Major cases of the Supreme Court October 2014 term

The United States Supreme Court addressed a variety of issues during its October 2014 term, one which was described by Adam Liptak, Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, as containing "blockbusters that could really transform American life." In a similar statement, the Georgetown University Law Center's Supreme Court Institute referred to the 2014 term as one that "could be among the most momentous in recent history."

The Supreme Court heard cases that addressed same-sex marriage, redistricting, the Affordable Care Act also known as "Obamacare" and hiring discrimination, as well as many other issues.

Ballotpedia understands that this list is subjective and that individuals may have prioritized other rulings. Our starting point for choosing which cases to watch this year came from articles published by major news organizations at the start of the term. Below is a short sampling of articles used:

• Heritage Foundation, "Overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2014 Term," September 18, 2014

• New York Times, "Justices Take Cases on Bias, Redistricting and Judicial Elections," October 2, 2014

• Reuters, "Gay marriage aside, business cases dominate U.S. high court docket," October 3, 2014

• ThinkProgress, "What To Expect When The Supreme Court Returns To Work Next Week," September 24, 2014

• Wall Street Journal, "Supreme Court Adds Discrimination Cases to Its Docket," October 2, 2014

Ballotpedia's goal was to provide readers with an easy understanding of the important aspects of these rulings. For further exploration of or information about the major cases heard by the Supreme Court in 2014, please visit the rulings included under the cases below.

To read about major cases heard in other terms, click on the following links: 2012, 2013, and 2015. Click here for information about all of the cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 2015-2016 term and here for all cases from the 2016-2017 term.

October sitting

Traffic stops and police accountability: Heien v. North Carolina

Heien v. North Carolina was argued before the Supreme Court on October 6, 2014. The court affirmed, in an 8-1 decision on December 15, 2014, that a police officer's reasonable mistake of law may constitute the justification needed for suspicion to conduct a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Heien v. North Carolina
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Heien v. North Carolina
• More information: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: Reasonable mistakes of law by police do not violate the Fourth Amendment"

Background:

“	Following a suspicious vehicle, Sergeant Matt Darisse noticed that only one of the vehicle’s brake lights was working and pulled the driver over. While issuing a warning ticket for the broken brake light, Darisse became suspicious of the actions of the two occupants and their answers to his questions. Petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien, the car’sowner, gave Darisse consent to search the vehicle. Darisse found cocaine, and Heien was arrested and charged with attempted trafficking. The trial court denied Heien’s motion to suppress the seized evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, concluding that the vehicle’s faulty brake light gave Darisse reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.	”
—Supreme Court of the United States, Heien v. North Carolina

Decision:

The decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court was affirmed, 8-1, with Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissenting. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan. Kagan filed a concurring opinion, as well.

The decision found that, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers and other government officials are required to "act reasonably, but not perfectly." The North Carolina statute requiring working brake lights was found to be reasonably interpreted by the officer in this case. Previously, the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to require only one working brake light, and therefore found the traffic stop by Officer Darisse was not justified, since Heien's car had one working brake light at the time of the stop. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, finding that Officer Darisse's misunderstanding of the law had been reasonable, and therefore the stop stemming from his mistake had been reasonable as well. The Supreme Court further affirmed the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, stating that the officer's actions were reasonable in light of the vague nature of the statute.

“	The Fourth Amendment requires government officials to act reasonably, not perfectly, and gives those officials “fair leeway for enforcing the law,” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176. Searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact may be reasonable. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177, 183–186. The limiting factor is that “the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.” Brinegar, supra, at 176.	”
—Supreme Court of the United States, Heien v. North Carolina

Dissent:

In Sotomayor's dissent, she argued that the court was not clear in defining what constituted "reasonable mistakes of the law." Because of the vagueness of that term, as well as past precedents, Sotomayor argued that no mistake of the law by an officer should justify seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Religious practices in prison: Holt v. Hobbs

Holt v. Hobbs was argued before the Supreme Court on October 7, 2014, and decided on January 20, 2015. The court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Corrections religiously discriminated against a prisoner by prohibiting him from growing a short beard as dictated by his religious beliefs.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Holt v. Hobbs
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Holt v. Hobbs
• More information: SCOTUSblog, "A unanimous Supreme Court endorses religious liberties in prison"

Background:

Gregory Holt, a Muslim inmate in Arkansas, sought an exemption from a "no beard" rule on religious grounds so that he could maintain a 1/2-inch beard. When his request was refused, he sued in federal court. Prison officials argued that the rule was a safety measure, which prevented inmates from hiding contraband in their beards and from disguising their identity. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the inmate's complaint, a decision which was upheld by the Eighth Circuit.

