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Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer

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Supreme Court of the United States
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer
Reference: 15-577
Issue: First Amendment
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: April 19, 2017
Decided: June 26, 2017
Outcome
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
Vote
7-2 to reverse and remand
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch
Concurring
Thomas (in part), Breyer (in the judgment), Gorsuch (in part)
Dissenting
Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Sonia Sotomayor


Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit.

In brief: Trinity Lutheran Church operates a licensed preschool and daycare center called The Learning Center. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy but, as a ministry of the church and as part of its daily programs, provides religious instruction from a Christian worldview. The Learning Center applied for a grant through a solid waste management program operated by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. At the time of the filing, the program offered grants for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires in order to resurface playgrounds. The Learning Center's grant application was denied, citing a provision of the Missouri Constitution that prohibits public money to be given in support of a church. Trinity Lutheran claimed that denying funds for a neutral, secular purpose on the basis of religion was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

In a 7-2 decision, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, holding that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources violated Trinity Lutheran Church's First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion by denying the church a public benefit on account of the church's religious status. The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.


HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers grants through its solid waste management program to qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires in order to resurface playgrounds. The Learning Center, a licensed preschool and daycare center of Trinity Lutheran Church, applied for a grant under the program but was denied. The DNR claimed that the department was prohibited from providing financial assistance directly to the church under Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.
  • The issue: Does excluding Trinity Lutheran Church from a Missouri DNR grant program providing funds for a neutral, secular purpose constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
  • The outcome: On June 26, 2017, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.


    • You can review the Eighth Circuit's opinion here.[1]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers "Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants" through its solid waste management program. The grants award DNR funds to qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires in order to resurface playgrounds. In 2012, Trinity Lutheran Church applied for a DNR grant to replace the playground surface of The Learning Center, a licensed preschool and daycare facility operated by Trinity Lutheran Church. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy but, as a ministry of the church and as part of its daily programs, provides religious instruction from a Christian worldview. On May 12, 2012, the program director of Missouri's waste management program informed the director of The Learning Center that the department would be unable to provide direct financial assistance to the church because to do so would violate Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution. That provision of the Missouri Constitution provides,

    “

    That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. [2]

    		”

    According to the Eighth Circuit's opinion, "A Solid Waste Management Program planner subsequently advised the Solid Waste Management District Director that Trinity Church's application ranked fifth out of forty four applications in 2012, and that fourteen projects were funded."[1]

    Trinity Lutheran filed a lawsuit against Sara Parker Pauley in her capacity as director of natural resources, arguing that the denial of its application for DNR funds violated the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution. A federal district court granted Pauley's motion to dismiss the case, holding that Trinity Lutheran failed to state a claim. Trinity Lutheran filed a motion to reconsider and petitioned the court for leave to amend its complaint to add a factual allegation that the DNR had given similar grants from the same program to "at least fifteen other religious organizations, including churches." The district court denied the church's motion to reconsider and its petition for leave to amend its complaint. Trinity Lutheran appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging all aspects of the district court's dismissal except for that court's dismissal of its freedom of speech claim under the First Amendment.[1]

    On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The panel held that while Trinity Lutheran couched its First and Fourteenth Amendment claims as an attack on the state DNR, "all its claims are plainly facial attacks on Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution ... which was cited by DNR as the sole basis for its denial." The circuit panel noted,[1]

    “

    the issue here is not what the State is constitutionally permitted to do, but whether the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause compel Missouri to provide public grant money directly to a church, contravening a long-standing state constitutional provision that is not unique to Missouri. No Supreme Court case ... has granted such relief. [2]

    		”

    The court held that neither the U.S. Supreme Court's nor the Supreme Court of Missouri's precedents hold that Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution violates the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Due to this interpretation, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court was correct to dismiss Trinity Lutheran's federal constitutional claims for failure to state a claim for which the courts could grant relief. The circuit panel also affirmed both the district court's dismissal of Trinity Lutheran's claims under state law and the district court's decision to deny Trinity Lutheran leave to amend its complaint.[1] Trinity Lutheran appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Carol Comer succeeded Pauley as director in January 2017 as was named as the respondent in the case.


    Petitioners' challenge

    Trinity Lutheran Church, the petitioner, is challenging the Missouri DNR's exclusion of churches from a program offering public funds for a neutral, secular program as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.[3]

    Certiorari granted

    On November 4, 2015, Trinity Lutheran Church, the petitioners, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Trinity Lutheran's certiorari request on January 15, 2016. Argument in the case was held on April 19, 2017.

    Question presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Question presented:

    "Whether the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when the state has no valid Establishment Clause concern."[3]


    Outcome

    On June 26, 2017, in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

    In the case, seven justices agreed that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources violated Trinity Lutheran Church's First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion by denying the church a public benefit on account of the church's religious status.[4]

    Opinion

    After a review of the factual and procedural history of the case, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Missouri regulation must be subjected to the court's highest form of review, strict scrutiny, and that the regulation failed to meet this test. Missouri had argued that the court's precedent in Locke v. Davey was controlling, but the court also rejected that argument. Chief Justice Roberts wrote,[4]

    “

    The Free Exercise Clause 'protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment' and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for 'special disabilities' based on their 'religious status.' ... Applying that basic principle, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest 'of the highest order.' ... The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny. ... The Department contends that merely declining to extend funds to Trinity Lutheran does not prohibit the Church from engaging in any religious conduct or otherwise exercising its religious rights. ... It is true the Department has not criminalized the way Trinity Lutheran worships or told the Church that it cannot subscribe to a certain view of the Gospel. But, as the Department itself acknowledges, the Free Exercise Clause protects against 'indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.' ...

    The Department attempts to get out from under the weight of our precedents by arguing that the free exercise question in this case is instead controlled by our decision in Locke v. Davey. It is not. ... Washington’s restriction on the use of its scholarship funds was different. ... Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church. ...

