Arizona v. United States
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| Arizona v. United States | |
| Reference: 567 U.S. 387 | |
| Term: 2012 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: April 25, 2012 Decided: June 25, 2012 | |
| Outcome | |
| affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| John Roberts • Anthony M. Kennedy • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Steven G. Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor | |
| Concurring | |
| Antonin Scalia • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito[1] | |
| Dissenting | |
| Antonin Scalia • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito | |
Arizona v. United States is a case that was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on April 25, 2012, during the court's October 2011-2012 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and concerned whether federal immigration law preempted and invalidated Arizona's state immigration laws. Click here to read more about the case's background.
On June 25, 2012, SCOTUS partially affirmed and partially reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings in a 5-3 opinion, holding that federal immigration laws preempted the state laws. The Court nullified three of the four Arizona state law provisions for interfering with federal immigration laws and their enforcement, and upheld the provision allowing later legal challenges in lower courts. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.[2][3]
Background
On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted SB 1070, a state law contained four primary provisions related to immigration. The following summary of the case was published by Oyez, a free law project from Cornell’s Legal Information Institute, Justia, and the Chicago-Kent College of Law:[3]
| “ | On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States.
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The United States government challenged the law in the District of Arizona before the law went into effect to stop its enforcement. The federal government argued that Arizona's law usurped federal authority over the enforcement of immigration law. On July 28, 2010, the district court blocked the four provisions listed above.[2][3][5]
Arizona appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the district court, finding that the United States had demonstrated that federal immigration law likely preempted the four provisions of SB 1070 at issue.[3][6]
Arizona appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on December 9, 2011.[3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on April 25, 2012.[3]
Questions presented
The court limited oral arguments to the following question:
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Audio
Audio of oral argument:[3]
Transcript
Transcript of oral argument:[3]
Outcome
On June 25, 2012, SCOTUS partially affirmed and partially reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings in a 5-3 opinion, holding that federal immigration laws preempted the state laws. The Court nullified three provisions of SB 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law:[2][3]
- The provision making it a state crime to reside in the country without legal permission
- The provision making it a state crime to work in the country without legal permission
- The provision allowing law enforcement officers to arrest individuals without a warrant based on probable cause of unlawful presence
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.[2]
Opinion of the court
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government's power over immigration and alien status comes from its constitutional power over naturalization and its sovereign power over foreign relations. Consequently, the Court held that federal immigration law precluded three provisions of Arizona's SB 1070. The Court found that the District of Arizona and Ninth Circuit erred in deciding that federal law also preempted Arizona's requirement for law enforcement officers to verify the legal status of all arrestees and detainees:[2][3]
| “ | 1. The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration and alien status rests, in part, on its constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and on its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign relations, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10. Federal governance is extensive and complex. Among other things, federal law specifies categories of aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8 U. S. C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and specifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens. It also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center, which provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock. Pp. 2–7.
3. Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted by federal law. Pp. 8–19. (a) Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. In Hines, a state alien-registration program was struck down on the ground that Congress intended its “complete” federal registration plan to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That scheme did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. The federal registration framework remains comprehensive. Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Pp. 8–11. (b) Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and requires employers to verify prospective employees’ employment authorization status, §§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b). It imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, §§1324a(e)(4), (f), but only civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment, e.g., §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8). IRCA’s express preemption provision, though silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against employees, “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” making it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–872. The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. Pp. 12–15. (c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, §6 too creates an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., §1357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” §1357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by §6. Pp. 15–19. 4. It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives. Pp. 19–24. (a) The state provision has three limitations: A detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification; officers may not consider race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” P. 20. (b) This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with those limits, §2(B) must be held preempted at this stage. Pp. 20–24. (1) The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal immigration scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations. See §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c). The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___. Pp. 20–21. (2) It is not clear at this stage and on this record that §2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. This would raise constitutional concerns. And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. If the law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. Without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277. This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. Pp. 22–24. ...
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[4] |
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| —Justice Anthony M. Kennedy | ||
Dissenting opinions
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Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Samuel Alito, and Justice Clarence Thomas each wrote separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Scalia
In his opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:[2]
| “ | The United States is an indivisible “Union of sovereign States.” Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938). Today’s opinion, approving virtually all of the Ninth Circuit’s injunction against enforcement of the four challenged provisions of Arizona’s law, deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be there. Neither the Constitution itself nor even any law passed by Congress supports this result. I dissent.[4] | ” |
| —Justice Antonin Scalia | ||
Justice Thomas
In his opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[2]
| “ | I agree with Justice Scalia that federal immigration law does not pre-empt any of the challenged provisions of S. B. 1070. I reach that conclusion, however, for the simple reason that there is no conflict between the “ordinary meanin[g]” of the relevant federal laws and that of the four provisions of Arizona law at issue here.[4] | ” |
Justice Alito
In his opinion, Justice Alito wrote:[2]
| “ | While I agree with the Court on §2(B) and §3, I part ways on §5(C) and §6. The Court’s holding on §5(C) is inconsistent with De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which held that employment regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, is an area of traditional state concern. Because state police powers are implicated here, our precedents require us to presume that federal law does not displace state law unless Congress’ intent to do so is clear and manifest. I do not believe Congress has spoken with the requisite clarity to justify invalidation of §5(C). Nor do I believe that §6 is invalid. Like §2(B), §6 adds virtually nothing to the authority that Arizona law enforcement officers already exercise. And whatever little authority they have gained is consistent with federal law.[4] | ” |
Text of the opinion
Read the full opinion here.
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Arizona v. United States established that immigration laws and their enforcement fall under the federal government's constitutional and sovereign power, not state power. State law enforcement officers are authorized to inquire about a resident's legal status during lawful encounters, but they cannot enforce immigration laws that are preempted by federal law.
See also
- The Roberts Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
- Federalism
- Arizona SB 1070
- Illegal immigration
- Immigration in Arizona
External links
- Search Google News for this topic
- Full text of the case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito partially concurred and partially dissented from the judgment.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 U.S. Supreme Court, Arizona v. United States, decided June 25, 2012
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 Oyez, "Arizona v. United States," accessed May 27, 2025
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ United States District Court for the District of Arizona, United States v. Arizona, decided July 28, 2010
- ↑ United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Arizona, decided April 11, 2011
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "11-182 ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES," accessed February 3, 2017
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