Decision:

The Supreme Court held that the rule prohibiting beards was in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which states that the government cannot burden the religious exercises of institutionalized people unless it can prove that the burden "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest."

The court, in a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Samuel Alito, found that, though the regulation of contraband was a legitimate concern for the prison, a 1/2-inch beard was too short to make a difference in that respect. Regarding the identification issue, the court ruled that requiring inmates to be photographed both with and without a beard would solve that problem in a less restrictive way.

Overtime pay: Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk

Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk was argued before the Supreme Court on October 8, 2014. The court ruled, in a unanimous decision on December 9, 2014, that employees do not have to be compensated under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for their time undergoing security screenings at the conclusion of the work day.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk

Background:

“	Petitioner Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., required its hourly warehouse workers, who retrieved products from warehouse shelves and packaged them for delivery to Amazon.com customers, to undergo a security screening before leaving the warehouse each day. Respondents, former employees, sued the company alleging, as relevant here, that they were entitled to compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) for the roughly 25 minutes each day that they spent waiting to undergo and undergoing those screenings. They also alleged that the company could have reduced that time to a de minimis amount by adding screeners or staggering shift terminations and that the screenings were conducted to prevent employee theft and, thus, for the sole benefit of the employers and their customers.	”
—Supreme Court of the United States, Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk

Decision:

Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the court's unanimous decision. He pointed to the Portal-to-Portal Act, which exempts employers from liability for activities which come before or after an employee's essential tasks, referred to in the Act as "principal activities." The court found that the security screenings did not fit this description of "principal activities" because the workers were not employed to undergo the screenings, nor were they "integral and indispensable" to those activities.

The court reversed the Ninth Circuit's opinion, which argued that, because the employer required the screenings, the employees should be compensated for them.

November sitting

Separation of powers: Zivotofsky v. Kerry

Zivotofsky v. Kerry was argued before the Supreme Court on November 3, 2014. At issue was whether the president has the exclusive authority to formally recognize a foreign sovereign, and if so, whether Congress can issue a law requiring the president to make a statement contradicting a prior recognition.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held the president "has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition of a foreign sovereign" and that Congress may not impede on that right because it is exclusive.

• Link to the opinion: Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: Walking on a tightrope on Mideast policy," June 8, 2015

Background:

The petitioner, Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, was born to American parents in Jerusalem in 2002. Zivotofsky's mother requested her son's passport list his birthplace as Israel. The American Embassy in Tel Aviv declined, citing a policy in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual that Jerusalem should be listed without a country since the United States does not recognize any as having sovereignty over the city. In September 2002, however, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which permitted American citizens born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their place of birth under §241(d) of the law. This provision contradicted the executive and State Department's neutral position.

Zivotofsky filed suit in federal court to enforce §241(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Initially, the district court dismissed the case as relating to "a nonjusticiable political question" and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case, stating, "the Judiciary must decided if Zivotofsky's interpretation of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional" rather than "whether Jerusalem is, in fact, part of Israel."

The Court of Appeals held the statute was unconstitutional and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari.

Decision:

Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court which affirmed the Court of Appeals and held "the power to recognize or decline to recognize a foreign state and its territorial bounds resides in the President alone." The majority's argument rested on a historical reading of the Reception Clause and the president's other Article II powers, which grant him the right to receive and nominate ambassadors and negotiate treaties. Given this executive power, "To allow Congress to control the President’s communication in the context of a formal recognition determination is to allow Congress to exercise that exclusive power itself. As a result, the statute is unconstitutional." Kennedy also emphasized the practical consideration that the United States must "speak with one voice" in foreign affairs, and that that voice should be the president's.

The Court cautioned this holding does not limit the powers of Congress. Rather, Kennedy wrote, "In holding §214(d) invalid the Court does not question the substantial powers of Congress over foreign affairs in general or passports in particular. This case is confined solely to the exclusive power of the President to control recognition determinations, including formal statements by the Executive Branch acknowledging the legitimacy of a state or government and its territorial bounds."

Concurrences and dissents:

Although the case was decided in a 6-3 split, there were five separate opinions authored. Justices Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined Justice Kennedy.

Justice Breyer issued the following brief concurring opinion: "I continue to believe that this case presents a political question inappropriate for judicial resolution. But because precedent precludes resolving this case on political question grounds, I join the Court's opinion."

Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion concurred in judgment that §214(d) is unconstitutional as applied to passports, but attributed the president's authority to a "residual foreign affairs power."

Joined by Justice Samuel Alito, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissent where he noted, "Never before has this Court accepted a President's direct defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs." Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent, also joined by Justices Alito and Roberts, where he stated §214(d) does not implicate a formal declaration regarding sovereignty over Israel. Justice Antonin Scalia then criticized the majority for holding "the implied power to recognize territorial claims (which the Court infers from the power to recognize states, which it infers from the responsibility to receive ambassadors) on a higher footing than the express power to make treaties."

Destruction of evidence: Yates v. United States

Yates v. United States was argued before the Supreme Court on November 5, 2014, and decided on February 25, 2015. The court held 5-4 that 18 U.S.C. § 1519, a federal statute that prohibits "destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy," could not be applied to the case of Yates, a fisherman who had thrown illegally caught fish back into the water to impede federal investigation.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Yates v. United States
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Yates v. United States
• More information: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: A fisherman slips through federal prosecutors’ net"

Background:

“	While conducting an offshore inspection of a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the ship’s catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of federal conservation regulations. The officer instructed the ship’s captain, petitioner Yates, to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After the officer departed, Yates instead told a crew member to throw the undersized fish overboard. For this offense, Yates was charged with destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1519. That section provides that a person may be fined or imprisoned for up to 20 years if he "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a federal investigation.	”
—Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Yates v. United States opinion

At trial before the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Yates was found in violation of federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for "destroying or concealing a 'tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence' the government’s investigation into harvesting undersized grouper." The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.

Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and sided with Yates. The divisive 5-4 opinion was authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion and Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Anthony Kennedy. The court held that a "tangible object," as provided in the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 1519, was to be defined as "one used to record or preserve information" and did not include all physical evidence, such as the fish at issue in the case.

In rendering its opinion, the court first took into consideration dictionary definitions of "tangible" and "object," but found that such definitions ultimately were "not dispositive of the meaning of 'tangible object' in §1519." The court also took into account legislative intent in the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §1519, which had been enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 to address the destruction of evidence following the Enron scandal.

The court refused to read §1519 that broadly and concluded that it was "highly improbable that Congress would have buried a general spoliation statute covering objects of any and every kind in a provision targeting fraud in financial record-keeping."

Dissent:
Kagan's dissent stressed a more conventional, everyday reading of §1519 and definition of "tangible object." She argued that the term "tangible object" is "broad, but clear," that in other state laws and provisions of the U.S. Code, "tangible objects" cover all different types of physical objects, and that the words surrounding the phrase "tangible object" in §1519 "show that Congress meant the term to have a wide range." Kagan clarified that it is when "Congress sets out to draft a statute broadly—to include every imaginable variation on a theme—that such mismatches will arise. To respond by narrowing the law, as the plurality does, is thus to flout both what Congress wrote and what Congress wanted."

Redistricting: Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, et al. v. Alabama, et al.

Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, et al. v. Alabama, et al. was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on November 12, 2014, and was decided on March 25, 2015. The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the lower court erred when it held in favor of the State of Alabama in the implementation of its 2012 redistricting plan.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
• More information: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: A small victory for minority voters, or a case with “profound” constitutional implications?"

Background:
The Alabama Constitution requires that the state’s 105 house districts and 35 senate districts be redrawn every 10 years based on the results of the National Census. In 2012, the Alabama State Legislature redrew the lines with two goals in mind. First, it sought to minimize the difference in population between districts "by keeping any deviation less than 1% of the theoretical ideal." Second, it aimed to maintain the same percentage of the minority population in current majority-minority districts, in hopes of avoiding the retrogression in line with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Appellants, the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference, described the results of these measures as a "racial gerrymander," whereby Republican state legislators shifted the black population into more majority-minority districts resulting in a fortified voting power for their party in statewide districts.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held 2-1 in favor of the State of Alabama, throwing out the claims not based on race and finding that the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference failed to prove that the districts had been redrawn with race as a "predominant motivating factor."

Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion, with Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joining. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion.

The court stated that the legal analysis conducted by the district court, which referred "to the State 'as a whole,' rather than district-by-district, was legally erroneous." Specifically, the court had an issue with the finding that although "racial criteria had not predominated in the drawing of some Alabama districts sufficient to defeat a claim of racial gerrymandering with respect to the State as an undifferentiated whole ... a showing that race-based criteria did not significantly affect the drawing of some Alabama districts would have done little to defeat a claim that race-based criteria predominantly affected the drawing of other Alabama districts."

