402 (opinion of Marshall, J.), as well as the continuing effects of that history on African Americans today. And they are of course correct that for the last five decades, Bakke and Grutter have allowed narrowly tailored racebased affirmative action in higher education.

    But I respectfully part ways with my dissenting colleagues on the question of whether, under this Court’s precedents, race-based affirmative action in higher education may extend indefinitely into the future. The dissents suggest that the answer is yes. But this Court’s precedents make clear that the answer is no. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342–343; Dowell, 498 U. S., at 247–248; Croson, 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.). [7]

    —Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Dissenting opinion: Sotomayor

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:[4]

    The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enshrines a guarantee of racial equality. The Court long ago concluded that this guarantee can be enforced through race-conscious means in a society that is not, and has never been, colorblind. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court recognized the constitutional necessity of racially integrated schools in light of the harm inflicted by segregation and the “importance of education to our democratic society.” Id., at 492–495. For 45 years, the Court extended Brown’s transformative legacy to the context of higher education, allowing colleges and universities to consider race in a limited way and for the limited purpose of promoting the important benefits of racial diversity. This limited use of race has helped equalize educational opportunities for all students of every race and background and has improved racial diversity on college campuses. Although progress has been slow and imperfect, race-conscious college admissions policies have advanced the Constitution’s guarantee of equality and have promoted Brown’s vision of a Nation with more inclusive schools.

    Today, this Court stands in the way and rolls back decades of precedent and momentous progress. It holds that race can no longer be used in a limited way in college admissions to achieve such critical benefits. In so holding, the Court cements a superficial rule of colorblindness as a constitutional principle in an endemically segregated society where race has always mattered and continues to matter. The Court subverts the constitutional guarantee of equal protection by further entrenching racial inequality in education, the very foundation of our democratic government and pluralistic society. Because the Court’s opinion is not grounded in law or fact and contravenes the vision of equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, I dissent. [7]

    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor

    Dissenting opinion: Jackson

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.

    In her dissent, Justice Jackson wrote:[4]

    The only way out of this morass—for all of us—is to stare at racial disparity unblinkingly, and then do what evidence and experts tell us is required to level the playing field and march forward together, collectively striving to achieve true equality for all Americans. It is no small irony that the judgment the majority hands down today will forestall the end of race-based disparities in this country, making the colorblind world the majority wistfully touts much more difficult to accomplish...

    Turning back the clock (to a time before the legal arguments and evidence establishing the soundness of UNC’s holistic admissions approach existed), the Court indulges those who either do not know our Nation’s history or long to repeat it. Simply put, the race-blind admissions stance the Court mandates from this day forward is unmoored from critical real-life circumstances. Thus, the Court’s meddling not only arrests the noble generational project that America’s universities are attempting, it also launches, in effect, a dismally misinformed sociological experiment.

    Time will reveal the results. Yet the Court’s own missteps are now both eternally memorialized and excruciatingly plain. For one thing—based, apparently, on nothing more than Justice Powell’s initial say so—it drastically discounts the primary reason that the racial-diversity objectives it excoriates are needed, consigning race-related historical happenings to the Court’s own analytical dustbin. Also, by latching onto arbitrary timelines and professing insecurity about missing metrics, the Court sidesteps unrefuted proof of the compelling benefits of holistic admissions programs that factor in race (hard to do, for there is plenty), simply proceeding as if no such evidence exists. Then, ultimately, the Court surges to vindicate equality, but Don Quixote style—pitifully perceiving itself as the sole vanguard of legal high ground when, in reality, its perspective is not constitutionally compelled and will hamper the best judgments of our world-class educational institutions about who they need to bring onto their campuses right now to benefit every American, no matter their race.

    The Court has come to rest on the bottom-line conclusion that racial diversity in higher education is only worth potentially preserving insofar as it might be needed to prepare Black Americans and other underrepresented minorities for success in the bunker, not the boardroom (a particularly awkward place to land, in light of the history the majority opts to ignore).106 It would be deeply unfortunate if the Equal Protection Clause actually demanded this perverse, ahistorical, and counterproductive outcome. To impose this result in that Clause’s name when it requires no such thing, and to thereby obstruct our collective progress toward the full realization of the Clause’s promise, is truly a tragedy for us all.

    [7]

    —Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.


    October term 2022-2023

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2022-2023

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 3, 2022. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[10]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes