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Arguments about police collective bargaining

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See also: Arguments related to policing and police collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

This article does not receive scheduled updates. It contains information from 2023 and was last updated in 2024. If you would like to help our coverage grow, consider donating to Ballotpedia. Contact our team to suggest an update.

This page tracks arguments about police collective bargaining. Information about this topic area in relation to police CBAs in the 50 states and 100 largest U.S. cities by population can be found on Ballotpedia's Police CBA Dashboard.

This page tracks the following arguments about police collective bargaining:

Arguments supporting collective bargaining agreements

Argument: Police collective bargaining is necessary to grant officers due process rights

This argument states that collective bargaining establishes standards for discipline and investigations that are fundamental due process rights for officers.

  • Stephanie Francis Ward, assistant managing editor of the American Bar Association Journal assessed the relationship between police union contracts and what she refers to as police reform. The article cited Holly E. Oliva-Van Horsten, general counsel of the International Union of Police Associations, who argued that the protections offered to officers by police union contracts cover the officers’ due process rights during internal investigations: "Holly E. Oliva-Van Horsten, general counsel of the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO in Sarasota, Florida, says many terms for discipline and investigations in police contracts are fundamental due process rights. Even if municipalities complain about what’s in the contract, she adds, they still agreed to conditions as part of the collective bargaining process."[1]
  • Reporters Kim Barker, Michael H. Keller, and Steve Eder highlighted perspectives from police union representatives arguing that police union involvement in developing disciplinary procedures ensures protections and due process rights for police officers: "Union leaders defend the disciplinary protections, saying that police work is difficult, and that rules help ensure that chiefs don’t impose discipline because of political pressure or personal biases. Public outcry, they said, can unfairly influence a city’s decision to fire an officer accused of excessive force."[2]
  • The Police Officers Association of Michigan (POAM) published an article in October 2023 arguing in support of union representation for law enforcement officers. POAM contended police unions give officers the power to negotiate for better pay and job protections, as well as protect their legal rights: "Union representation means more than better pay: It also means access to resources to help stave off legal attacks. Michigan police officer unions allow officers access to professional and competent representation if there are ever disciplinary issues or concerns. These services and the ability to file grievances against any government violating contracts or creating unsafe working conditions are a cornerstone of union involvement."[3]

Argument: Police collective bargaining supports police officer accountability

This argument posits that collective bargaining can establish mechanisms to support police officer accountability.

  • Daniel DiSalvo, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, argued in a 2021 report that police unions and policymakers can address topics such as arbitration, misconduct investigations, and recordkeeping requirements through collective bargaining contract negotiations, "By revisiting the details of CBAs, officer accountability can be improved. Accountability is worthy in its own right but may also reduce the unnecessary use of force, changing public perceptions of police departments, and bolstering community trust in the police. … Working inside the collective bargaining process, policymakers can take steps to enhance accountability and thereby improve the professionalism of local police departments. Reforming any large organization is hard, but such changes will help bolster public confidence in the police and reduce the unnecessary use of force."[4]

Arguments opposing collective bargaining agreements

Argument: Law Enforcement Officer Bills of Rights and union contracts remove or obstruct accountability for officers’ misconduct

This argument states that the existence of the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights (LEOBORs) and union contracts in police departments create barriers and protections that prevent police officers from being held accountable for their misconduct. According to proponents of this claim, the legal protections that stem from these agreements make it difficult or impossible for police officers to receive discipline or be held accountable for misconduct on the job.

