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Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

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Supreme Court of the United States
Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment
Term: 2025
Important Dates
Argued: December 1, 2025
Decided: March 25, 2026
Outcome
reversed and remanded
Vote
9-0
Majority
Chief Justice John RobertsClarence ThomasSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorElena KaganNeil GorsuchBrett KavanaughAmy Coney BarrettKetanji Brown Jackson
Concurring
Sonia SotomayorKetanji Brown Jackson

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 25, 2026, during the court's October 2025-2026 term. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on December 1, 2025.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court held that because Cox neither prompted its users to perform copyright infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerns a business's liability for copyright infringement. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it ‘distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement.’ Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users.

    Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for ‘materially contributing’ to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it?

    2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal.

    Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)? "[2]

  • The outcome: In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[1]

  • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Background

    Case summary

    The following are the parties to this case:[3]

    • Petitioner: Cox Communications, Inc., et al.
      • Legal counsel: E. Joshua Rosenkranz
    • Respondent: Sony Music Entertainment, et al.
      • Legal counsel: Paul D. Clement

    The following summary of the case was published by Oyez, a free law project from Cornell’s Legal Information Institute, Justia, and the Chicago-Kent College of Law:[4]

    Cox Communications, Inc. is a major internet service provider selling internet, telephone, and cable television to millions across the United States. Between 2013 and 2014, some of Cox’s internet subscribers used peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as BitTorrent, to download and distribute copyrighted songs owned by numerous record companies and music publishers, including Sony Music Entertainment (the “Plaintiffs”). These record companies, through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), hired a company called MarkMonitor to monitor illegal file sharing and notify internet service providers when infringement was detected. MarkMonitor sent Cox over 163,000 notices of infringement during the relevant period. In response, Cox operated a “thirteen-strike” policy, under which it warned or temporarily suspended subscribers after repeated notices, but in practice it rarely terminated service for copyright infringement, while regularly terminating service for nonpayment.

    Plaintiffs became frustrated with Cox’s limited enforcement against repeat infringers and sued Cox instead of its subscribers, alleging that Cox was secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring on its network. Specifically, plaintiffs contended Cox either intentionally contributed to or benefited from its subscribers’ infringements by failing to take adequate steps to stop it, thereby inducing or materially contributing to the unlawful acts.

    The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Cox statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and allowed the case to proceed to trial on theories of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The jury found Cox liable on both counts and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, reversed the vicarious liability verdict, and vacated the damages award, remanding the case for a new trial on damages. [5]

    To learn more about this case, see the following:

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:[6]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it ‘distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement.’ Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users.

    Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for ‘materially contributing’ to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it?

    2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal.

    Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)? [5]

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court held that because Cox neither prompted its users to perform copyright infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.[1] Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court.

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote:[1]

    Countless people use the Internet for legal activities, but some use it to illegally share copyrighted works, such as songs and movies. The Copyright Act authorizes copyright owners to sue these copyright infringers. 17 U. S. C. §§501(a), 504(a). In this case, however, instead of suing those infringers, the copyright owners sued petitioners, Cox Communications, Inc., and its subsidiary, who provided the Internet connections that the infringers used. They contended that Cox was itself liable for copyright infringement because it continued to provide known infringers with Internet access.

    Based on this theory of infringement, respondents, Sony Music Entertainment and other major copyright owners, secured a billion-dollar verdict against Cox. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that because Cox provided Internet service to known infringers, it was a willful infringer itself.

    Under our precedents, a company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights. Accordingly, we reverse. [5]

    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson.

    In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor wrote:[1]

    The facts of this case do not establish the requisite intent needed to hold Cox liable for infringement that occurred on its network. Because the majority needlessly curtails secondary liability in a manner inconsistent with both precedent and statute, I concur only in the judgment.[5]

    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2025-2026

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2025-2026

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 6, 2025. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions by mid-June.[9]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes