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Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
| What is deference in the context of the administrative state? Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here. |
 | |
| Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council | |
| Reference: 467 U.S. 837 | |
| Term: 1983 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: February 29, 1984 Decided: June 25, 1984 | |
| Outcome | |
| D.C. Circuit reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice Warren Burger • Harry Blackmun • William Brennan • Lewis Powell • John Paul Stevens • Byron White | |
| Concurring | |
| None | |
| Dissenting | |
| None | |
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council is a case that was decided on June 25, 1984, by the United States Supreme Court. The case is famous for establishing the extent to which a federal court, in reviewing a federal government agency's action, should defer to the agency’s construction of a statute that the agency has been delegated to administer. This principle is commonly known as Chevron deference.[1]
In brief: The Environmental Protection Agency issued a regulation defining the statutory term stationary source for the purpose of implementing the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Under the regulation, the agency allowed states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single bubble or stationary source. The National Resources Defense Council sued the EPA and several companies in federal court, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the agency's regulation. The Supreme Court reversed this decision in favor of the agency, holding that the EPA's regulation was a permissible definition of the statutory term stationary source.
Why it matters: The Supreme Court established the principle known as Chevron doctrine. This principle defines the extent to which a federal court, in reviewing a federal government agency's action, should defer to the agency’s construction of a statute that the agency has been delegated to administer. Under Chevron, if a statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular matter, the court must decide if the agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Chevron deference further entails that "When Congress explicitly left a gap in a program to fill, the agency’s regulations are given controlling weight unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute. When such a gap is implicitly left by Congress, the court is not to substitute its own construction of the statute as long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable."
The Trump administration was open about its desire to nominate judicial appointees who were, according to a March 2018 New York Times article, "devoted to a legal doctrine that challenges the broad power federal agencies have to interpret laws and enforce regulations, often without being subject to judicial oversight." The criteria were first applied when nominating Justice Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gorsuch's opposition to the Chevron doctrine made him the model for Trump administration judicial appointments.[3]
The Supreme Court ruled on June 28, 2024, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce to overturn the decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute.[4]
Background
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This case was consolidated with two other cases: American Iron & Steel Institute et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al. and Ruckelshaus, Supervisor, Environmental Protection Agency v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al. The case arose as a challenge to an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation, consistent with amendments made in 1977 to the Clean Air Act and put into effect on October 14, 1981, in which the agency defined a statutory term, stationary source.
Ordinarily, under the Act, a permit was issued for new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution only if the entity seeking a permit met conditions imposed by the EPA. Under the regulation challenged in these cases, the EPA allowed the states to treat all pollution control devices in a single plant as being one single stationary source, i.e., to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single bubble. A polluter could install or modify equipment in the plant without meeting the new source requirements, but only if the alteration did not increase the total emissions from the plant.
In a challenge presented by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the regulations. As the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in the case noted:[2]
| “ | The court observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean Air Act 'does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a stationary source, to which the permit program . . . should apply,' and further stated that the precise issue was not 'squarely addressed in the legislative history.' ... In light of its conclusion that the legislative history bearing on the question was 'at best contradictory,' it reasoned that 'the purposes of the nonattainment program should guide our decision here.' ... Based on two of its precedents concerning the applicability of the bubble concept to certain Clean Air Act programs, ... the court stated that the bubble concept was 'mandatory' in programs designed merely to maintain existing air quality, but held that it was 'inappropriate' in programs enacted to improve air quality. ... Since the purpose of the permit program - its 'raison d'etre,' in the court's view - was to improve air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was inapplicable in these cases under its prior precedents. ... It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary to law.[5] | ” |
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on February 29, 1984. The case was decided on June 25, 1984.[2]
Decision
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous six-person court. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was reversed.[2]
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the decision of the cases. Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.[2] According to Robert Percival's research into Justice Marshall's papers, "On June 12, Justices Rehnquist and Marshall circulated notes indicating without explanation that they were recusing themselves from the case." Further, Justice O'Connor recused herself after oral argument "because the estate of her father, who died after oral argument was heard, owned stock in one of the parties."[6]
Opinion
Chevron deference defined
Justice Stevens began his opinion by clarifying the scope and extent to which a federal court should defer to a federal agency's interpretation of a statute, which the agency itself has the authority and obligation to administer. These principles are known today as Chevron deference:[2]
| “ |
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. ... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. [5] |
” |
Chevron deference provides the following guidelines for federal courts regarding agency interpretation of a statute:
- 1. A court must determine whether Congress has made an express intent known in the statute and that this expression is unambiguous.
- If the intention of Congress is unambiguously stated, the inquiry must end, because the courts and agencies must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
- If, however, the intention of Congress is ambiguous, or if the statute lacks express language on a specific point, then a federal court must decide whether the agency interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
- 2. In examining the agency's reasonable construction, a court must assess whether the decision of Congress to leave an ambiguity, or fail to include express language on a specific point, was done explicitly or implicitly.
