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List of court cases relevant to judicial deference to administrative agencies

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What is deference in the context of the administrative state?

Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here.


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This table contains major court cases related to judicial deference. It begins with historical examples from English courts before treating decisions made by state and federal courts in the United States:[1]

Cases relevant to judicial deference
Case U.S. Court Year Impact
Partridge v. Strange, 75 Eng. Rep. 123; 1 Plowden 77 N/A 1553 Held that the life of a statute rests in the minds of the expositors of its words. The court said that those who approach nearest to the minds of makers of the statute shall construe the words.
Earl of Leicester v. Heydon, 75 Eng. Rep. 582; 1 Plowden 384 N/A 1571 The case cited legislative history as a clue to understanding the intent of the makers of an act.
Molyn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 261; 6 Co. Rep. 5b, 6a N/A 1590 The opinion quoted the Latin phrase consuetudo est optima interpres legum to say that usage is the best interpreter of laws.
The Case of the Abbot of Strata Mercella, 77 Eng. Rep. 765; 9 Co. Rep. 24a, 28a N/A 1591 Held that contemporary courts should construe ancient grants as the law was taken at the time when the charter was made.
Lord Cromwel v. Andrews, 76 Eng. Rep. 574; 2 Co. Rep. 69b, 81a N/A 1601 The court applied the “usage is the best interpreter of laws” canon of construction.
The Case of the Master and Fellows of Magdalen Coll. in Cambridge, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235; 11 Co. Rep. 66b, 73b N/A 1615 Judge Edward Coke said that acts of Parliament are to be construed according to the meaning and intent of those who made them, observing the original intent and meaning.
Stevens v. Duckworth, 145 Eng. Rep. 486; Hardres 338 N/A 1664 The opinion said that usage was an excellent teacher and interpreter.
Sheppard v. Gosnold, 124 Eng. Rep. 1018; Vaugh. 159 N/A 1672 Held that where the writing of a statute is dubious, long usage is a just medium to expound it by because common acceptation is a way to discern meaning. However, the court held that custom does not trump the obvious meaning of a statute.
Rex v. Bishop of London, 89 Eng. Rep. 714; 1 Show. K.B. 493 N/A 1694 Held that in any construction of the acts of Parliament, the original intent and meaning of the makers of the law was to be observed.
Evans v. Harrison, 97 Eng. Rep. 51, 62; Wilm. 130 N/A 1762 Held that parliamentary doubts and debates ought to have no weight in directing judicial determinations.
Simon v. Metivier or Motivos, 96 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.) 1766 N/A 1766 Part of the ruling held that the key to the construction of the act in question was the intent of the legislature.
Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303 N/A 1769 A concurring opinion in the case held that the sense and meaning of a law must come from what it says when passed into law and not from the history of changes it underwent on the way to becoming law.
Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142; 1 Cowp. 382 N/A 1775 The case involved looking into the debates during the time the law was enacted to figure out what a provision meant.
Donaldson v. Harvey, 3H. & McH. 12 Maryland General Court of Appeals 1790 Held that the same rules that apply when expounding statutes will apply when expounding the U.S. Constitution.
Ex’rs of Rippon v. Ex’rs of Townsend,, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 445 South Carolina Court of Common Pleas 1795 Held that it would be wrong for judges to give a legal technical term a different meaning than the law gave it merely because the legislature might have meant to do so.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 U.S. Supreme Court 1803 The court held that it is the duty of the judicial branch to say what the law is.
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 U.S. Supreme Court 1803 Upheld the idea that Supreme Court justices could “ride circuit” even without distinct commissions as circuit judges because the objection was relatively new and the practice was well-established without objection ever since the Constitution first organized the judicial system.
Hammond v. Anderson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 69 English Court of Common Pleas 1804 Held that it is of greater consequence that the law should be as uniform as possible than that the equitable claims of an individual should be attended to.
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307 U.S. Supreme Court 1810 The court held that laws with multiple plausible interpretations should be read in a way that is in line with the U.S. Constitution even if the reading is less natural than another one.
Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53 U.S. Supreme Court 1810 The court held that men use language calculated to express the ideas they mean to convey.
McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 U.S. Supreme Court 1813 The court held that the power of circuit courts to issue a writ of mandamus was confined to those cases in which the writ is necessary to the exercise of the courts’ jurisdiction.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 U.S. Supreme Court 1819 The court held that an exposition of the constitution deliberately established by legislative acts that people rely on should not be disregarded lightly.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 U.S. Supreme Court 1821 Held an act to be constitutional in part because many members of the convention that framed the constitution were in the Congress that passed the law.
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 U.S. Supreme Court 1821 Held that state courts did not have the authority to issue mandamus to federal officials.
Edward’s Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 U.S. Supreme Court 1827 The court held that the cotemporaneous construction of an ambiguous law by those called to act under it and appointed to carry it into effect is entitled to very great respect.
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 U.S. Supreme Court 1827 Held that statutes giving discretionary power to a person to be exercised by him upon his opinion of certain facts make that person the exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 U.S. Supreme Court 1827 Concurring opinion said that contemporaries of the Constitution had the best opportunities to inform themselves of how the framers understood the document and the sense the people put on it when they adopted it.
United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. 1 U.S. Supreme Court 1833 The court held that practical reality keeps Congress from legislating every detail of statutory schemes.
United States v. Duval, 25 F. Cas. 953 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 1833 The case is an example of a court dealing with legal ambiguity and the relationship between legislation, regulation, and executive enforcement.
United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8 U.S. Supreme Court 1835 The court held that Congress did not empower ministerial officers to levy fines on people without a method of appeal for people facing fines.
United States v. Cadwalader, 25 F. Cas. 231 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 1835 The case is an example of a court dealing with legal ambiguity and the relationship between legislation, regulation, and executive enforcement.
Boyden v. Town of Brookline, 8 Vt. 284 Supreme Court of Vermont 1836 The court held that long-established construction of law should have the force of a judicial determination because courts have always paid deference to such expositions of statutory and constitutional law.
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 U.S. Supreme Court 1838 The court held that the D.C. Circuit was the only court that could issue writs of mandamus to federal officers and then only to those in D.C.
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 U.S. Supreme Court 1840 The court held that judges are not bound to adopt the construction of a statute given by a department head if an issue arose outside the mandamus context.
United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 7th Circuit 1840 The court held that the executive branch was in the best position to reconcile competing policy interests under ambiguous statutes.
Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336 U.S. Supreme Court 1841 The case is an example of a court dealing with legal ambiguity and the relationship between legislation, regulation, and executive enforcement.
Attorney Gen. v. Bank of Cape Fear, 40 N.C. (5 Ired. Eq.) 71 Supreme Court of North Carolina 1847 The court held that co-temporary exposition practiced and acquiesced in for years fixes that construction unless contrary to the obvious meaning of the words of the law.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 U.S. Supreme Court 1849 Taney dissent said that if the court could give old words new meaning in the Constitution, then the federal government could gain any power and the states could be denied any power.
Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 U.S. Supreme Court 1849 The case involved a writ of mandamus.
Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 U.S. Supreme Court 1850 The case is an example of a court dealing with legal ambiguity and the relationship between legislation, regulation, and executive enforcement.
Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. 263 U.S. Supreme Court 1853 The court held that when discretionary power is delegated to public officers their acts using that power are binding and valid except in questions of fraud, the scope of the power of the officers, and others established by law.
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 U.S. Supreme Court 1854 The case involved a writ of mandamus.
West v. Cochran, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 403 U.S. Supreme Court 1854 Court upheld determinations on claims that came from former Louisiana Territory governments.
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 U.S. Supreme Court 1855 The court held that Congress may or may not bring certain matters involving public rights within the cognizance of courts.
Minnesota v. Bachelder, 68 U.S. 109 U.S. Supreme Court 1863 The court held that a court of equity will look into proceedings and correct errors of law or of fact.
Comm’r of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522 U.S. Supreme Court 1866 The court made a distinction between the construction of the statute in the case and the act of the commissioner.
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 U.S. Supreme Court 1866 The court held that the court has no jurisdiction over a bill to enjoin the president in the performance of his duties.
United States v. Commissioner of General Land Office, 72 U.S. 563 U.S. Supreme Court 1866 The case involved a writ of mandamus.
Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347 U.S. Supreme Court 1868 The court held that a prohibition on the review of discretionary acts extended to writs of injunction. The court would not issue a writ of injunction where the official’s discretion rested on a question requiring the construction of more than one act of Congress.
Litchfield v. Register, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 575 U.S. Supreme Court 1869 The court did not issue a writ of injunction because the officer acted under discretionary authority.
Barney v. Leeds, 51 N.H. 253 New Hampshire Supreme Court 1871 The court held that contemporaneous construction was entitled to great respect.
Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43 Wisconsin Supreme Court 1871 The court held that long and uninterrupted practice under a statute, especially by those who had to execute it, was good evidence of the statute’s construction. The court held that such practical construction would be adhered to even if it would be difficult to maintain without that precedent.
Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72 U.S. Supreme Court 1871 The court defended its ability to look into legal questions even where executive officials express contrary views.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 U.S. Supreme Court 1871 The court held that a rule infringed the constitutional power of the executive branch.
Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1872 The court held that interpreting ambiguous constitutional provisions was settled by contemporaneous construction and longstanding practice in accord with that construction.
Peabody v. Stark, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 240 U.S. Supreme Court 1872 The court held that the unvarying practical construction given to an unclear statute by an executive officer was acceptable but not obligatory.
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 U.S. Supreme Court 1873 The court cited Edward’s Lessee and found that it was significant that a particular legal proposition had not occurred in a prior set of cases and that such silence was nearly as effective as express authoritative negation of the idea.
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227 U.S. Supreme Court 1873 The court held that constructions of statutes made by executive officers that are repugnant to the body of the act are inadmissible.
Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 U.S. Supreme Court 1875 The court issued an extraordinary writ against a state officer.
Garfielde v. United States, 93 U.S. 242 U.S. Supreme Court 1876 The court agreed with an agency interpretation of law because it was in line with usage established by many years.
Regina v. Hertford Coll., 3 QB 693 English Court of Appeals 1878 The court held that the statute in question was clear and that parliamentary history of a statute was inadmissible to explain it.
United States v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 334 U.S. Supreme Court 1878 Held that uniform action under the statute in question was as conclusive of the construction of the statute as if it had been established by a court.
United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760 U.S. Supreme Court 1878 The court held that the construction of a statute that had always obtained in the department was entitled to the most respectful consideration and should not be overturned without cogent reason.
United States v. Pugh, 99 U.S. 265 U.S. Supreme Court 1878 The court held that it should not disturb precedent on a legal question previously acquiesced in by the United States unless there was an obvious error.
City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453 U.S. Supreme Court 1879 Court held that when an act is ambiguous the contemporaneous construction of the statute is entitled to great respect especially where it appear that construction has prevailed for a long time and that a different construction would impair vested rights.
Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473 U.S. Supreme Court 1879 The court held that where there is a mixed question of law and fact where the mistake of law is unclear, the decision of the tribunal given authority by the law is conclusive. However, if the facts are not disputed, the court can give relief if officers have deprived someone of rights by mistake of law.
United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 U.S. Supreme Court 1880 First case where the court approved a writ of mandamus following the Decatur opinion.
Graham v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 83 U.S. Supreme Court 1883 The court held that contingent legislation does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.
Hahn v. United States, 107 U.S. 402 U.S. Supreme Court 1883 The court noted as part of the ruling that Congress had not interfered with a previous construction.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 U.S. Supreme Court 1884 The construction placed on the U.S. Constitution by early laws by men who also framed the Constitution is entitled to great weight and it is nearly conclusive when the rights established by that construction have not been disputed during almost 100 years.
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 U.S. Supreme Court 1884 Court held that they would issue a writ of mandamus if an officer refused to perform a ministerial duty.
Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471 U.S. Supreme Court 1884 Dissent disagreed that the construction of a law set by the government was sufficiently longstanding to settle the issue.
Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568 U.S. Supreme Court 1885 Held that contemporaneous and uniform interpretation is entitled to weight in the construction of the law, and ought to tip the scale in a case of doubt.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 U.S. Supreme Court 1886 The court held that long usage acquiesced in by the courts goes a long way to prove there is a plausible ground or reason for an interpretation of the law because “[i]t is a maxim that, consuetudo est optimus interpres legum; and another maxim that, contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege.”
United States ex rel. Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U.S. 423 U.S. Supreme Court 1886 The case involved a writ of mandamus.
Hedden v. Iselin, 31 F. 266 United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York 1887 The case is an example of a court deferring to a longstanding interpretation of a law by an executive department.
United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 169 U.S. Supreme Court 1887 Held that using contemporaneous construction to interpret laws had been applied in many varied cases to enforce justice.
United States v. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52 U.S. Supreme Court 1887 Upheld the Secretary of the Navy’s construction of a benefits statute because it had been relied upon for decades and was not obviously wrong.
Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607 U.S. Supreme Court 1888 Court applied the idea that when a law is ambiguous the contemporaneous construction of those who were called to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect.
United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 U.S. Supreme Court 1888 Held that courts could not interfere by mandamus with the executive in the exercise of ordinary duties, even if those duties required interpreting law, but left open the possibility of disagreeing with executive interpretation of law in a different kind of case.
United States v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236 U.S. Supreme Court 1888 Court applied the idea that when a law is ambiguous the contemporaneous construction of those who were called to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect.
United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 37 F. 551 United States Circuit Court for the District of Colorado 1889 Brewer opinion held that more than mere doubt must exist to justify divesting innocent people of titles sanctioned by a particular construction for a long time.
Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S. 542 U.S. Supreme Court 1890 Held that an agency construction of a statute that it had to execute is not binding on the courts unless that construction has been in force for a long time.
United States v. Lynch, 137 U.S. 280 U.S. Supreme Court 1890 Held that the Decatur precedent meant that the court would not control by mandamus the exposition of statutes by direct action on executive officers but that courts were not bound to adopt executive constructions of law in other cases.
Schell’s Executors v. Fauché, 138 U.S. 562 U.S. Supreme Court 1891 The court held that in all cases of ambiguity contemporaneous construction of courts and departments is universally held to be controlling.
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 U.S. Supreme Court 1892 Held that the practical construction of the Constitution, seen in many laws spanning almost the entire existence of the U.S., should not be overruled unless such legislation was clearly incompatible with the Constitution.
United States v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co., 142 U.S. 615 U.S. Supreme Court 1892 The Court held that contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive that persisted through six administrations of the department outweighed a novel interpretation offered by the executive during litigation.
Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 U.S. Supreme Court 1893 Issued a writ of injunction restraining executive officers from revoking a railroad’s right of way.
United States ex rel. International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.S. 303 U.S. Supreme Court 1894 The case involved a writ of mandamus.
United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136 U.S. Supreme Court 1895 Held that a lack of uniformity in departmental practice under the law led the court to determine the true interpretation of the law without reference to the practice of the department. The opinion said that the court would have accepted the department’s uniform interpretation as true if the meaning of the statute was obscure.
Wis. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46 U.S. Supreme Court 1895 The court did not find the determination of the Land Department conclusive because it was a construction of law and not a question of fact.
Burfenning v. Chi., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 321 U.S. Supreme Court 1896 The court invalidated a patent when it found that the Land Department had acted against the will of Congress, but it held that courts will not review questions of fact.
Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331 U.S. Supreme Court 1896 The court held that practical constructions given to an act of Congress susceptible to different constructions, given by executive departments, is entitled to the highest respect and should be followed by courts when in doubt especially when important interests have grown up under the construction in force.
D.M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 F. 550 United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 1898 Judge Taft cited Decatur and said that if courts had jurisdiction over the controversy, then the court would not feel bound by the construction of the executive officer in that case.
Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93 U.S. Supreme Court 1898 The Court held that decisions by the Land Department on questions of fact were conclusive in the absence of fraud and deceit and cannot be re-litigated in court.
