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United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association

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Supreme Court of the United States
United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association
Term: 2019
Important Dates
Argument: February 24, 2020
Decided: June 15, 2020
Outcome
reversed and remanded
Vote
7-2
Majority
Clarence Thomas • Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan


United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on February 24, 2020, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. It was consolidated with Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association.[1]

The court reversed and remanded the 4th Circuit's ruling in a 7-2 vote, holding that because the Department of the Interior's decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit.[2] Click here for more information.


HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: In 2018, the U.S. Forest Service issued a record of decision and a special use permit to Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC, allowing the company to construct a natural gas pipeline that would cross under the Appalachian Trail. Cowpasture River Preservation Association challenged the record of decision and the special use permit. The 4th Circuit vacated the permit, ruling the Forest Service didn't have the legal authority to grant right-of-way on the Appalachian Trail land. The Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline petitioned to the Supreme Court, arguing the 4th Circuit was wrong to vacate the record of decision and the special use permit.[3]
  • The issue: Whether the Forest Service has authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests.[3]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 4th Circuit and remanded the case, holding that because the Department of the Interior's decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit.[2]


    • You can review the lower court's opinion here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • June 15, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the 4th Circuit and remanded the case.
    • February 24, 2020: Oral argument
    • October 4, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • June 25, 2019: The United States Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, the petitioners, filed petitions with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • December 13, 2018: The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the U.S. Forest Service's grant of a special use permit to Atlantic Coast Pipeline and remanded the case to the Forest Service.[3]

    Background

    U.S. Forest Service and the Appalachian Trail

    The U.S. Forest Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, administers National Forest System lands. The National Forest System is made up of units of federally owned land in the United States and in U.S. territories.[3]

    As of 2019, the Appalachian Trail extended approximately 2000 miles from Maine to Georgia. According to the petition filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, "As of 1966, 43 percent of the Appalachian Trail’s total mileage crossed private lands, 23 percent crossed state lands, and 34 percent crossed federal lands."[3]

    In 1968, Congress passed the National Trails System Act, giving the secretary of the interior authorization to administer the Appalachian Trail, including in matters of selecting right-of-way. The interior secretary then placed the National Park Service in charge of managing the trail. However, the National Trails System Act also stated that when the right-of-way for the Appalachian Trail runs "across Federal lands under the jurisdiction of another Federal agency," the interior secretary must agree with the head of that agency regarding right-of-way.[3]

    FERC and the natural gas pipeline

    In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowed Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline from Harrison County, West Virginia, to eastern Virginia and North Carolina. The FERC approved a pipeline route in which 0.1 miles of pipeline would cross under the Appalachian Trail on Forest Service land.[3]

    The FERC determined that since the Appalachian Trail crossing was on Forest Service land, the pipeline didn't require authorization from the U.S. Park Service. The FERC based its conclusion on the Mineral Leasing Act, which gave the interior secretary the authority to grant right-of-way through federal lands for natural gas pipelines. Under the act, federal lands include "all lands owned by the United States" except "lands in the National Park System."[3]

    4th Circuit decision

    On January 23, 2018, the Forest Service issued a record of decision and a special use permit to Atlantic Coast Pipeline, giving the company right-of-way for the pipeline through the Appalachian Trail. Cowpasture River Preservation Association and other respondents challenged the record of decision and the special use permit in the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.[3][4]

    The 4th Circuit granted review, vacated the permit, and remanded the case to the Forest Service. The 4th Circuit ruled the Appalachian Trail was within the National Park System, and so the Forest Service didn't have the legal authority to grant right-of-way on the Appalachian Trail land. According to the petition, "In light of its ruling that the Appalachian Trail is 'land' in the National Park System, the court of appeals concluded that the Mineral Leasing Act 'specifically excludes' the Trail 'from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior "or appropriate agency head" to grant pipeline rights of way.'"[3]

    Petition to SCOTUS

    The Forest Service filed a writ of certiorari June 25, 2019. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition October 4.

    In the petition, the Forest Service argued, "The court of appeals erred in holding that national forest lands underlying the Appalachian Trail are in the National Park System and thus ineligible for the grant of a right-of-way for a pipeline under the Mineral Leasing Act." The petitioner continued, "That ruling threatens to hamper the development of energy infrastructure in the eastern United States, including the construction and operation of the natural gas pipeline at issue in this case."[3]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Questions presented:
    • Whether the Forest Service has authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests.[3]

    Outcome

    In a 7-2 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the 4th Circuit and remanded the case, holding that because the Department of the Interior's decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Elena Kagan.[2]

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote:[2]

    “ We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §181 et seq., to grant rights-of-way through lands within national forests traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 588 U. S. ___ (2019). We hold that the Mineral Leasing Act does grant the Forest Service that authority and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.


    ... We are tasked with determining whether the Leasing Act enables the Forest Service to grant a subterranean pipeline right-of-way some 600 feet under the Appalachian Trail. To do this, we first focus on the distinction between the lands that the Trail traverses and the Trail itself, because the lands (not the Trail) are the object of the relevant statutes. ... We conclude that the lands that the Trail crosses remain under the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and, thus, continue to be “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act.