  • The Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform wrote, “The Law Enforcement Bill of Rights at the state level needs to be addressed. It further doubles down on qualified immunity and removes accountability for law enforcement.” The group continued, “Police union contracts need to be evaluated to ensure they do not obstruct the ability for officers who engage in misconduct to be held accountable. Making changes to the Law Enforcement Bill of Rights at the state helps with this, but the Congress should provide more regulations to help local municipalities with this process.”[5]
  • J.D. Candidate Katherine J. Bies wrote, “[P]olice unions are unparalleled in their ability to successfully advocate for policy proposals that conflict with traditional democratic values of accountability and transparency. As this Note illustrates, police unions often strategically frame any opposition to their agenda of secrecy as endangering public safety and harming the public interest. However, police unions often conflate ‘the public interest’ with the private interests of police officers. Police unions - like all unions - first and foremost advocate for the rank-and-file’s interests as employees, sometimes at the expense of democratic values. Additionally, police unions have established highly developed political machinery that exerts significant political and financial pressure on all three branches of government. This Note draws on two case studies that illuminate the unique ability of police unions to persuade and control public officials. Further, this Note argues that the power of police unions over policymakers in the criminal justice context distorts the political process and generates political outcomes that undermine the democratic values of transparency and accountability.”[6]
  • Nick Place, a Gideon's Promise fellow at the Orleans Public Defender in New Orleans, Louisiana, argued that LEOBORs offer what Place called escape routes to protect officers from accountability, which include the scope, rights, and protections granted to officers during misconduct investigations. Place wrote, “LEOBORs in statutes and collective bargaining agreements are written for one purpose and ‘sold’ publicly for another. They are written, in statute and contract, mostly as seemingly reasonable stipulations any group of employees might have for their bosses, especially in a field with as much potential for ‘customer dissatisfaction’ as policing. LEOBORS are pushed by police unions and their representatives as necessary to ensure police have at least the same rights as criminals. Without LEOBORs, these arguments go, the law offers more protections to potential murderers and thieves than cops. But when police make mistakes or abuse their power, the actual effects of LEOBORs reveal a third, more dangerous purpose: putting even the most vile, destructive actions of law enforcement officers beyond serious accountability. The juxtaposition between the advertisement, the product, and the side effects leaves no doubt that LEOBORs were made for, and have been very effective at, thwarting accountability for police misconduct.”[7]
  • Law professor Stephen Rushin wrote, “Policymakers have long relied on a handful of external legal mechanisms like the exclusionary rule, civil litigation, and criminal prosecution to incentivize reform in American police departments. In theory, these external legal mechanisms should increase the costs borne by police departments in cases of officer misconduct, forcing rational police supervisors to enact rigorous disciplinary procedures. But these external mechanisms have failed to bring about organizational change in local police departments. This Article argues that state labor law may partially explain this failure. Most states permit police officers to bargain collectively over the terms of their employment, including the content of internal disciplinary procedures. This means that police union contracts—largely negotiated outside of public view—shape the content of disciplinary procedures used by American police departments.”[8]
  • Reporters Noam Scheiber, Farah Stockman, and J. David Goodman argued in The New York Times that the protections granted to law enforcement officers by police unions, such as representation and defense during misconduct investigations, prevent accountability reform efforts from taking effect: "They aggressively protect the rights of members accused of misconduct, often in arbitration hearings that they have battled to keep behind closed doors. And they have also been remarkably effective at fending off broader change, using their political clout and influence to derail efforts to increase accountability."[9]
  • Law professor Jonathan H. Adler argued that the role of police unions in shaping disciplinary procedures prevents officers from being held accountable for misconduct. Adler claimed that such collective bargaining agreements establish protections that impede efforts to increase police officer accountability: "Recent academic research further demonstrates that police disciplinary procedures established through union contracts obstruct accountability and … collective bargaining for police officers appears to increase police misconduct. This is not surprising. Through collective bargaining, police unions demand protections from disciplinary procedures that would not otherwise be approved, oppose consent decrees and other measures to increase police accountability, and (given the power of police unions in state and local politics) they receive relatively little pushback."[10]
  • Scholar Falco Muscante II published a 2022 article in the University of Miami Race and Social Justice Law Review claiming that certain officer protections found in CBAs prevent law enforcement officers from being held accountable for misconduct. Muscante proposed model language for governing entities to adopt to prohibit or restrict police union collective bargaining in an effort to increase what he views as accountability and transparency: "Removing police unions from the purview of collective bargaining will also increase transparency. Instead of the confidentiality-laced provisions enshrined in collective bargaining agreements now keeping disciplinary files accessible only to those within the department, communities could form coalitions of concerned stakeholders to promote citizens and police departments coming together to analyze, discuss, and improve the profession that affects everyone in the community. Disciplinary proceedings and any contract negotiations would also become more transparent to prevent cities from ‘using lax disciplinary procedures as a bargaining chip to secure lower officer salaries.’"[11]
  • Political commentator Amy Sundberg wrote in a 2024 article in The Urbanist about an anticipated new Seattle, Washington, police CBA. Sundberg highlighted the effect of the extended use of the expired CBA on the implementation of certain accountability reforms: "The Seattle Police Officers Guild (SPOG) collective bargaining agreement has languished for three full years since its expiration at the end of 2020. That expired contract has held up accountability reforms that Judge Robart, the federal judge overseeing the City of Seattle and the Seattle Police Department’s consent decree, has said are necessary before Justice Department oversight can officially end. It has delayed efforts to begin a new civilian emergency first response program like ones currently operating in many peer cities. And it has stood firm against efforts to ‘reimagine public safety’ to be more equitable and more responsive to root causes."[12]
  • Professor William P. Jones published a report in September 2023 with the Harvard Law School Center for Labor and a Just Economy about the relationship between police collective bargaining and violence. Jones contended collective bargaining is an essential right, but has been misused by "police unions in shielding officers from accountability for misconduct." He also argued CBAs limit police accountability as a result of influence from public officials: "Collective bargaining agreements are not imposed unilaterally by unions but, rather, result from negotiations between workers and employers. In the case of police contracts, a singular focus on the power of unions overlooks the responsibility of officials to reject provisions they deem inconsistent with the interests of the public they represent. Public officials have often favored limits on police accountability because they ran for office on 'tough on crime' platforms and sought political and financial support from police unions, or because such measures are less costly than increased wages or benefits. Elected officials have the power—and the responsibility—to ensure that collective bargaining contracts do not insulate police from accountability to the people who they serve. However, the limitations on accountability contained in many collective bargaining contracts result from the often-aligned interests of elected officials and police unions."[13]