United States v. Dean Linseed-Oil Co., 87 F. 453 6th Circuit 1898 Court held that the Supreme Court had often commented on the importance of adhering to longstanding and reasonable constructions of statutes by those who had the duty to execute those laws when the statutes are ambiguous.
Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 U.S. Supreme Court 1900 Held that the removal of officers was a matter left to the province of those in charge of the departments until Congress said otherwise.
Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U.S. 362 U.S. Supreme Court 1901 The court held that determinations by the Land Department in a case within its jurisdiction of questions of fact are conclusive and cannot be challenged later in courts.
Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 U.S. Supreme Court 1902 Held that when an official violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have jurisdiction to provide relief. It also held that Congress had not entrusted the administration of the relevant statutes to the discretion of the executive such that its interpretations would be conclusive for all questions that arose. The opinion also said that decisions of the officers of departments on questions of law do not conclude the courts, which can grant relief to those aggrieved by an erroneous decision.
United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 U.S. Supreme Court 1903 The court held that mandamus was not the proper writ to control the judgment and discretion of an officer.
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 U.S. Supreme Court 1904 The court held that the exercise of discretion ought not to be interfered with unless the court is clearly of the opinion than it was wrong. It held that agency action carried a strong presumption of its correctness. Harlan’s dissent accused the majority of overthrowing the settled principle that courts will respect the established practice of an executive department unless the practice comes from a construction that is obviously wrong.
Pub. Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 U.S. Supreme Court 1904 Court cited Bates to say that determinations by the Postmaster-General were presumptively constitutional while asking whether the findings of the Postmaster-General on classifying mail were final.
United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 U.S. Supreme Court 1906 Held that courts of admiralty had no general equity jurisdiction but that they could apply equitable principles to cases within their jurisdiction.
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of United States v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 209 U.S. 317 U.S. Supreme Court 1908 The court chose not to review a decision made by the postmaster because the petitioner sought an appeal from the discretion of the department to the discretion of the court with no legal right.
Cent. Tr. Co. v. Cent. Tr. Co. of Ill., 216 U.S. 251 U.S. Supreme Court 1910 The court held that the accepted rule was that findings of fact by executive officers were conclusive unless containing palpable error.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 U.S. Supreme Court 1912 The court held that mixed questions of law and fact would be examined only as far as necessary to determine whether substantial evidence sustained an order.
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53 U.S. Supreme Court 1912 The court held that Bates meant that judges would not interfere with the decision of the Postmaster-General on questions of law unless the court thought he was clearly wrong.
United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 683 U.S. Supreme Court 1912 The court made a distinction between whether the officer interpreted the law correctly and whether the proper standard of review of his action under law was mandamus.
Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 U.S. Supreme Court 1912 The court held that findings of fact by executive officials in immigration proceedings may be made conclusive.
Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 U.S. Supreme Court 1917 The court approved a writ of mandamus after a department changed its practice under the law.
Mills & Gibb v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. Appls. 31 Court of Customs Appeals 1917 Judge DeVries dissent described Decatur as a case applying when mandamus is the sole remedy, which is when no judicial review of the power granted to executive officials is provided by law.
Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495 U.S. Supreme Court 1919 Court cited Bates and held that the exercise of a discretionary power by an executive officer was conclusive.
Houston v. St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 U.S. Supreme Court 1919 Held that a question of fact will not be overturned when it is answered with substantial evidence in support.
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 U.S. Supreme Court 1920 Held that the due process clause requires that courts must determine independently about law and facts when a property owner claims that a state action will confiscate his property.
McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477 U.S. Supreme Court 1921 The court held that courts will not disturb practical constructions of acts of Congress open to multiple constructions made by those who execute those acts if they have acted for a number of years unless courts have cogent reasons.
Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 U.S. Supreme Court 1922 Held that the court would not overturn a question of fact left to the executive officer to decide.
Stone & Downer Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. 484 Court of Customs Appeals 1923 Court held that the government has the right to provide for the summary collection of revenues and to restrict duty payers to special tribunals and to specific remedies for acts of injustice.
Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221 U.S. Supreme Court 1924 Held that the court in Bates allowed judicial review when agency decisions were wholly dependent on questions of law.
Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 U.S. Supreme Court 1925 The opinion distinguished ministerial duties, where mandamus could compel certain actions, from discretionary duties beyond the scope of writs of mandamus. The court held that writs of mandamus cannot control the interpretation of a statute left to the discretion of an officer even if the court thinks he is wrong.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 U.S. Supreme Court 1926 The court held that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders were actively participating in governing that has been acquiesced in for many years fixes the construction of the provision in question.
United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 U.S. Supreme Court 1926 Held that courts will not review the basis of fact on which administrative orders rest.
J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 U.S. Supreme Court 1928 The Supreme Court's decision in this case formulated the intelligible principle standard as a legal test for whether or not a delegation of authority by Congress to the executive branch violates the separation of powers and the related nondelegation doctrine.
Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 U.S. Supreme Court 1932 The court mentioned that great weight is given to constructions consistently given to a law by the executive department that administers it, but that the court is not bound by the administrative construction. It held that inconsistent construction will only be taken into account if supported by valid reasons.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 U.S. Supreme Court 1932 The court cited Bates as a precedent for the court upholding agency action that issued a determination of fact.
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 U.S. Supreme Court 1935 Equated the exercise of delegated power by legislatures and administrative bodies. Held that when regulations were within the scope of delegated authority that a presumption of the existence of facts justifying the specific exercise of power attaches to statutes, municipal ordinances, and administrative orders.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 U.S. Supreme Court 1936 The court held that courts cannot substitute their own discretion for that of administrative officers who have acted within the bounds of their powers.
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 U.S. Supreme Court 1936 The court held that officers' findings of fact are conclusive within the authority given them by statutes, but not the recitation of procedures.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 U.S. Supreme Court 1936 Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion said that due process requires an opportunity to have a court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the adjudication process of facts was conducted regularly. He also said that courts could set aside agency action if there are errors of law that are substantive or procedural.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 U.S. Supreme Court 1936 The court held that uniform and undisputed legislative practice rested on a view of the Constitution that the court felt it could not disturb even if it had thought the practice had less support in principle.
Appalachian Power Co. v. NLRB, 93 F.2d 985 United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 1938 The court applied the substantial evidence rule, which requires agencies to act based on substantial evidence.
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 U.S. Supreme Court 1938 The court applied the substantial evidence rule, which requires agencies to base decisions on substantial evidence.
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 U.S. Supreme Court 1938 The case is an example of the court saying that constitutional error was possible.
SEC v. Associated Gas & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795 United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit 1938 The Roosevelt-era Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure cited the case in its report as a precedent for deferential judicial review.
NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U.S. 318 U.S. Supreme Court 1940 Held that courts should be mindful of the separate responsibilities Congress imposed on executive agencies and courts.
NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 U.S. Supreme Court 1940 The court held that courts may not encroach on the exclusive agency power to find facts.
United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 U.S. Supreme Court 1940 The court held that the judgment of an officer as to the existence of facts that Congress authorized him to act under is not subject to judicial review.
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 U.S. Supreme Court 1941 The court held that Congress delegated the function of interpreting a statutory term to the experts in the agency and said that the court would respect the delegation and not touch the administrative conclusion.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 U.S. Supreme Court 1942 Held that a 1776 law allowing spies to be tried by court-martial was entitled to the greatest respect since it was a contemporary construction of the Constitution and has been followed since the founding.
Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 U.S. Supreme Court 1943 The court held that courts may attach weight to decisions by specialized administrative bodies on law questions.
Fed. Sec. Adm’r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 U.S. Supreme Court 1943 The court held that courts should allow agencies to exercise discretion and informed judgment when reviewing general regulations adopted using rulemaking power to enforce a statute.
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 1943 The 9th Circuit applied the substantial evidence rule, which requires agencies to act based on substantial evidence.
Switchmen’s Union of N. Am. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 U.S. Supreme Court 1943 In Justice Reed’s dissent, he argued that agencies should be allowed to make reasonable determinations about the meaning of statutes on questions committed to their discretion but not about the limits of their own powers.
