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United States v. Davis

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Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Davis
Term: 2018
Important Dates
Argument: April 17, 2019
Decided: June 24, 2019
Outcome
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
Vote
5-4
Majority
Ruth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSonia SotomayorElena KaganNeil Gorsuch
Dissenting
Brett KavanaughClarence ThomasSamuel AlitoChief Justice John G. Roberts


United States v. Davis is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on April 17, 2019, during the court's 2018-2019 term. It came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.[1]

On June 24, 2019, the court issued a 5-4 decision that affirmed in part and vacated in part the 5th Circuit's ruling. The court also remanded the case. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito and partially joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Click here for more information on the opinion.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A jury found defendants Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover guilty on November 19, 2015, on counts including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. The defendants challenged their sentences and the 5th Circuit denied their challenges. After the defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, the court remanded the case to the 5th Circuit, which confirmed in part and vacated in part. The court vacated its decision about the aiding and abetting conspiracy count because it rests on a clause defining an offense as a crime of violence which could be considered unconstitutionally vague.
  • The issues: Whether the subsection-specific definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime, is unconstitutionally vague.
  • The outcome: On June 24, 2019, the court issued a 5-4 decision that affirmed in part and vacated in part the 5th Circuit's ruling. The court held 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)—the residual clause—was unconstitutionally vague. The case was remanded.[2]

  • You can review the lower court's opinion here.[3]

    Timeline

    • June 24, 2019: The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the 5th Circuit's ruling. The court also remanded the case.
    • April 17, 2019: Oral argument
    • January 4, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
    • October 3, 2018: Petition filed with the U.S. Supreme Court
    • September 7, 2018: The 5th Circuit affirmed in part, vacated the conviction, and remanded in part the case

    Background

    A jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts on November 19, 2015. Those counts included the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (referred to as a "Hobbs Act robbery") as well as the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. On the same day, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts which included the two mentioned above. Both defendants challenged their sentences, but the 5th Circuit denied both challenges on January 31, 2017. The defendants then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, the court remanded the case back to the 5th Circuit to look into further in light of the Dimaya decision.[3]

    The 5th Circuit confirmed in part and vacated in part. A section of U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) has both an "elements clause" and a "residual clause" with different definitions of offenses as crimes of violence. The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another," and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense."[4]

    In Dimaya, the U.S. Supreme Court considered and ultimately invalidated a residual clause identical to the one in 18 U.S.C. § 924. However, the Court did not address the elements clause; therefore, the 5th Circuit in its decision held the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause. Resulting from this holding, the 5th Circuit affirmed its prior decision regarding the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated regarding the aiding and abetting conspiracy count because the former rests on the elements clause while the latter rests on the residual clause.[3]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[5]

    Questions presented:
    • Whether the subsection-specific definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which applies only in the limited context of a federal criminal prosecution for possessing, using or carrying a firearm in connection with acts comprising such a crime, is unconstitutionally vague.

    Outcome

    On June 24, 2019, the court issued a 5-4 decision that affirmed in part and vacated in part the 5th Circuit's ruling. The court also remanded the case. The court held that 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)—the residual clause—was unconstitutionally vague.[2]

    Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito and partially joined by Chief Justice John Roberts.[2]

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch rejected the government's argument that lower courts should adopt a case-specific approach when considering cases involving crimes of violence under §924(c)(3)(B). Gorsuch wrote:[2]

    It might have been a good idea for Congress to have written a residual clause for §924(c) using a case-specific approach. It doesn’t tell us whether Congress actually wrote such a clause. To answer that question, we need to examine the statute’s text, context, and history. And when we do that, it becomes clear that the statute simply cannot support the government's newly minted case-specific theory.[6]

    Gorsuch also wrote that accepting the government's argument for a case-specific approach "would produce a series of seemingly inexplicable results."[2]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Kavanaugh did not agree with the majority's opinion that 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. Kavanaugh wrote:[2]

    The Court's decision today will make it harder to prosecute violent gun crimes in the future. The Court’s decision also will likely mean that thousands of inmates who committed violent gun crimes will be released far earlier than Congress specified when enacting §924(c). [6]


    Kavanaugh, citing previous court decisions, argued that precedent showed how "criminal laws that apply a risk standard to a defendant’s conduct are not too vague, but instead are perfectly constitutional." He also argued that language used in 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B) was widespread in federal and state criminal statute.[2]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Audio


    Transcript

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes