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Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren

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Supreme Court of the United States
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren
Term: 2017
Important Dates
Argument: March 21, 2018
Decided: May 21, 2018
Outcome
Washington State Supreme Court vacated
Vote
7 - 2
Majority
Neil GorsuchChief Justice John G. RobertsAnthony KennedyRuth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSonia SotomayorElena Kagan
Concurring
Chief Justice John G. RobertsAnthony Kennedy
Dissenting
Clarence ThomasSamuel Alito


Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on March 21, 2018. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Washington State Supreme Court.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A couple who owned property adjacent to land owned by the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe filed suit, seeking a court order that a parcel of disputed land belonged to them rather than to the Tribe. The Tribe moved to dismiss the suit, arguing it was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. A Washington state superior court denied the Tribe's motion. On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed. The Washington State Supreme Court concluded that because the suit only required the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the land—not over the Tribe—sovereign immunity did not prevent the suit from going forward. The Tribe appealed to the United States Supreme Court.[1]
  • The issue: "Does a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcome the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity when the Tribe has not waived immunity and Congress has not unequivocally abrogated it?"[2]
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Washington State Supreme Court, ordering the state court to consider alternative common law arguments.[3]

  • You can review the lower court's opinion here.[1]

    Background

    Legal question

    This was a case about sovereign immunity and in rem jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction is the power of a court to exercise authority over property. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court to exercise authority over a person or group. Under United States law, Native American tribes are entitled to sovereign immunity, which prevents them from being sued unless they consent to liability. Sovereign immunity also protects U.S. states and state agencies (like police departments) from suit. In this case, all parties agreed that the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity. The issue in this case was whether a court can exercise in rem jurisdiction to rule in a case involving disputed tribal property despite the Tribe's sovereign immunity.

    Case background

    Shailene and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe owned adjacent properties. A dispute arose over the ownership over part of the land. The Lundgrens filed a quiet title claim in a Washington state superior court, asking the court to rule that they owned the disputed land. To quiet title to property means to resolve a dispute over ownership. The Tribe filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the case could not move forward. The superior court agreed that the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity. However, the court concluded that it nevertheless had in rem jurisdiction to determine ownership of the disputed land and that it did not need personal jurisdiction over the Tribe in order to rule in the Lundgrens' quiet title claim. In other words, the court concluded, "It could determine ownership of the land without the Tribe's participation." The Tribe appealed.[1]

    Panel opinion

    On appeal, a majority of the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Charles W. Johnson wrote the opinion for the court:

    Superior courts in Washington have jurisdiction to exercise in rem jurisdiction to settle disputes over real property. Quiet title actions are proceedings in rem. In such proceedings, the court has jurisdiction over the property itself. Personal jurisdiction over the landowner is not required. A court exercising in rem jurisdiction is not necessarily deprived of its jurisdiction by a Tribe's assertion of sovereign immunity...Because the court determined there was in rem jurisdiction, it did not need to address sovereign immunity.[1][4]


    The majority concluded that in rem jurisdiction gave the superior court the ability to rule on the Lundgrens' quiet title claim despite the Tribe's assertion of sovereign immunity.[1]

    Four justices dissented. Justice Debra Stephens wrote the opinion for the dissent. Stephens wrote:

    While the existence of in rem jurisdiction gives a court authority to quiet title to real property without obtaining personal jurisdiction over affected parties, Civil Rule (CR) 19 counsels against exercising this authority in the face of a valid assertion of sovereign immunity...I would conclude that the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined in this quiet title action. The result is clear under our precedent: we should dismiss this case without reaching the merits of the Lundgrens' claims. Accordingly, I would reverse the superior court and remand for entry of an order of dismissal.[1][4]

    Petitioner's challenge

    The petitioner, the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, challenged the holding of the Washington State Supreme Court. The Tribe argued that, contrary to the Washington State Supreme Court's ruling, sovereign immunity required the superior court to dismiss the Lundgrens' claim.

    Certiorari granted

    On September 11, 2017, the petitioners initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Washington State Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted petitioners' request for certiorari on December 8, 2017. Argument in the case was held on March 21, 2018.[2]

    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "Does a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcome the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity when the Tribe has not waived immunity and Congress has not unequivocally abrogated it?"[2]

    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Outcome

    Decision

    The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Washington State Supreme Court, ordering the state court to consider on remand whether the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity applied in this case.[3]

    Majority opinion

    Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the majority. Gorsuch wrote that the Washington State Supreme Court had erred by distinguishing in rem actions from in personam actions in the context of tribal sovereign immunity. He wrote that the case the state supreme court had relied on to make the distinction "resolved nothing about the law of sovereign immunity." The court vacated the state supreme court's judgment on those grounds.[3]

    On remand, he wrote, the state supreme court should consider an alternative argument that arose late in the case. Specifically, the court should consider the common law rule that sovereign nations "enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immovable property located in the territory of another sovereign." That rule, which the court refers to as the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity, provided that sovereign immunity could not apply to protect a sovereign from suits involving immovable property (in other words, land) outside the sovereign's jurisdiction. Gorsuch directed the state supreme court to consider whether that exception applies here, because the contested land is outside the bounds of the tribe's reservation lands.[3]

    Gorsuch and the majority expressly declined to rule on whether the exception applied, electing to remand the case for the state supreme court's consideration first. Gorsuch concluded:

    Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record that will not expand the relief granted below, in this case we think restraint is the best use of discretion. Determining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before us; and the alternative argument for affirmance did not emerge until late in this case . . . This Court has often declined to take a 'first view' of questions that make their appearance in this posture, and we think that course the wise one today.[3][4]


    Concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts

    Chief Justice John Roberts concurred in the majority's opinion and also wrote separately, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Although Roberts joined the majority's opinion in full, he wrote that "that opinion poses an unanswered question: What precisely is someone in the Lundgrens’ position supposed to do?" Roberts expressed concern that property owners would not have a meaningful remedy to seek quiet title. He concluded, "I do not object to the Court’s determination to forgo consideration of the immovable-property rule at this time. But if it turns out that the rule does not extend to tribal assertions of rights in non-trust, non-reservation property, the applicability of sovereign immunity in such circumstances would, in my view, need to be addressed in a future case."[3]

    Dissent by Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Thomas criticized the court majority for failing to directly rule on the tribal immunity question at hand, writing that as a consequence, "the disagreement that led us to take this case will persist." He would have ruled that the immovable property exception applied in this case. He continued:

    The Court easily could have resolved that disagreement by addressing respondents’ alternative ground for affirmance . . . [The immovable property] exception is settled, longstanding, and obviously applies to tribal immunity—as it does to every other type of sovereign immunity that has ever been recognized. Although the Lundgrens did not raise this argument below, we have the discretion to reach it. I would have done so. The immovable-property exception was extensively briefed and argued, and its application here is straightforward. Addressing the exception now would have ensured that property owners like the Lundgrens can protect their rights and that States like Washington can protect their sovereignty. Because the Court unnecessarily chooses to leave them in limbo, I respectfully dissent.[3][4]

    Text of the opinion

    See also

    Footnotes