- If the decision of Congress was explicit, then the agency’s regulations are binding on federal courts unless those regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.
- If the decision of Congress was implicit, then so long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable, a federal court cannot substitute its own statutory construction superior to the agency's construction.[1][2]
Chevron deference applied
Once announced, Justice Stevens applied Chevron deference principles in reviewing the judgment of the D.C. Circuit in this case.[2]
| “ |
...it is clear that the Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is 'inappropriate' in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one. [5] |
” |
Justice Stevens noted that the Supreme Court did concur with the circuit court that Congress did not present an express intention on the EPA's applicability of a bubble concept. Thus, under Chevron deference, the court reviewed if this omission was explicit or implicit and, accordingly, whether the Agency's interpretation could be upheld.[2]
Definition of statutory source
Justice Stevens presented a lengthy history of the term stationary source, reviewing the relevant statutes, amendments, legislative history, and regulatory language. Upon this review, the court agreed with the circuit court that, in part, the court was not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute revealed an actual intent of Congress and that the legislative history was unilluminating on the precise issue in question. Nevertheless, the court found a consistency throughout the examination of the sources presented.[2]
| “ |
...the agency primarily responsible for administering this important legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly - not in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex arena. The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation ... does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. Moreover, the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute. Significantly, it was not the agency in 1980, but rather the Court of Appeals that read the statute inflexibly to command a plantwide definition for programs designed to maintain clean air and to forbid such a definition for programs designed to improve air quality. The distinction the court drew may well be a sensible one, but our labored review of the problem has surely disclosed that it is not a distinction that Congress ever articulated itself, or one that the EPA found in the statute before the courts began to review the legislative work product.[5] |
” |
Decision
In concluding his opinion for the court, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the circuit court's error was in applying its own interpretation over a reasonable construction used by the EPA. He further acknowledged the important roles that both federal courts and executive agencies play in interpreting statute.[2]
| “ |
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges - who have no constituency - have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones. [5] |
” |
Justice Stevens held that the agency's interpretation of the word source was a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute.
Impact
According to the U.S. Department of Justice website, "Chevron is one of the most influential administrative law cases decided by the Supreme Court in the past half-century ... Chevron has become one of the most-cited cases on the basic standards of review of agency statutory interpretation."[1]
Professor Errol Meidinger called the Chevron decision perhaps the most frequently cited decision in modern American administrative law.[7] Additionally, Professor Thomas Merrill, in a Northwestern Law Review symposium issue on Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote that Chevron was arguably Justice Stevens' most famous decision.[8]
Justice Neil Gorsuch
Writing for a three-judge panel including Judges Robert Bacharach and Monroe McKay in 2016, Judge Neil Gorsuch remanded an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) for further consideration after the Board incorrectly applied Tenth Circuit precedent when reviewing Gutierrez-Brizuela’s immigration status. The panel held that the Board could not apply its rules retroactively in exercising its agency interpretation over a judicial precedent, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. In addition to his opinion for the panel, Judge Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed his views on Chevron deference. He wrote:
| “ | What would happen in a world without Chevron? If this goliath of modern administrative law were to fall? Surely Congress could and would continue to pass statutes for executive agencies to enforce. And just as surely agencies could and would continue to offer guidance on how they intend to enforce those statutes. The only difference would be that courts would then fulfill their duty to exercise their independent judgment about what the law is. Of course, courts could and would consult agency views and apply the agency’s interpretation when it accords with the best reading of a statute. But 'de novo' judicial review of the law’s meaning would limit the ability of an agency to alter and amend existing law. It would avoid the due process and equal protection problems of the kind documented in our decisions. It would promote reliance interests by allowing citizens to organize their affairs with some assurance that the rug will not be pulled from under them tomorrow, the next day, or after the next election. And an agency’s recourse for a judicial declaration of the law’s meaning that it dislikes would be precisely the recourse the Constitution prescribes — an appeal to higher judicial authority or a new law enacted consistent with bicameralism and presentment. We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again. Put simply, it seems to me that in a world without Chevron very little would change.[5] | ” |
| —Neil Gorsuch (August 23, 2016)[9] | ||
See also
- Chevron deference (doctrine)
- Deference (administrative state)
- Auer v. Robbins
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full text of the case via FindLaw
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 U.S. Department of Justice, "Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council," accessed July 15, 2016
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, decided June 25, 1984
- ↑ New York Times, "Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State’," March 26, 2018
- ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo," accessed July 3, 2024
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Environmental Law Reporter, "Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights From the Marshall Papers," October 1993
- ↑ University of Buffalo, "Introduction to American Public Law," January 2004
- ↑ SCOTUSBlog, "Academic highlight: A tribute to Justice Stevens," December 6, 2012
- ↑ U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Hugo Rosario Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, August 23, 2016