The court also found an error in the lower court's calculation of "'predominance' in its alternative holding that '[r]ace was not the predominant motivating factor.'" It noted that the nonracial factors of "legislative efforts to create districts of approximately equal population" were taken into account even though they were not "'traditional' factors to be weighed against the use of race to determine whether race 'predominates,'" as provided by Miller v. Johnson (1995).

In reference to the lower court's reading of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Section 5, the court noted: "Section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to maintain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice."

Dissent:
Scalia opened his dissent with his belief that the court's decision was a "sweeping holding that will have profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one person, one vote, for the future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and for the primacy of the State in managing its own elections." The majority of the rest of his dissent focused on procedural implications, the issues concurrent with a remand to the district court and his argument regarding the lack of standing by the appellants.

Thomas, in his own dissent, voiced concern about the tainting of voting rights jurisprudence and the "uses to which the Voting Rights Acts has been put." He further clarified, stating: "Long ago, the DOJ and special-interest groups like the ACLU hijacked the Act, and they have been using it ever since to achieve their vision of maximized black electoral strength, often at the expense of the voters they purport to help ... The majority’s command to analyze black voting patterns en route to adopting the 'correct' racial quota does nothing to ease the conflict between our color-blind Constitution and the 'consciously segregated districting system' the Court has required in the name of equality."

December sitting

Threats: Elonis v. United States

Elonis v. United States was argued before the Supreme Court on December 1, 2014, and decided on June 1, 2015, in an 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts. At issue was whether a conviction for making threats on Facebook required actual proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten.

Link to the opinion: Elonis v. United States, No. 13-983
Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for Elonis v. United States, No. 13-983
More information: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: Internet threats still in legal limbo?"

Background:

The petitioner, Anthony Douglas Elonis, used a pseudonym on Facebook to post violent messages about killing his wife, colleagues, kindergarteners and law enforcement. Although Elonis frequently added a disclaimer to his posts, his boss fired him and his wife sought a protection-from-abuse order against him. Elonis' boss also contacted the FBI about the posts, and he was subsequently arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §875(c), which prohibits "in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another."

At trial, there was a disagreement over what jury instruction should be provided. Elonis wanted the prosecution to prove his Facebook posts were made to convey a "true threat." Instead, the District Court told the jury to use a "reasonable person" standard to determine if a reasonable person would have realized his statements could be seen as threats. After Elonis was convicted, he appealed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted cert on June 16, 2014, on the following question: "Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten."

Decision:

In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, reversing and remanding the case without addressing any First Amendment considerations. Roberts wrote that although the petitioner and the government had failed to show 18 U.S.C. §875(c) included any particular mental state requirement, "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal." Therefore, negligently publishing something online that a reasonable person could perceive as threatening was an insufficient ground to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §875(c). The Court declined to address whether a reckless rather than negligent communication would be sufficient.

In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting part, Justice Samuel Alito questioned the clarity of the majority's opinion. He wrote, "The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only negligence in conveying a threat. But the Court refuses to explain what type of intent was necessary. Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess."

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent finding the Third Circuit had appropriately applied a "general intent standard" and the petitioner's Facebook posts were "'true threats' unprotected by the First Amendment."

Pregnancy discrimination: Young v. United Parcel Service

Young v. United Parcel Service was argued before the Supreme Court on December 3, 2014, and was decided on March 25, 2015. The court held 6-3 that the lower court erred when it held in favor of United Parcel Service (UPS) and failed to take into consideration UPS's employment practice of treating its pregnant workers disparately from its non-pregnant workers and evaluate whether or not legitimate reasons existed for the difference in treatment.

• Link to the opinion: Supreme Court of the United States, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral Argument - Audio, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
• More information: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: Fashioning a remedy for pregnancy bias"

Background:

“	Peggy Young, worked as a part-time driver for the respondent, United Parcel Service (UPS). Her responsibilities included pickup and delivery of packages that had arrived by air carrier the previous night. In 2006, after suffering several miscarriages, she became pregnant. Her doctor told her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy or more than 10 pounds thereafter...UPS required drivers like Young to be able to lift parcels weighing up to 70 pounds (and up to 150 pounds with assistance)...UPS told Young she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young consequently stayed home without pay during most of the time she was pregnant and eventually lost her employee medical coverage.	”
—Justice Anthony Kennedy, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. opinion

In the lower courts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, holding that UPS had not discriminated against Young and denied her additional discovery motions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joining. Justice Samuel Alito agreed with the majority, but he wrote a separate concurrence. Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas dissented.