    The State in this case expressly requires Trinity Lutheran to renounce its religious character in order to participate in an otherwise generally available public benefit program, for which it is fully qualified. Our cases make clear that such a condition imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that must be subjected to the 'most rigorous' scrutiny. ... Under that stringent standard, only a state interest 'of the highest order' can justify the Department’s discriminatory policy. ... Yet the Department offers nothing more than Missouri’s policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns. ... In the face of the clear infringement on free exercise before us, that interest cannot qualify as compelling.[2]

    		”

    As a result of the court's opinion, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit was reversed and remanded.

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas wrote that he would not endorse the court's opinion in Locke at all, but because of the court's narrow application, he joined the court's opinion in part. Justice Thomas also wrote to note that he would not join the court's opinion as to footnote three.[4]

    Justice Stephen Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. In his view, the nature of the benefit provided by Missouri brought the case within the court's free exercise jurisprudence. He cautioned, however, that such application of the court's jurisprudence should be done so on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the benefit. He wrote, "the fact that the program at issue ultimately funds only a limited number of projects cannot itself justify a religious distinction. Nor is there any administrative or other reason to treat church schools differently. The sole reason advanced that explains the difference is faith. And it is that last-mentioned fact that calls the Free Exercise Clause into play. We need not go further. Public benefits come in many shapes and sizes. I would leave the application of the Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another day."[4]

    Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in part that was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch noted that he did not see a distinction between discrimination on the basis of religious status and on the basis of religious use. He wrote, "I don’t see why it should matter whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran things (use). It is free exercise either way."[4]

    Justice Gorsuch also noted that he could not concur with the court as to footnote three. Justice Gorsuch wrote,[4]

    “

    I am unable to join the footnoted observation ... that '[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.' Of course the footnote is entirely correct, but I worry that some might mistakenly read it to suggest that only 'playground resurfacing' cases, or only those with some association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the legal rules recounted in and faithfully applied by the Court’s opinion. Such a reading would be unreasonable for our cases are 'governed by general principles, rather than ad hoc improvisations.' ... And the general principles here do not permit discrimination against religious exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere else.[2]

    		”

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In her view, Justice Sotomayor believed that the court's precedent in Locke v. Davey should govern, as Missouri argued, and she expressed concern about the impact of the court's opinion here in future cases. She wrote,[4]

    “

    To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about recycling tires to resurface a playground. The stakes are higher. This case is about nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to both. ...

    At bottom, the Court creates the following rule today: The government may draw lines on the basis of religious status to grant a benefit to religious persons or entities but it may not draw lines on that basis when doing so would further the interests the Religion Clauses protect in other ways. Nothing supports this lopsided outcome. Not the Religion Clauses, as they protect establishment and free exercise interests in the same constitutional breath, neither privileged over the other. Not precedent, since we have repeatedly explained that the Clauses protect not religion but 'the individual’s freedom of conscience,' ... that which allows him to choose religion, reject it, or remain undecided. And not reason, because as this case shows, the same interests served by lifting government-imposed burdens on certain religious entities may sometimes be equally served by denying government-provided benefits to certain religious entities. ...

    The Court today dismantles a core protection for religious freedom provided in these Clauses. It holds not just that a government may support houses of worship with taxpayer funds, but that—at least in this case and perhaps in others ... it must do so whenever it decides to create a funding program. History shows that the Religion Clauses separate the public treasury from religious coffers as one measure to secure the kind of freedom of conscience that benefits both religion and government. If this separation means anything, it means that the government cannot, or at the very least need not, tax its citizens and turn that money over to houses of worship. The Court today blinds itself to the outcome this history requires and leads us instead to a place where separation of church and state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment. I dissent.[2]

    		”

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Filings

    The court granted Trinity Lutheran's certiorari request on January 15, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' filings

    • Trinity Lutheran Church, the petitioner, filed a merits brief on April 14, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioner, Trinity Lutheran Church.

    • Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice
    • Brief of the Association of Christian Schools International and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
    • Brief of the American Association of Christian Schools
    • Brief of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
    • Brief of Belmont Abbey College
    • Brief of the Bronx Household of Faith
    • Brief of the Christian Legal Society et al.
    • Brief of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities et al.
    • Brief of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission
    • Brief of the General Council of the Assemblies of God
    • Brief of the Institute for Justice
    • Brief of the Institutional Religious Freedom Alliance
    • Brief of the Justice and Freedom Fund
    • Brief of Liberty Counsel et al.
    • Brief of the National Association of Evangelicals
    • Brief of the Pacific Legal Foundation
    • Brief of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
    • Brief of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et al.
    • Brief of various law and religion practitioners
    • Brief of various members of Congress
    • Brief of WallBuilders, Inc. et al.
    • Brief of World Vision, Inc.


    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the respondent, Carol Comer.

    • Brief of the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty and the General Synod of the United Church of Christ
    • Brief of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
    • Brief of various legal and religious historians
    • Brief of various religious and civil rights organizations


    The following group filed an amicus curiae brief in support of neither party.

    • Brief of the American Jewish Committee


    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • Trinity Lutheran Church, the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on November 4, 2015.
    • Sara Pauley, the respondent, filed a brief in opposition to certiorari on December 7, 2015. Pauley was replaced as a party to the case by her successor, Carol Comer.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of granting certiorari.

    • Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice
    • Brief of the Association of Christian Schools International and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
    • Brief of the Ethics and Liberty Commission
    • Brief of the Foundation for Moral Law


    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Sara Parker Pauley, May 29, 2015
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley, January 15, 2016
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Supreme Court of the United States, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, June 26, 2017
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, argued April 19, 2017
    6. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, argued April 19, 2017
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