Calder v. Bull
 | |
| Calder v. Bull | |
| Reference: 3 U.S. 386 | |
| Term: 1798 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: Feb 9, 1798 Decided: Feb 13, 1798 | |
| Outcome | |
| Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Oliver Ellsworth • Samuel Chase • James Wilson | |
| Concurring | |
| William Cushing • William Paterson • James Iredell | |
Calder v. Bull was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court on February 13, 1798, holding that Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution does not prohibit all retrospective (ex post facto) laws.
Why it matters: In Calder v. Bull, the court unanimously ruled that the Connecticut state law was not an ex post facto law. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and private rights and argued that the restrictions in the Constitution regarding ex post facto laws were not written to apply to private contract rights. Justice Chase argued that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not ex post facto laws. To read more about the legacy of Calder v. Bull click here.
Background
Caleb Bull and his wife were the stated beneficiaries of Norman Morrison's will but the will was invalidated by a Hartford, Connecticut, probate court on March 21, 1793. As a result, the Calder family inherited the property. The Bulls later appealed but state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling.
The Connecticut General Assembly on May 14, 1795, enacted a law to change the state law prohibiting appeals outside of 18 months. The Bulls appealed the will's invalidation and argued that they were the rightful inheritors of Norman Morrison's property. The Calders argued that the Connecticut General Assembly created an ex-post-facto law when it enacted the change, violating Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.[1]
Oral argument
Oral argument took place on February 9, 1798.[2]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided Calder v. Bull on February 13, 1798, and unanimously ruled that the Connecticut law was not an ex post facto law and, therefore, was not prohibited by Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Justice Samuel Chase wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Justice William Cushing, and Justice James Wilson.[1]
Justices James Iredell and William Paterson wrote separate concurring opinions.[1]
Opinions
Majority opinion
The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut law did not violate Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution because the law was not an ex post facto law. Justice Samuel Chase wrote the majority opinion and argued that, although the law was retrospective, and although the law deprived Calder of vested property, it was not an ex post facto law because it did not apply a criminal punishment. Justice Chase drew a distinction between criminal laws and civil laws and argued that the provision in the Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws applied to criminal laws, not civil cases. Because Calder's case was a civil case, Justice Chase argued that the Connecticut law did not violate the Constitution:[3]
| “ | In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law. The former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. | ” |
Concurring opinions
Patterson concurrence
Justice William Patterson wrote a concurring opinion and said that he had the desire to extend the ex post facto clause to all retrospective laws, but after consideration of the case he was convinced that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution must be limited in the manner expressed by the majority opinion:[3]
| “ | I had an ardent desire to have extended the provision in the Constitution to retrospective laws in general. There is neither policy nor safety in such laws, and therefore I have always had a strong aversion against them. It may in general be truly observed of retrospective laws of every description that they neither accord with sound legislation nor the fundamental principles of the social compact. But on full consideration I am convinced that ex post facto laws must be limited in the manner already expressed; they must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense. | ” |
Iredell concurrence
Justice James Iredell wrote a concurring opinion that considered the relationship between natural justice and legal justice. Justice Iredell wrote that the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions precisely define the objects of legislative power and that legislative power is restrained within constitutional boundaries. He argued that if any legislative act violates those boundaries it is void. On the other hand, he argued that if the legislature passes a law that does not exceed constitutional provisions, it cannot be pronounced void. Further, Iredell further argued that either power is delegated to the legislature by the Constitution and it is valid, or it exceeds the boundaries of power written in the Constitution and it is invalid. Ultimately, Iredell argued that because the state law was not an ex post facto law, it was not expressly prohibited by the Constitution:[3]
| “ | Still, however, in the present instance, the act or resolution of the Legislature of Connecticut cannot be regarded as an ex post facto law, for the true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases. It is only in criminal cases, indeed, in which the danger to be guarded against is greatly to be apprehended. | ” |
Cushing concurrence
Justice William Cushing wrote a two-sentence concurrence and argued that the state law is constitutional:[3]
| “ | The case appears to me to be clear of all difficulty, taken either way. If the act is a judicial act, it is not touched by the federal Constitution, and if it is a legislative act, it is maintained and justified by the ancient and uniform practice of the State of Connecticut. | ” |
Legacy
| Federalism |
|---|
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Calder v. Bull was one of several opinions that interpreted the Bill of Rights, the Fifth Amendment, and the right to property at the time of the founding. In Calder v. Bull, Justice Iredell argued that natural law and the Bill of Rights protected persons from the government "taking property from A and giving it to B." Justice Iredell argued that such a transfer of property, by any form of government, "is against all reason and justice."[3]
The early U.S. Supreme Court heard other opinions through which it interpreted the right to property, such as Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795). In Vanhorne's Lessee Justice William Patterson argued that "the right of acquiring and possessing private property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man."[5]
See also
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
- Federalism
- James Iredell
- Samuel Chase
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Quimbee, Calder v. Bull, accessed October 4, 2022
- ↑ Oyez, Calder v. Bull, accessed October 4, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 JUSTIA, Calder v. Bull, accessed October 4, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ JUSTIA, Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, accessed December 15, 2022
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