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Malloy v. Hogan
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| Malloy v. Hogan | |
| Reference: 378 U.S. 1 | |
| Term: 1964 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 5, 1964 Decided: June 15, 1964 | |
| Outcome | |
| Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors reversed | |
| Majority | |
| William Brennan • Earl Warren • Hugo Black • William Douglas • Arthur Goldberg | |
| Dissenting | |
| Tom Clark • John Harlan II • Potter Stewart • Byron White | |
Malloy v. Hogan is a case decided on June 15, 1964, by the United States Supreme Court that incorporated the protection against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to states. The case concerned an individual being held in contempt for refusing to provide testimony that may have incriminated himself. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that individuals' Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is applicable in state courts. To read more about the impact of Malloy v. Hogan click here.
Background
William Malloy was arrested in 1959 in Hartford, Connecticut during a gambling raid. He pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of pool selling; he was sentenced to one year in jail and a $500 fine, but his sentence was soon amended to two years of probation. A few months after Malloy pleaded guilty, he was ordered to testify about gambling activity in Hartford County. Malloy refused to testify on the grounds that it could self-incriminate him and was held in contempt. Malloy filed a petition of habeas corpus, which was denied.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on March 5, 1964. The case was decided on June 15, 1964.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to reverse the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. Justice William Brennan delivered the opinion of the court. Justice William Douglas joined the majority opinion, however, he adhered to his concurrence in Gideon v. Wainwright. Justice John Harlan II wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Tom Clark. Justice Byron White wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Potter Stewart.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice William Brennan, writing for the court, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from coercing confessions out of accused individuals therefore making the actions in this case unconstitutional. Brennan also highlighted the Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the protections of the Fifth Amendment to the states.[2]
| “ | Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not, by coercion, prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from inducing a person to confess through 'sympathy falsely aroused,' Spano v. New York, supra, at 360 U. S. 323, or other like inducement far short of 'compulsion by torture,' Haynes v. Washington, supra, it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the States to resort to imprisonment, as here, to compel him to answer questions that might incriminate him. The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement -- the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.[3] | ” |
| —William Brennan, majority opinion in Malloy v. Hogan[2] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice John Harlan II, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Tom Clark, argued that the topic of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights required more consideration before a decision could have been made to incorporate Fifth Amendment rights to state governments. Harlan also contended that the decision of the state court was constitutional and met the federal standard of incrimination.[2]
| “ | I accept and agree with the proposition that continuing reexamination of the constitutional conception of Fourteenth Amendment 'due process' of law is required, and that development of the community's sense of justice may, in time, lead to expansion of the protection which due process affords. In particular, in this case, I agree that principles of justice to which due process gives expression, as reflected in decisions of this Court, prohibit a State, as the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Federal Government, from imprisoning a person solely because he refuses to give evidence which may incriminate him under the laws of the State. I do not understand, however, how this process of reexamination, which must refer always to the guiding standard of due process of law, including, of course, reference to the particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights, can be short-circuited by the simple device of incorporating into due process, without critical examination, the whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against the Federal Government. The consequence of such an approach to due process as it pertains to the States is inevitably disregard of all relevant differences which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its enforcement. The ultimate result is compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system and which is achieved either by encroachment on the States' sovereign powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the Bill of Rights.[3] | ” |
| —John Harlan II, dissenting opinion in Malloy v. Hogan[2] | ||
Justice Byron White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Potter Stewart, argued that the questions asked in the state court proceedings adhered to the federal standard of incrimination. White posited that, since the answers sought were not incriminating, Malloy had no grounds to seek the privilege of the Fifth Amendment.[2]
| “ | Even on the Court's assumption that persons convicted of a misdemeanor are necessarily suspect criminals, sustaining the privilege in these circumstances is unwarranted, for Malloy placed no reliance on this theory in the courts below or in this Court. In order to allow the judge passing on the claim to understand how the answers sought are incriminating, I would at least require the claimant to state his grounds for asserting the privilege to questions seemingly irrelevant to any incriminating matters.
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” |
| —Byron White, dissenting opinion in Malloy v. Hogan[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Incorporation
Malloy v. Hogan established that the protection against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment applies to state court criminal proceedings.[2]
The decision in this case overruled Twining v. New Jersey and was responsible for incorporating the right to protection against self-incrimination to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation is the process of binding a fundamental right onto the states through a Supreme Court decision.[4]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Malloy v. Hogan," accessed August 24, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 Justia, "Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)," accessed August 24, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Oxford Reference, "Malloy v. Hogan," accessed August 24, 2022
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