Argument: Police collective bargaining increases violent misconduct

This argument states that the inclusion of collective bargaining rights within police departments leads to more violent police misconduct cases. It is argued that violent misconduct increases because police unions protect law enforcement from being disciplined for misconduct. This lack of discipline prevents police officers from experiencing deterrence against violent misconduct, according to proponents of this argument.

  • Law professors Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams, and John Rappaport wrote, “We provide the first quasi-experimental evidence on the impact of collective bargaining rights on misconduct by law enforcement officers. … Our estimates imply that collective bargaining rights led to a ~40% increase in violent incidents of misconduct among SOs [sheriffs’ offices].”[14]
  • Daniel DiSalvo wrote, "[C]urrent concerns focus on the rules inscribed in collective-bargaining contracts negotiated under the rubric of ‘conditions of employment.’ In many jurisdictions, these conditions establish disciplinary, grievance, and arbitration procedures for officers accused of misconduct. Such job protections are said to shield incompetent or abusive officers, as union leaders have a legal duty to defend all members equally."[15]

Arguments about collective bargaining agreements

Argument: Extending collective bargaining agreement expiration dates allows for more time to negotiate new agreements

This argument posits that some government officials and police department representatives rely on the ability to continue using expired police CBAs to allow for more time to negotiate new agreements.

  • Journalist Nicolas Dubina published a 2024 article for WETM TV 18 examining ongoing contract negotiations in Elmira, New York. Dubina included a statement from Elmira Police Benevolent Association President Brooks Shaw on the ability to continue negotiations without an interruption in police services: "The Elmira Police PBA cannot comment on the ongoing contract negotiations with the City of Elmira as they are confidential. The citizens of the City of Elmira can expect to have continued professional police services from the members of the Elmira Police Department in the event an agreement is not reached by the end of the year."[16]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ↑ American Bar Association Journal, "Do police union contracts inhibit reform?" July 1, 2020
  2. ↑ The New York Times, "How Cities Lost Control of Police Discipline," March 10, 2021
  3. ↑ Police Officers Association of Michigan, "Why Every Law Enforcement Officer in Michigan Needs Union Representation," October 10, 2023
  4. ↑ Manhattan Institute, "Enhancing Accountability: Collective Bargaining and Police Reform," January 12, 2021
  5. ↑ Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform, "A Better Path Forward for Criminal Justice," 2021
  6. ↑ Stanford Law School, "Let the Sunshine In: Illuminating the Powerful Role of Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer Misconduct," 2017
  7. ↑ University of San Francisco Law Review, "Double Due Process: How Police Unions and Law Enforcement 'Bills of Rights' Enable Police Violence and Prevent Accountability," 2018
  8. ↑ Duke Law Journal, "Police union contracts," 2017
  9. ↑ The New York Times, "How Police Unions Became Such Powerful Opponents to Reform Efforts," April 2, 2021
  10. ↑ Reason, "Police Unions and the Problem of Police Misconduct (Updated)," May 30, 2020
  11. ↑ University of Miami Race and Social Justice Law Review, "Police Brutality & Unions: Collective Bargaining is the Problem, Not Law Enforcement," 2022
  12. ↑ The Urbanist, "What to Look For in a New Seattle Police Contract," January 17, 2024
  13. ↑ Center for Labor & A Just Economy, "Police Collective Bargaining and Police Violence," September 2023
  14. ↑ The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, "Collective Bargaining Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida," 2020
  15. ↑ National Affairs, "The Trouble with Police Unions," Summer 2023
  16. ↑ WETM TV 18, "Elmira Police Union contract expires, negotiations continue," January 2, 2024
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