At issue before the court was whether or not the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) required that employers accommodate a pregnant employee in the same manner that they would accommodate a non-pregnant employee who had similar work limitations that were unrelated to pregnancy. In 1976, the court visited the issue, finding that companies did not discriminate based on gender if they failed to incorporate pregnancy into their disability plans. Congress, in response, subsequently passed the PDA, banning discrimination based on pregnancy. At the time that Peggy Young first filed suit, lower courts had been unable to come to a consensus on how to apply the act.

The court held that an "individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework." Under the framework set by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792), the plaintiff has "the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination." If the plaintiff succeeds in fulfilling her burden, the employer then has the burden of articulating "some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[s] for the difference in treatment." After the employer puts forth its reasons, it is the plaintiff's burden again "to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons . . . were a pretext for discrimination." The court then remanded the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to determine if in Young's case there existed "a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’ reasons for having treated Young less favorably than these other nonpregnant employees were pretextual."

Concurrence:
Alito, though voting with the majority, was concerned that the court's interpretation of the PDA would hold employers liable for discrimination, whether or not that was their intent, and that the comparison should be between the treatment of pregnant employees and that of "nonpregnant employees whose jobs involve the performance of the same or very similar tasks" and who are "similar in their ability or inability to work."

Dissent:
Scalia, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, authored a dissenting opinion and voiced his concern with the majority's opinion. He noted: "To 'treat' pregnant workers 'the same . . . as other persons,' we are told, means refraining from adopting policies that impose 'significant burden[s]' upon pregnant women without 'sufficiently strong' justifications... Where do the 'significant burden' and 'sufficiently strong justification' requirements come from? Inventiveness posing as scholarship—which gives us an interpretation that is as dubious in principle as it is senseless in practice."

Dissent:
Kennedy, in his own dissent, acknowledged the importance of the PDA and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, both enacted to remedy the historical "denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities [that] has been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second." However, he also was troubled with the court's interpretation of the PDA, which he found "risks 'conflation of disparate impact with disparate treatment' by permitting a plaintiff to use a policy’s disproportionate burden on pregnant employees as evidence of pretext." Kennedy stated that such a conflation would cause unnecessary confusion in the "burden-shifting framework" precedent already in place by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.

January sitting

Government control over signs: Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona was argued before the Supreme Court on January 12, 2015. At issue was whether the town's claim that its sign regulations lacked a discriminatory motive was enough to justify the removal of the plaintiff's signs advertising church services.

• Link to the opinion: Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, No. 13-502
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, No. 13-502
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "The message determines the right," June 18, 2015

Background:

The town of Gilbert, Arizona, places restrictions on the display of temporary outdoor signs. The petitioners, a pastor and his church, posted temporary signs around Gilbert with their church's name and the time and location of the next service. Each week, they were posted on Saturday and removed midday Sunday. The town cited the church for displaying signs without an event date and for keeping them up past the time limit set in the town's code. The petitioners filed suit against the town after they were unable to find an accommodation, claiming their right to freedom of speech was violated. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Decision:

In a 9-0 opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court determined that Gilbert's sign restrictions were content-based because they applied differently to temporary, political and ideological signs. Because the restrictions were content-based, the court evaluated whether they would survive the judicial review standard of strict scrutiny. This standard requires a rule abridging freedom of speech further a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest to be constitutional. Thomas wrote that was not the case here, explaining, "[The town] has offered only two governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code draws: preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic safety. Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling governmental interests, the Code’s distinctions fail as hopelessly underinclusive."

Housing and discrimination: Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project

On June 25, 2015, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the Fair Housing Act covers not only intentional housing discrimination, but also practices that have a discriminatory effect, whether intended or not. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the court, and Justices Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Thomas also wrote a dissent.

• Link to the opinion: Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., No. 13-1371
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., No. 13-1371
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "A civil rights law made broader, but not too broad," June 25, 2015

Background:

The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs allocates federal tax credits for low-income housing in the state. The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) filed a suit against the Department of Housing under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). ICP claimed the Department of Housing had perpetuated segregation by offering more tax credits for housing in black urban areas than white suburban areas. The argument was based on the theory that although there was no evidence of an intent to discriminate, the housing policy had a disproportionately negative impact on minorities.

The question at issue was whether this disparate impact claim was allowed under the Fair Housing Act. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas found in favor of ICP because the Department of Housing did not meets its burden to show there were no other less discriminatory methods to allocate the tax credits. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on the merits. Since the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development had recently acknowledged disparate impact liability under the FHA and issued a regulation providing for a burden-shifting framework, the Fifth Circuit held the burden the District Court had imposed on the Department of Housing was improper.

