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Velazquez v. Bondi

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Supreme Court of the United States
Velazquez v. Bondi
Term: 2024
Important Dates
Argued: November 12, 2024
Decided: April 22, 2025
Outcome
reversed and remanded
Vote
5-4
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch • Ketanji Brown Jackson
Dissenting
Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
This article is about the court case previously known as Velazquez v. Garland. It became Velazquez v. Bondi following Pam Bondi's appointment as attorney general of the United States.

Velazquez v. Bondi is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 22, 2025, during the court's October 2024-2025 term. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on November 12, 2024.

In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, holding that if §1229c(b)(2)’s deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it is extended to the next business day. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)'s voluntary-departure period. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?"[2]
  • The outcome: In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit[1]


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Background

    Case summary

    The following are the parties to this case:[3]

    • Petitioner: Hugo Abisai Monsalvo Velazquez
      • Legal counsel: Gerard Justin Cedrone (Goodwin Procter, LLP)
    • Respondent: Pam Bondi

    The following summary of the case was published by SCOTUSblog:[5]

    “ In Monsalvo Velazquez v. Garland, the court will consider a procedural question in an immigration case – specifically, when the time for a noncitizen to voluntarily leave the country ends on a weekend or holiday, whether a noncitizen who files a motion to reopen immigration proceedings can avoid penalties for failing to leave the country by filing that motion on the following business day.[6] ”

    To learn more about this case, see the following:


    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

    [6]

    		”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]




    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, holding that if §1229c(b)(2)’s deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it is extended to the next business day. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    “

    That takes us to the merits. The Board’s final order of removal permitted the government to detain and remove Mr. Monsalvo if he failed to leave the country within ‘60 days . . . the maximum period allowed by’ §1229c(b)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. Everyone agrees the proper construction of that order is ‘governed by’ the proper construction of §1229c(b)(2). 88 F. 4th, at 1308. Like Mr. Monsalvo’s final order of removal, that statute sets forth a deadline expressed in terms of a number of ‘days.’ See §1229c(b)(2) (‘Permission to depart voluntarily under this subsection shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days’). But what does that mean: Does every calendar day count? Or does the statute operate to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day?

    In truth, the statute is susceptible to both understandings. An ordinary reader might understand ‘days’ to mean calendar days, no more or less. That is how the Board and the Tenth Circuit saw it. See supra, at 4–5. And, to be sure, we usually assume statutory terms bear their ordinary meaning ‘until and unless someone points to evidence suggesting otherwise.’ Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 163. But here, evidence suggesting the possibility of specialized meaning does exist. In legal settings, the term ‘days’ is often understood to extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. Various federal rules reflect this understanding. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(a)(1)(C). As do our own. See this Court’s Rule 30(1). The Ninth Circuit and the immigration judge in this case thought §1229c(b)(2) of a piece with that practice. See supra, at 2, 5. The question before us thus boils down to whether §1229c(b)(2) uses the term ‘days’ in its ordinary or specialized sense.

    To resolve that question, we turn to one of this Court’s customary interpretive tools. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding administrative construction,’ this Court generally presumes the new provision should be understood to work in harmony with what has come before. Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297–298 (1981); accord, United States v. Hill, 506 U. S. 546, 553–554 (1993); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 437 (1986).

    That presumption is all but dispositive here. For many years, Congress has authorized the executive branch to draw up regulations to enforce the immigration laws. See 8 U. S. C. §1103(a)(3). And since at least the 1950s, those regulations have provided that, when calculating the deadline for the ‘taking of any action,’ the term ‘day’ carries its specialized meaning by excluding Sundays and legal holidays if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. 8 CFR §1.1(a)(6) (1958) (emphasis added). In all the years since, the only notable change to this rule has been the addition of Saturdays to the list of excluded days. 52 Fed. Reg. 2935 (1987). Congress adopted §1229c(b)(2) against the backdrop of this consistent, longstanding administrative construction. And, given that, we presume the statute employs the same understanding. [6]

    		”
    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett as to Parts I and II.

    In his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “

    This Court granted certiorari to decide whether the deadline for a removable alien to voluntarily depart the United States extends to the next business day if it would otherwise fall on a weekend or public holiday. See 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2). But, the merits-stage briefing revealed a serious, novel jurisdictional objection that may bar our review. Given that complication, we should have vacated and remanded for the Tenth Circuit’s consideration in the first instance. Instead, the majority reaches the merits after finding jurisdiction based on a flawed theory of its own creation. I respectfully dissent.[6]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh.

    In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote:[1]

    “

    The provision before us is straightforward. It provides that ‘[p]ermission to depart voluntarily . . . shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days.’ §1229c(b)(2). Because I see no reason to apply a ‘specialized’ definition of ‘day,’ I would take that language for what it’s worth. ‘60 days’ means ‘60 days.’ I must therefore respectfully dissent.[6]

    		”
    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2024-2025

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2024-2025

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 7, 2024. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[9]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 U.S. Supreme Court, Velazquez v. Garland, decided April 15, 2025
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "23-929 VELAZQUEZ V. GARLAND," July 2, 2024
    3. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "23-929 - Velazquez v. Garland," accessed July 2, 2024
    4. ↑ Note: When this case was argued, counsel was given by former United States Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar.
    5. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Justices add five cases out of clean-up conference," July 2, 2024
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    7. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued November 12, 2024
    8. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued November 12, 2024
    9. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed January 24, 2022
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