Humphrey's Executor v. United States
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| Humphrey's Executor v. United States | |
| Reference: 295 US 602 (1935) | |
| Term: 1934 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: May 1, 1935 Decided: May 27, 1935 | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice Charles Hughes • Willis Van Devanter • Louis Brandeis • George Sutherland • Pierce Butler • Harlan Fiske Stone • Owen Josephus Roberts • Benjamin Nathan Cardozo | |
| Concurring | |
| James Clark McReynolds | |
| Dissenting | |
| None | |
Humphrey's Executor v. United States is a case decided on May 27, 1935, by the United States Supreme Court. It involved the power of the president to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission for reasons other than the ones explicitly stated in the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the president could not remove a commissioner for a cause other than those listed in the act, which were "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."[1]
In brief:
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked William E. Humphrey, a member of the Federal Trade Commission, to resign. When Humphrey refused, Roosevelt had him removed, though Humphrey continued to insist that this removal was unlawful. Humphrey died several months later and his estate then sued to recover the wages they claimed were due to him for the time after his removal. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the President could only remove FTC commissioners for the reasons explicitly listed in the Federal Trade Commission Act, which were "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
Why it matters: The ruling set a precedent that the presidents could not remove officers from independent federal agencies for reasons other than those listed in the relevant statutes. The court noted that administrative agencies were meant to be independent and nonpartisan, so the President generally could not remove such officers for purely political reasons.
Background
| Administrative State |
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| • Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
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- See also: Appointment and removal power
William E. Humphrey was appointed to the Federal Trade Commission by President Herbert Hoover on December 10, 1931 to serve a seven-year term ending in 1938. On July 25, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation and when Humphrey refused to resign, had him removed from office on October 7, 1933. Humphrey rejected this action and attempted to continue performing his duties until his death on February 14, 1934. Humphrey's estate then sued to recover the salary alleged to be due to him for the time after his removal.
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 created the Federal Trade Commission with a mandate to "prevent unfair methods of competition in commerce." The commission consisted of five members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, with not more than three of the members being of the same political party. Members were to serve terms of seven years and "Any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office," a clause which became one of the main points of contention in this case.[2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on May 1, 1935. The case was decided on May 27, 1935. [3]
Decision
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the President could not remove a Federal Trade Commissioner for a cause other than "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."[1]
Justice George Sutherland wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, Willis Van Devanter, Louis Brandeis, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, Harlan Fiske Stone, Owen Josephus Roberts, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, and James Clark McReynolds.[3]
Justice James Clark McReynolds concurred with the majority opinion and noted that his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States stated his views concerning the power of the president to remove appointees.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the court, Justice George Sutherland identified two principal questions posed by the case.
| “ | '1. Do the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, stating that 'any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office', restrict or limit the power of the President to remove a commissioner except upon one or more of the causes named?
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” |
Does Section 1 of the FTC Act limit the President's power to remove FTC officers?
The federal government argued that the President was not limited by the causes listed in the act, using the precedent set in Shurtleff v. United States (1903). In that case, the President removed a general appraiser of merchandise without cause and the Supreme Court rejected the appraiser's petition to recover salary. In Humphrey's, however, Sutherland distinguished the circumstances from those in Shurtleff, since in that case no term length had been set by the relevant act. Since the Federal Trade Commission Act had set a term length, and the legislative reports from the act's creation process reflected the belief that "a fixed term was necessary to the effective and fair administration of the law," Sutherland argued that Congress had wanted the commission to remain independent of the will of the President.
| “ | Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service; a body which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government. To the accomplishment of these purposes, it is clear that Congress was of opinion that length and certainty of tenure would vitally contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the members of the commission continue in office at the mere will of the President, might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress sought to realize by definitely fixing the term of office.[1][4] | ” |
He thus concluded that the act did not allow the President to remove FTC commissioners for reasons other than the ones listed.
| “ | We conclude that the intent of the act is to limit the executive power of removal to the causes enumerated, the existence of none of which is claimed here...[1][4] | ” |
Is such a limitation constitutional?
The federal government also argued that the aforementioned limits in the Federal Trade Commission Act represented "an unconstitutional interference with the executive power of the President," using a precedent set in Myers v. United States. Again, Sutherland argued that the situation in Myers, in which the Supreme Court had affirmed the right of the President to dismiss a federal postmaster, was fundamentally different from the current one. While the postmaster in Myers had been a member of an Executive Department, the Federal Trade Commission performed "quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative" duties and had been created as an independent federal agency. The precedent set in Myers thus did not apply to the FTC.
| “ | The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control.[1][4] | ” |
Sutherland further argued that giving the President unlimited power to dismiss officers from independent agencies would threaten their independence and violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
| “ | If Congress is without authority to prescribe causes for removal of members of the trade commission and limit executive power of removal accordingly, that power at once becomes practically all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception of the judiciary provided for by the Constitution...We are thus confronted with the serious question whether not only the members of these quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies, but the judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising judicial power continue in office only at the pleasure of the President.[1][4] | ” |
In light of these constitutional concerns, Sutherland concluded that the President could not dismiss officers from independent agencies for causes not listed in the relevant statutes.
| “ | The result of what we now have said is this: Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power of the President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely executive officers; and as to officers of the kind here under consideration, we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute.[1][4] | ” |
Concurring opinions
Justice James Clark McReynolds concurred with the majority opinion and noted that his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States stated his views concerning the power of the president to remove appointees.[1]
Dissenting opinions
There were no dissenting opinions.
Impact
The ruling affirmed the rights of independent agencies like the FTC to perform their duties free from direct Presidential control. Drawing on earlier decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, Justice Sutherland outlined a vision of administrative agencies as independent, nonpartisan entities.
| “ | The commission is to be nonpartisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts 'appointed by law and informed by experience.' [1][4] | ” |
The precedent set in Humphrey's was reaffirmed in Wiener v. United States (1958).
See also
- Appointment and removal power
- Wiener v. United States
- Mistretta v. United States
- Independent federal agency
- Nondelegation doctrine
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Administrative law
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full Text of the Case via Justia
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 FindLaw, HUMPHREY'S EX'R v. UNITED STATES, accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ FTC.gov, Federal Trade Commission Act, accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Oyez, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
