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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
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| Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District | |
| Reference: 393 U.S. 503 | |
| Term: 1969 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: November 12, 1968 Decided: February 24, 1969 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Abe Fortas • Earl Warren • William Douglas • William Brennan • Thurgood Marshall | |
| Concurring | |
| Potter Stewart • Byron White | |
| Dissenting | |
| Hugo Black • John Harlan II | |
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is a case decided on February 24, 1969, by the United States Supreme Court holding that students have a fundamental right to free speech in schools. The case concerned the constitutionality of the Des Moines Independent Community School District disciplining students for wearing armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that students' right to freedom of speech extended to schools. School officials may not censor speech unless they prove that the speech would interfere with the function of the school. To read more about the impact of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District click here.
Background
A group of students in Des Moines, Iowa decided in December 1965 to protest the Vietnam War and demonstrate their support for a truce by wearing black armbands to school. The principals established a policy on December 16, 1965, in response that would suspend students for wearing armbands to school. Mary Beth Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and John Tinker wore their armbands to school despite the policy and were suspended. The students sued the school district, through their parents, for violating their freedom of speech. They also filed for an injunction to prevent the students from being disciplined.
The district court ruled in favor of the school district, arguing that their actions were constitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. A writ of certiorari was filed for the Supreme Court to review the case.[1][2][3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on November 12, 1968. The case was decided on February 24, 1969.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 7-2 to reverse the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the court. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White wrote concurring opinions. Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan II wrote dissenting opinions.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Abe Fortas, writing for the court, argued that students are entitled to their First Amendment right to freedom of speech in schools. Fortas contended that school officials must prove that the expression of a certain opinion would interfere with the function of the school in order to justify speech censorship.[2]
| “ | In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, supra at 749.
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” |
| —Abe Fortas, majority opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District[2] | ||
Concurring opinion
Justice Potter Stewart, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the ruling of the majority but argued that children are not entitled to the full scope of First Amendment rights.[2]
| “ | Although I agree with much of what is said in the Court's opinion, and with its judgment in this case, I cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are coextensive with those of adults. Indeed, I had thought the Court decided otherwise just last Term in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629. I continue to hold the view I expressed in that case: '[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child -- like someone in a captive audience -- is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.' Id. at 649-650 (concurring in result). Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158.[4] | ” |
| —Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District[2] | ||
Justice Byron White, in a concurring opinion, highlighted that there is a distinction to be made in the majority opinion between speech through words and actions.[2]
| “ | While I join the Court's opinion, I deem it appropriate to note, first, that the Court continues to recognize a distinction between communicating by words and communicating by acts or conduct which sufficiently impinges on some valid state interest; and, second, that I do not subscribe to everything the Court of Appeals said about free speech in its opinion in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (C.A. 5th Cir.1966), a case relied upon by the Court in the matter now before us.[4] | ” |
| —Byron White, concurring opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District[2] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice Hugo Black, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the First Amendment does not authorize individuals to freedom of expression at all times. Black posited that the method of expression in this case was distracting to other students, which authorized school officials to discipline the students for causing a disruption.[2]
| “ | Even a casual reading of the record shows that this armband did divert students' minds from their regular lessons, and that talk, comments, etc., made John Tinker 'self-conscious' in attending school with his armband. While the absence of obscene remarks or boisterous and loud disorder perhaps justifies the Court's statement that the few armband students did not actually 'disrupt' the classwork, I think the record overwhelmingly shows that the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the students' minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war. And I repeat that, if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary. The next logical step, it appears to me, would be to hold unconstitutional laws that bar pupils under 21 or 18 from voting, or from being elected members of the boards of education.[4] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, dissenting opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District[2] | ||
Justice John Harlan II, in a dissenting opinion, argued that school officials should have the authority to use discipline to maintain order.[2]
| “ | I certainly agree that state public school authorities, in the discharge of their responsibilities, are not wholly exempt from the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting the freedoms of expression and association. At the same time, I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement between the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions. To translate that proposition into a workable constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns -- for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while permitting expression of the dominant opinion.[4] | ” |
| —John Harlan II, dissenting opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District established that students maintained their right to freedom of speech in public schools. School officials may not censor speech unless they prove that the speech would interfere with the function of the school. The landmark decision in this case has served as a basis for the protection of students' First Amendment rights in schools.[1][5]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District," accessed August 16, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 Justia, "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)," accessed August 16, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 LexisNexis, "Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. - 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969)," accessed August 16, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ National Constitution Center, "Tinker v. Des Moines: Protecting student free speech," February 24, 2017
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