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Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri

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Supreme Court of the United States
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri
Term: 2023
Important Dates
Argued: December 6, 2023
Decided: April 17, 2024
Outcome
vacated and remanded
Vote
9-0
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett • Ketanji Brown Jackson
Concurring
Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Brett Kavanaugh

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 17, 2024, during the court's October 2023-2024 term. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on December 6, 2023.

In a 9-0 opinion, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, holding that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII has to show that the transfer caused some harm in employment terms or conditions. However, that harm does not need to be significant. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?"[2]
  • The outcome: In a 9-0 opinion, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, holding that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII has to show that the transfer caused some harm in employment terms or conditions. However, that harm does not need to be significant. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the court.[1]


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[3] To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:


    Background

    Personnel

    Case summary

    St. Louis Police Department Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow ("Muldrow") sued the department, claiming that her involuntary transfer from the Intelligence Division to a patrol position was discriminatory on the basis of her sex because her supervisor, Captain Michael Deeba, wanted to hire a man for her position. She also claimed The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the police department, holding that Muldrow was not disadvantaged by this transfer. Muldrow appealed, arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is meant to eliminate discrimination and does not require her to demonstrate the type of material disadvantage incurred. Along with SCOTUS precedent on Title VII, she asserted she was a victim of discrimination on the basis of sex.[3][4][5]

    On April 4, 2022, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri's grant of summary judgment, holding:[3]

    “ Appellant Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow of the St. Louis Police Department (Department) brought Title VII claims against the City of St. Louis and state law claims against both the City of St. Louis and Captain Michael Deeba of the Department. The district court granted the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba's motion for summary judgment, finding in favor of the City of St. Louis on Sergeant Muldrow's Title VII claims and simultaneously dismissing her state law claims against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba. Sergeant Muldrow now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.[6] ”
    —Judge Bobby Shepherd

    On August 29, 2022, Muldrow filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case and determine the scope of Title VII prohibitions on employment discrimination.[2] On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case to its merits docket for oral argument.

    Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964

    See also: Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin by covered employers. The act defines a covered employer as an employer "who has fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," including federal, state, and local governments.[7][8]

    “ It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[6] ”
    —Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964

    Title VII does permit an employer to discriminate in hiring on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin if the trait is reasonably necessary to the operation of that business and there are no reasonable alternatives. However, an employer or customer preference is not recognized as sufficient to allow discrimination.[7]

    Between the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission only had the power to investigate claims of discrimination. The commission could refer cases to the U.S. Department of Justice, but did not have the power to initiate litigation itself. In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. This act amended Title VII to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the authority to initiate litigation when they found discrimination in hiring.[9]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?[6] ”

    Oral argument

    The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on December 6, 2023.

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[10]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[11]

    Outcome

    In a 9-0 opinion, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, holding that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII has to show that the transfer caused some harm in employment terms or conditions. However, that harm does not need to be significant. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Elena Kagan wrote:[1]

    “

    In light of everything said above, the Court of Appeals’ treatment of Muldrow’s suit cannot survive. The court required Muldrow to show that the allegedly discriminatory transfer out of the Intelligence Division produced a significant employment disadvantage. See supra, at 4. As we have explained, that is the wrong standard. Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions. The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so. And Muldrow’s allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that test with room to spare. Recall her principal allegations. She was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious specialized division giving her substantial responsibility over priority investigations and frequent opportunity to work with police commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job supervising one district’s patrol officers, in which she was less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily performed administrative work. Her schedule became less regular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost her take-home car. If those allegations are proved, she was left worse off several times over. It does not matter, as the courts below thought (and JUSTICE THOMAS echoes), that her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could advance to other jobs. See supra, at 3–4; post, at 2. Title VII prohibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the consequences Muldrow described.

    We recognize, however, that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The District Court noted, for example, that Muldrow had failed to discuss in her argument against summary judgment the changes in her work schedule and vehicle access; and perhaps following that lead, the Court of Appeals did not address those harms. See supra, at 3–4. In addition, both courts suggested that some of the allegations Muldrow made about the nature of the work she did in her old and new jobs lacked adequate evidentiary support. See ibid. We leave such matters for the courts below to address. All we require is that they use the proper Title VII standard, and not demand that Muldrow demonstrate her transfer caused ‘significant’ harm. [6]

    		”
    —Justice Elena Kagan

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “

    I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the Courts of Appeals all appear to articulate the same principle, but with slightly varying verbal formulations: A plaintiff bringing a claim under 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) must show harm that is more than trifling. Post, at 1–2 (opinion concurring in judgment). And, there is little practical difference between that principle and the Court’s holding. Ante, at 1 (holding that an employee ‘must show some harm’).[6]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Justice Samuel Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito wrote:[1]

    “

    I agree with the judgment in this case. Assuming without deciding that all the facts mentioned by the Court are relevant and properly presented, petitioner’s transfer altered the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of her employment, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and therefore she can prevail if she can prove that she was transferred because of her sex.

    I do not join the Court’s unhelpful opinion. For decades, dozens of lower court judges, with a wealth of experience handling Title VII cases, have held that not every unwanted employment experience affects an employee’s ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment. The lower courts have used various verbal formulations to express this point, and the Court, dubious about the words they had selected, granted review to provide guidance. Now, after briefing and argument, that guidance is as follows: Title VII plaintiffs must show that the event they challenge constituted a ‘harm’ or ‘injury,’ but that the event need not be ‘significant’ or ‘substantial.’ See ante, at 10–11.

    I have no idea what this means, and I can just imagine how this guidance will be greeted by lower court judges. The primary definition of ‘harm’ is ‘physical or mental damage,’ and an ‘injury’ is defined as ‘an act that damages, harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering or harm.’ Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1034, 1164 (1976). These definitions incorporate at least some degree of significance or substantiality. We do not typically say that we were harmed or injured by every unwanted experience. What would we think if a friend said, ‘I was harmed because the supermarket had run out of my favorite brand of peanut butter,’ or, ‘I was injured because I ran into three rather than the usual two red lights on the way home from work'? [6]

    		”
    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:[1]

    “

    All of that said, the Court’s new some-harm requirement appears to be a relatively low bar. Importantly, the Court emphasizes that ‘some harm’ is less than significant harm, serious harm, or substantial harm. Ante, at 6. Therefore, anyone who has been transferred because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin should easily be able to show some additional harm—whether in money, time, satisfaction, schedule, convenience, commuting costs or time, prestige, status, career prospects, interest level, perks, professional relationships, networking opportunities, effects on family obligations, or the like. So even though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s new some-harm requirement, I expect that the Court’s approach and my preferred approach will land in the same place and lead to the same result in 99 out of 100 discriminatory transfer cases, if not in all 100.[6]

    		”
    —Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2023-2024

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2023-2024

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 2, 2023. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[12]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 U.S. Supreme Court, "Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri," accessed April 18, 2024
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 United States Supreme Court, "22-193 MULDROW V. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO," accessed June 30, 2023
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, decided April 4, 2022
    4. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit," filed August 29, 2022
    5. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Major OxyContin case headlines December session," November 22, 2023
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Our Documents, "Transcript of Civil Rights Act (1964)," accessed February 12, 2024
    8. ↑ U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ," accessed February 12, 2024
    9. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," accessed February 12, 2024
    10. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued December 6, 2023
    11. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued December 6, 2023
    12. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed January 24, 2022
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