Help us improve in just 2 minutes—share your thoughts in our reader survey.

Arguments about police investigation procedures

From Ballotpedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Criminal Justice Banner Gray.png
Police hiring, training, and discipline
Criminal Justice Icon 200x200.png
• Police collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
• Ballotpedia CBA dashboard
•Reform proposals
•CBA areas of inquiry and disagreement
•Arguments about police collective bargaining
• Index of articles about criminal justice policy
Click here for more analysis of police hiring, training, and disciplinary requirements by state and city on Ballotpedia


See also: Arguments related to policing and police collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

This page tracks arguments about police investigation procedures. Information about this topic areas in relation to police CBAs in the 50 states and 100 largest U.S. cities by population can be found on Ballotpedia's Police CBA Dashboard.

This page tracks the following arguments about police investigation procedures:

Arguments supporting changes to investigation procedures for police misconduct

Argument: Police union contracts afford too many protections to police during misconduct investigations

This argument posits that police union contracts grant too many protections to police officers, such as arbitration and disciplinary procedures for officers accused of misconduct.

  • In a 2023 article published in the journal National Affairs, Daniel DiSalvo, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, wrote about arguments against police collective bargaining and the protections unions provide to police officers, "[C]urrent concerns focus on the rules inscribed in collective-bargaining contracts negotiated under the rubric of ‘conditions of employment.’ In many jurisdictions, these conditions establish disciplinary, grievance, and arbitration procedures for officers accused of misconduct. Such job protections are said to shield incompetent or abusive officers, as union leaders have a legal duty to defend all members equally."[1]
  • In a 2021 article published in the Vanderbilt Law Review, law professor Stephen Rushin assessed data surrounding police arbitration for disciplinary actions. Rushin considered reform approaches aimed at balancing law enforcement officers’ due process rights with community accountability: "[A]s currently structured, the existing process of police disciplinary appeals is not just an appellate system. Instead, critics of this system may argue that it creates a shadow disciplinary system that can largely disregard the decisions reached by law enforcement agencies, city leaders, or civilian review boards. Scholars have expressed widely varying views about how to create an internal disciplinary process for law enforcement officers that is sufficiently responsive to democratic demands without risking officer due process. Some scholars prefer to vest primary disciplinary authority in the hands of police chiefs. Others believe that police chiefs are too insulated from democratic accountability and argue instead that communities should vest authority in groups like civilian review boards that are more directly accountable and representative of the public. But regardless of where scholars fall on this spectrum, there seems to be broader agreement that ‘officer oversight should not be divorced from community input.’"[2]
  • In a 2021 article published in The New York Times, reporters Noam Scheiber, Farah Stockman, and J. David Goodman argued that the protections granted to law enforcement officers by police unions, such as representation and defense during misconduct investigations, prevent accountability reform efforts from taking effect: "They aggressively protect the rights of members accused of misconduct, often in arbitration hearings that they have battled to keep behind closed doors. And they have also been remarkably effective at fending off broader change, using their political clout and influence to derail efforts to increase accountability."[3]
  • Law professor Nino Monea argued, "Terminations almost never happen. Among 1,156 complaints filed against San Francisco officers between 1995 and 2001, only two officers involved in those complaints were fired. Even if the local police department terminates an officer, the officer can usually invoke an appeals process that results in a 'stunningly high percentage' of officers being rehired. Beyond internal procedures, officers may have the right to bring matters to arbitration. This system too can be highly favorable to officers. A San Antonio officer had a habit of challenging suspects to a fistfight for a chance at freedom, yet avoided termination because friendly arbitrators kept retaining him. Arbitrators in Oakland refused to fire an officer who repeatedly shot unarmed men. In DC, for every nine officers fired, six are reinstated. Cash-strapped departments frequently rehire previously fired officers to save money, too.”[4]
  • Monea continued, "Some police departments have dedicated internal affairs bureaus, but these too are often ineffective at rooting out and punishing malfeasance. They have created nearly insurmountable burdens of proof, exonerate the accused officer in virtually all cases, and frequently do not bother to investigate allegations. They may have a reluctance to rock the boat. Two decades ago, Los Angeles’ police department was found to have engaged in systematic evidence fabrication, leading to at least 100 false convictions. In spite of this, the department’s internal report did not identify any leadership failures or call for structural changes. Worst of all, some bureaus have attempted to intimidate complainants to not file or refused to record complaints.”[4]

Argument: Police officers should not be granted paid administrative leave during misconduct investigations

This argument posits that paid administrative leave during misconduct investigations equates to paid vacation for misconduct.

  • Reporter Lea Skene published a 2018 article in The Advocate examining policy arguments about the paid administrative leave policy in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Skene highlighted arguments from critics of the policy claiming, "Some call it paid vacation while others compare it to house arrest. But critics of the Baton Rouge Police Department's paid administrative leave policy agree on the ironic nature of paying an officer to stay home while under investigation for possible workplace misconduct. When two officers were caught sneaking home during their shifts last year, the department ordered them to keep doing the same thing for another month: stay home and collect their paychecks pending the outcome of their investigation."[5]

Arguments opposing changes to investigation procedures for police misconduct

Argument: Police officers need their due process rights protected during misconduct investigations

This argument posits that police must have their fundamental due process rights protected, which is achieved by union contracts and Law Enforcement Officer Bills of Rights (LEOBORs).