The Supreme Court granted cert to the case on October 2, 2014. Oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2015.

Decision:

Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor. In the 20 years following the FHA's enactment, every circuit court to address the question of disparate impact claims found they were cognizable under the FHA. Congress amended the law in 1988 without adding language to bar disparate impact claims. Explaining this tacit acceptance, Kennedy wrote, "Congress’ decision in 1988 to amend the FHA while still adhering to the operative language...is convincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings of the Courts of Appeals finding disparate-impact liability."

Kennedy explained the narrow circumstances under which a disparate impact claim could succeed: the plaintiff must show that any statistical disparity is directly linked to the defendant's policies. Kennedy explained, "A robust causality requirement ensures that '[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact' and thus protects defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create." This restriction was necessary to protect both private developers and governmental entities, Kennedy added.

Highlighting the importance of the FHA to integration, Kennedy noted, "Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation."

Dissents:

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissent joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Calling the majority's opinion "a serious mistake," Alito did not find Kennedy's argument about Congress' intent compelling. Alito explained that "what matters is what Congress did, not what it might have 'assumed.'"

Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent warning that disparate impact liability will have severe consequences for people in need of access to housing. Using the Houston Housing Authority (HHA) as an example, Thomas wrote, "Because Houston is a majority-minority city with minority concentrations in all but the more affluent areas, any HHA developments built outside of those areas will increase the concentration of racial minorities. Unsurprisingly, the threat of disparate-impact suits based on those concentrations has hindered HHA’s efforts to provide affordable housing. State and federal housing agencies have refused to approve all but two of HHA’s eight proposed development projects over the past two years out of fears of disparate-impact liability. That the majority believes that these are not 'dire consequences,' is cold comfort for those who actually need a home."

February sitting

Hiring discrimination: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. was argued before the Supreme Court on February 25, 2015, and decided on June 1, 2015. The question at issue was whether an employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if it did not hire an applicant because of a religious practice and the applicant never directly notified the employer she needed accommodation for that religious practice.

In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that an employer may be held liable for discrimination under Title VII even if it has no "actual knowledge" of the applicant's need for religious accommodation, if such accommodation was a "motivating factor" to not hire the applicant.

• Link to the opinion: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: New shield against religious bias," June 1, 2015

Background:
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. is an apparel company that requires its employees to comply with a dress code, also known as the "Look Policy," reflecting the company's style and image. The Look Policy does not permit employees to wear "caps."

Samantha Elauf, a Muslim teenager, applied to work at an Abercrombie store. After an interview, the assistant store manager found Elauf was qualified for the position, but believed the headscarf Elauf wore as part of the practice of her faith would not comply with the Look Policy. The assistant manager consulted with the district manager, who stated that a headscarf would violate the terms of the Look Policy and Elauf should not be hired. The EEOC filed suit against Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf, claiming Abercrombie violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The provisions of Title VII make it unlawful for an employer:

“	(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.	”
—42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)

The District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma found in favor of the EEOC on the question of liability for discrimination, but the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed, holding an employer cannot be held liable for discrimination if the employer did not have "actual knowledge" of the applicant's need for religious accommodation.

Decision:

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit in an 8-1 decision. Justice Antonin Scalia authored the opinion with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joining. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurrence agreeing with the majority on separate grounds and Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

The court held that 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) does not explicitly "impose a knowledge requirement." Rather, "[a]n employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions....If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer's desire to avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivation factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII."

Scalia further emphasized the importance of the employer's motivation, stating, "Motive and knowledge are separate concepts. An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed."

Concurrence:
Justice Samuel Alito agreed the Tenth Circuit should be reversed, but disputed the majority's argument that there is no knowledge requirement in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Justice Alito wrote, "Those provisions prohibit intentional discrimination, which is blameworthy conduct, but if there is no knowledge requirement, an employer could be held liable without fault. The prohibition of discrimination because of religious practices is meant to force employers to consider whether those practices can be accommodated without undue hardship. But the 'no knowledge' interpretation would deprive employers of that opportunity. For these reasons, an employer cannot be liable for taking adverse action because of a religious practice if the employer does not know that the practice is religious."