    ...The dissent notes that the Federal Government has referred to the Trail as an "area" and a "unit" and has described the Trail in terms of "acres." See post, at 7–10, 13 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.) In the dissent's view, this indicates that the Trail and the land are the same. This is not so. Like other right-of-way easements, the Trail burdens "a particular parcel of land." Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land §1:1, at 1–6. It is thus not surprising that the Government might refer to the Trail as an "area," much as one might mark out on his property the "area" of land burdened by a sewage easement. The fact remains that the land and the easement are still separate.

    The dissent also cites provisions of the Trails Act that discuss “lands” to be included in the Trail. See post, at 12. But this, too, is consistent with our conclusion that the Trail is an easement. Like all easements, the parcel of land burdened by the easement has particular metes and bounds. See e.g. Carmella v. Sadowy, 147 App. Div. 2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S. 2d 96, 98 (1989) ("[T]he subject easement ... reasonably described the portion of the property where the easement existed"); Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S.W. 2d 193, 195–196 (Ky. 1958). In fact, without such descriptions, parties to an easement agreement would be unable to understand their rights or enforce another party's obligations under the easement agreement. Thus, there is nothing noteworthy about the fact that the Trails Act discusses whether particular lands should be included within the metes and bounds of the tracts of land burdened by the easement. In short, none of the characterizations identified by the dissent changes the fact that the burden on the land and the land itself remain separate.

    In sum, read in light of basic property law principles, the plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses. It gave the Department of the Interior (and by delegation the National Park Service) an easement for the specified and limited purpose of establishing and administering a Trail, but the land itself remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. To restate this conclusion in the parlance of the Leasing Act, the lands that the Trail crosses are still "Federal lands," 30 U.S.C. §185(a), and the Forest Service may grant a pipeline right-of-way through them–just as it granted a right-of-way for the Trail. Sometimes a complicated regulatory scheme may cause us to miss the forest for the trees, but at bottom, these cases boil down to a simple proposition: A trail is a trail, and land is land.

    The various duties described in the Trails Act reinforce that the agency responsible for the Trail has a limited role of administering a trail easement, but that the underlying land remains within the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. ...

    The dissent resists this conclusion by asserting that the National Park Service “administers” the Trail, and that so long as that is true, the Trail is land within the National Park System. See post, at 15–16. But the National Park Service does not administer the “land” crossed by the Trail. It administers the Trail as an easement—an easement that is separate from the underlying land.

    Finally, Congress has used unequivocal and direct language in multiple statutes when it wished to transfer land from one agency to another, just as one would expect if a property owner conveyed land in fee simple to another private property owner. ...[5]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Elena Kagan.[2]

    In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:[2]

    “ The majority’s complicated discussion of private-law easements, footpath maintenance, differently worded statutes, and policy masks the simple (and only) dispute here. Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail “lan[d] in the National Park System”? 30 U.S.C. §185(b)(1). If it is, then the Forest Service may not grant a natural-gas pipeline right-of-way that crosses the Trail on federally owned land. So says the Mineral Leasing Act, and the parties do not disagree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 10; Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; Brief for Respondents 1. By definition, lands in the National Park System include “any area of land” “administered” by the Park Service for “park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” 54 U.S.C. §100501. So says the National Park Service Organic Act, and the parties agree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 38; Brief for Fed-eral Petitioners 45–46; Brief for Respondents 5–6.


    The Appalachian Trail, in turn, is “administered” by the park Service to ensure “outdoor recreation” and to conserve “nationally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities.” §§3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919–920; see also 34 Fed. Reg. 14337 (1969). So say the National Trails System Act and relevant regulations, and again the parties agree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 6, 8–9; Brief for Federal Petitioners 9, 26; Brief for Respondents 5.

    Thus, as the Government puts it, the only question here is whether parts of the Appalachian Trail are “‘lands’” within the meaning of those statutes. Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. Those laws, a half century of agency understanding, and common sense confirm that the Trail is land, land on which generations of people have walked. Indeed, for 50 years the “Federal Government has referred to the Trail” as a “‘unit’” of the National Park System. Ante, at 9; see Part I–C, infra. A “unit” of the Park System is by definition either “land” or “water” in the Park System. 54 U.S.C. §§100102(6), 100501. Federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail any more than it distinguishes “land” from the many monuments, historic buildings, park-ways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System. Because the Trail is land in the Park System, “no federal agency” has “authority under the Mineral LeasingAct to grant a pipeline right-of-way across such lands.” Brief for Federal Petitioners 3.

    By contrast, today’s Court suggests that the Trail is not “land” in the Park System at all. The Court strives to separate “the lands that the Trail traverses” from “the Trail itself,” reasoning that the Trail is simply an “easement,” “not land.” Ante, at 6, 7. In doing so, however, the Court relies on anything except the provisions that actually answer the question presented. Because today’s Court condones the placement of a pipeline that subverts the plain text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trail, I respectfully dissent.[5]

    		”
    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[6]



    Transcript

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association also came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. The docket number was 18-1587.
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Supreme Court of the United States, United States Forest Service et al. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, decided June 15, 2020
    3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 Supreme Court of the United States, United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association: Petition for a writ of certiorari," accessed October 8, 2019
    4. ↑ The other respondents included Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia, Inc.
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    6. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed March 2, 2020
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