  • In a 2020 article in the American Bar Association Journal, Stephanie Francis Ward assessed the relationship between police union contracts and what she refers to as police reform. The article cited Holly E. Oliva-Van Horsten, general counsel of the International Union of Police Associations, who argued that the protections offered to officers by police union contracts cover the officers’ due process rights during internal investigations: "Holly E. Oliva-Van Horsten, general counsel of the International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO in Sarasota, Florida, says many terms for discipline and investigations in police contracts are fundamental due process rights. Even if municipalities complain about what’s in the contract, she adds, they still agreed to conditions as part of the collective bargaining process."[6]
  • In a 2018 article published by Police1, Bloomington, Minnesota Police Chief Booker Hodges argued that police unions are responsible for advocating for members, which includes representing members during misconduct investigations: "Legally unions are responsible for representing their members. The public seems to support this premise when it concerns other labor unions, but not those who represent police officers. Even members of other labor unions, particularly those who belong to educator unions, don’t seem to support this premise when it comes to police unions. Many of them have taken to the streets to protest against police officers, criticized police unions for defending their members and called for an end of binding arbitration for police officers."[7]

Argument: Arbitration procedures are a necessary part of the police disciplinary process

This argument posits that arbitration is a key part of the disciplinary process and highlights the failures of municipalities and police departments.

  • In a 2023 article published in the Ohio State Law Journal, law professor Michael Z. Green wrote about what he considers to be potential reform approaches to arbitration in police discipline aimed at developing a process agreed upon by all stakeholders. Green argued in favor of police arbitration and contended that arbitration procedures are negatively impacted by claims that arbitrators favor police officers in their decision-making: "Despite the political rhetoric, some commentators have gone beyond the blaming and looked at the actual decisions to find that labor arbitrators rarely are the problem in police discipline matters. Instead, the problems that arise when arbitrators reverse police disciplinary actions must lie at the feet of municipalities and departments for their inconsistencies and failures that come forward during the arbitration review process. But political leaders need cover from the fallout when those disciplinary actions get reversed."[8]

Argument: Police officers should be placed on paid administrative leave during misconduct investigations

This argument posits that it is best for police officers to be placed on paid leave during misconduct investigations to protect officers' rights.

  • Reporter Joe Callahan wrote in a 2016 article in Ocala StarBanner that, according to certain officials in the field, paid administrative leave during law enforcement officer investigations protects the rights of the officers and ensures that the case is properly investigated: "[Former Florida state prosecutor and law professor Bob] Dekle said the procedure of placing an officer on paid administrative leave is the way agencies have handled such cases for decades. It is the best way to ensure all shooting cases are handled fairly for everyone. Officials said that paid leave is neither a punishment nor a paid vacation. It is the best way for authorities to investigate such shootings fairly and, at the same time, allow for the officer to mentally deal with what has happened in the blink of eye [sic]."[9]

Arguments about investigation procedures for police misconduct

Argument: Police departments should have a statute of limitations for investigating officers for complaints of misconduct

This argument posits that there should be a statute of limitations for investigating and disciplining officers for misconduct because it protects both officers and the community.

  • Abramson & Denenberg, P.C., a Pennsylvania-based law firm, published an article about police misconduct statute of limitations, arguing it is necessary because it protects both officers and the community: "The statute of limitations is vital to society’s welfare by protecting the rights of would-be defendants and plaintiffs. The timeframe shields defendants from unfair legal action based on the considerable passage of time. It promotes justice by preventing the unexpected revival of claims long after the crime. Defendants get reasonable repose to protect them from the need to defend stale claims. The timeline also enables plaintiffs to collect and preserve the necessary evidence to prove their case, enabling them to pursue their claims diligently."[10]

Argument: Police departments should not have a statute of limitations for investigating officers for complaints of misconduct

This argument posits that there should not be a statute of limitations for investigating and disciplining officers for misconduct because it results in a lack of accountability.

  • Journalist Eric Umansky published an article in September 2024 with ProPublica about the New York Police Department (NYPD) opting not to act on hundreds of misconduct complaints. Umansky argued the department saw a rise in cases being thrown out "as a way to cope with escalating caseloads that were approaching a deadline for discipline." The article stated: "'This is highly problematic and deeply troubling,' said City Council member Alexa Avilés, who has sponsored police reform legislation. 'What the department is saying is that there’s not enough time, so they’re not going to do anything at all. They’re using the statute of limitations to avoid accountability.'"[11]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ↑ National Affairs, "The Trouble with Police Unions," Fall 2020
  2. ↑ Vanderbilt Law Review, "Police Arbitration," 2021
  3. ↑ The New York Times, "How Police Unions Became Such Powerful Opponents to Reform Efforts," April 2, 2021
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 SSRN, "A Tale of Two Committees: Comparing Police Officer Standard and Training (POST) Bodies," 2023
  5. ↑ The Advocate, "Baton Rouge police paid leave policy: Paid vacation or due process rights? May 28, 2018
  6. ↑ ABA Journal, "Do police union contracts inhibit reform?" July 1, 2020
  7. ↑ Police1, "What police unions do (and why it matters)," April 2, 2018
  8. ↑ Ohio State Law Journal, "Black and Blue Police Arbitration Reforms," 2022
  9. ↑ Ocala StarBanner, "Why paid leave is the right move," November 4, 2016
  10. ↑ Abramson & Denenberg, P.C., "What Is the Police Misconduct Statute of Limitations?" June 5, 2024
  11. ↑ ProPublica, "The NYPD Is Tossing Out Hundreds of Misconduct Cases — Including Stop-and-Frisks — Without Even Looking at Them," September 11, 2024
v • e
Police hiring, training, and disciplinary requirements by state and city
Main
By state
Collective Bargaining Agreements
Main arguments
Reform proposals
Retrieved from "https://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php?title=Arguments_about_police_investigation_procedures&oldid=10379732"