Dissent:
The lone dissenter, Justice Clarence Thomas, was concerned the majority misinterpreted the application of Title VII to neutral employment policies. Justice Thomas wrote, "I would hold that Abercrombie’s conduct did not constitute 'intentional discrimination.' Abercrombie refused to create an exception to its neutral Look Policy for Samantha Elauf ’s religious practice of wearing a headscarf. In doing so, it did not treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices, but instead remained neutral with regard to religious practices. To be sure, the effects of Abercrombie’s neutral Look Policy, absent an accommodation, fall more harshly on those who wear headscarves as an aspect of their faith. But that is a classic case of an alleged disparate impact. It is not what we have previously understood to be a case of disparate treatment because Elauf received the same treatment from Abercrombie as any other applicant who appeared unable to comply with the company’s Look Policy."

Arizona gerrymandering: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

On June 29, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The court ruled that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto."

• Link to the opinion: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,, No. 13-1314
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for 'Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,, No. 13-1314
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "Opinion analysis: A cure for partisan gerrymandering," June 29, 2015

Background:

On March 2, 2015, the court heard oral arguments for Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, a case involving gerrymandering in Arizona. In 2000, Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, a non-political group with the responsibility of drawing congressional and legislative districts with the purpose of reducing gerrymandering.

The Republican-led Arizona State Legislature filed suit, arguing that the legislature is the only body vested by the United States Constitution with such a power.

During oral arguments, the justices of the court asked about the scope of the case, how broadly it should be applied and to what extent the case would impact election laws nationally. Justice Elena Kagan listed a number of recent election laws passed in other states created by like referendums and initiatives, and asked Paul Clement, the attorney for the Arizona State Legislature, whether or not such laws would become unconstitutional. Clement responded that the laws would not be considered unconstitutional since they did not take away power from the legislature like the Arizona initiative.

Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer and Chief Justice John Roberts found issue with the precedent used by commission attorney Seth Waxman and Department of Justice attorney Eric Feigin. They further questioned the attorneys over their interpretation of the word "legislature" and its use in the Constitution.

California is the only other state to have a similar independent commission, also created by a ballot initiative. Idaho, New Jersey, Montana, Hawaii and Washington use a mix of both commission and legislative-drawn lines. Justin Levitt, a law professor at the Loyola Law School who also submitted a brief in support of independent commissions, opined: "This case isn't just about Arizona. It's not just about redistricting. It's about who gets to make the rules for federal elections. That means redistricting in every state. That means how ballots are cast and counted in every state. The ramifications (could be) sweeping."

The Affordable Care Act: King v. Burwell

See also: King v. Burwell and Obamacare lawsuits

The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in King v. Burwell on March 4, 2015. At issue was whether the Internal Revenue Service could effect regulations allowing tax credit subsidies for health insurance coverage purchased through federal exchanges rather than state exchanges under Obamacare.

Decision:

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that federal tax credits under the Affordable Care Act, commonly called Obamacare, were available not only to individuals living in states with their own health exchange, but also those living in states with federal exchanges.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion. Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The majority read the pivotal phrase, "an exchange established by the State," to include both state and federal exchanges. Explaining the majority's reasoning, Roberts wrote, "the context and structure" of Obamacare requires a departure "from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase."

Dissent:

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas. Scalia argued that "other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between the establishment of an Exchange by a State and the establishment of an Exchange by the Federal government." To read "by the state" to include "by the state or the Federal government" would be both duplicative and nullifying of other sections of the Act, according to Scalia.

Concluding his dissent, Scalia offered harsh criticism of the Court's interpretation in this case and the 2012 case, National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius. Scalia wrote, "Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will attain the enduring status of the Social Security Act of the Taf-Hartley Act; perhaps not. But this Court's two decisions on the Act will surely be remembered through the years. The somersaults of statutory interpretation they have performed ('penalty' means tax, 'further [Medicaid] payments to the State' means only incremental Medicaid payments to the State, 'established by the State' means not established by the State) will be cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence. And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites."

April sitting

Same-sex marriage: Obergefell v. Hodges

See also: Obergefell v. Hodges

On June 26, 2015, in a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that same-sex marriage is protected under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, same-sex marriages bans have been struck down as unconstitutional and same-sex marriages performed out-of-state must be recognized in other states. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion and Justices Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined.

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each authored a dissent.

The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in four same-sex marriage cases from Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan and Kentucky under the consolidated title Obergefell v. Hodges on April 28, 2015. The following cases were consolidated when granting them cert on January 16, 2015:

• Obergefell v. Hodges (from Ohio)
• Tanco v. Haslam (from Tennessee)
• DeBoer vs. Snyder (from Michigan)
• Bourke v. Beshear (from Kentucky)

The court limited the argument to the following questions:

• Question #1: "Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?"

• Transcript of argument for Question #1

• Audio of argument for Question #1

• Question #2: "Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?"

• Transcript of argument for Question #2

• Audio of argument for Question #2

Lethal injection: Glossip v. Gross

On June 29, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that it was constitutional to substitute sodium thipental, the first drug in the three-drug protocol for lethal injection, with midazolam.

• Link to the opinion: Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955
• Listen to the oral argument: Oral argument audio and transcript for Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955
• More analysis: SCOTUSblog, "Symposium: The death penalty lives to fight another day," June 29, 2015

Background:

Generally, lethal injection uses a three-drug protocol to render an inmate unconscious, paralyze his muscles and then induce cardiac arrest. In 2008 in Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court held this method of execution did not violate the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment. Sodium thiopental was the first drug in the three-drug protocol considered in Baze. Unable to acquire sodium thiopental, Oklahoma has begun to use midazolam in its executions. The petitioners in Glossip, four death row inmates, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, challenging the constitutionality of the use of midazolam. The District Court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Glossip v. Gross on April 29, 2015.

The court considered the following questions:

• Question 1: "Is it constitutionally permissible for a state to carry out an execution using a three-drug protocol where (a) there is a well-established scientific consensus that the first drug has no pain relieving properties and cannot reliably produce deep, comalike unconsciousness, and (b) it is undisputed that there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering from the administration of the second and third drugs when a prisoner is conscious."

• Question 2: "Does the Baze-plurality stay standard apply when states are not using a protocol substantially similar to the one that this Court considered in Baze?"

• Question 3: "Must a prisoner establish the availability of an alternative drug formula even if the state's lethal-injection protocol, as properly administered, will violate the Eighth Amendment?"

• Transcript of the argument.

Decision:

Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, holding, "First, the prisoners failed to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims. Second, the District Court did not commit clear error when it found that the prisoners failed to establish that Oklahoma’s use of a massive dose of midazolam in its execution protocol entails a substantial risk of severe pain."

Although the petitioners suggested two other drugs which could be used in lieu of midozolam, Oklahoma no longer had access to them and they were, consequently, not a viable alternative. Furthermore, the petitioners failed to show that the District Court had erred in finding that midozolam did not pose a "risk" that was "sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering." Alito argued that, in spite of the drug's use in the botched execution of Clayton Lockett in 2014, there were 12 other executions which used the contested drug protocol without issue. However, Alito cautioned, "[F]ederal courts should not 'embroil [themselves] in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.'"

Concurrences:

Joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. Speaking more to Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent than Alito's opinion, Scalia wrote, "Capital punishment presents moral questions that philosophers, theologians, and statesmen have grappled with for millennia. The Framers of our Constitution disagreed bitterly on the matter. For that reason, they handled it the same way they handled many other controversial issues: they left it to the People to decide. By arrogating to himself the power to overturn that decision, Justice Breyer does not just reject the death penalty, he rejects the Enlightenment."

Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, to dispute Justice Breyer's argument that capital punishment is no longer reserved for the "worst of the worst," but rather disproportionately applied across criminal cases. Thomas argued that studies seeking to quantify this phenomena are "inherently unreliable" and "dehumanizing."

Dissents:

Justice Stephen Breyer dissented and was joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Breyer questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty, altogether. Breyer expressed concern that the death penalty sentence was not used consistently. Breyer cited studies that "indicate that the factors that most clearly ought to affect application of the death penalty—namely, comparative egregiousness of the crime—often do not. Other studies show that circumstances that ought not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race, gender, or geography, often do."

After detailing studies on inconsistent death penalty sentencing across a spectrum of violent crimes, Breyer stated, "The imposition and implementation of the death penalty seems capricious, random, indeed, arbitrary. From a defendant’s perspective, to receive that sentence, and certainly to find it implemented, is the equivalent of being struck by lightning. How then can we reconcile the death penalty with the demands of a Constitution that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?"

Justice Sonia Sotomayor also authored a dissent. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. In addition to arguing that midazolam is constitutionally insufficient, Sotomayor highlighted the practical consequences of the majority's holding. "[T]he Court’s available-alternative requirement leads to patently absurd consequences. Petitioners contend that Oklahoma’s current protocol is a barbarous method of punishment—the chemical equivalent of being burned alive. But under the Court’s new rule, it would not matter whether the State intended to use midazolam, or instead to have petitioners drawn and quartered, slowly tortured to death, or actually burned at the stake: because petitioners failed to prove the availability of sodium thiopental or pentobarbital, the State could execute them using whatever means it designated," Sotomayor wrote.

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court