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 U.S. Supreme Court 1944 The court held that agency interpretations of laws they administer were entitled to persuasive weight.
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 U.S. Supreme Court 1944 The court held that it was long settled that the experienced judgment of agencies is entitled to great weight on questions of law.
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 U.S. Supreme Court 1944 The court ruled that the function of a reviewing court is limited when the question is the application of a broad statutory term by an agency administering the statute. It held that courts should accept agency constructions with warrant in the record and with a reasonable basis in law.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 U.S. Supreme Court 1944 The court held that agency legal interpretations are not controlling on courts, but are a body of experience and informed judgment that is a source of guidance. The court held that the weight of agency interpretation depended on a thorough consideration of the issue, valid reasoning, consistency with other agency pronouncements, and other factors that are persuasive even if not controlling.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 U.S. Supreme Court 1944 The court approved delegation of power to fix certain prices.
Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 U.S. Supreme Court 1945 The dissent argued that the construction of the provision involved so many technical details that the experience of the agency should allow it to prevail over the court’s construction.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 U.S. Supreme Court 1945 The court established the precedent for Seminole Rock deference, a judicial deference procedure in which a federal court defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of a regulation that the agency administers unless the agency's interpretation is plainly erroneous, according to the opinion.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 U.S. Supreme Court 1945 The court held that statutory language can give administrative discretion to agencies to draw conclusions from infinite varieties of circumstances.
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 U.S. Supreme Court 1946 Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion cited Gray and held that Congress could leave matters to the exclusive discretion of an agency.
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 U.S. Supreme Court 1946 The court cited Skidmore to reject an agency interpretation.
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 U.S. Supreme Court 1946 The court used legislative history to interpret a law.
Soc. Sec. Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 U.S. Supreme Court 1946 The court held that agency determinations must have a basis in law and be within granted authority. It held that courts decide the limits of the statutory power of agencies.
Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 U.S. Supreme Court 1946 The court held that all it needed to support an agency interpretation was warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law.
Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 U.S. Supreme Court 1947 The court held that reviewing court’s task is complete if it finds that the agency choice when applying the law to specific facts is based on substantial evidence and not forbidden by law.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 U.S. Supreme Court 1950 The court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was framed to check zealous administrators.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 U.S. Supreme Court 1950 The court held that the Administrative Procedure Act reflected a series of compromises.
O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 U.S. Supreme Court 1951 The opinion was cited by Kenneth Culp Davis as evidence that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell survived the passing of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 U.S. Supreme Court 1952 A dissenting opinion argued that the President cannot be nothing more than a messenger-boy without even the power to preserve legislative programs from destruction.
Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 U.S. Supreme Court 1958 The court allowed the FTC to exercise discretion when singling out a firm out of a group of others to create a test case to examine relevant questions case by case.
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 U.S. Supreme Court 1958 The court held that adjusting the tolls of the Panama Canal was not a ministerial act but one Congress left to the discretion of the company. The court said that such discretion is beyond the scope of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 U.S. Supreme Court 1961 The court cited the judicial deference precedent from Bates.
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 U.S. Supreme Court 1962 The court held that agencies must make a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made in decisionmaking.
United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 U.S. Supreme Court 1962 The court cited the judicial deference precedent from Bates.
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 U.S. Supreme Court 1967 The court applied the principle that aggrieved individuals are entitled to judicial review of agency action.
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 U.S. Supreme Court 1968 The court cited the judicial deference precedent from Bates.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402 U.S. Supreme Court 1971 The decision clarified the requirements and guidelines for the review of environmental impact by agencies, and of judicial review of agency actions. It also established the special importance of environmental factors in these reviews.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 2nd Circuit 1976 Judge Henry Friendly wrote that some cases held that great deference must be given to the decisions of administrative agencies applying statutes to facts unless they lack a rational basis. Other precedents allow free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment about the meaning of statutory terms.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 U.S. Supreme Court 1977 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling in Pittston.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 U.S. Supreme Court 1978 The court set a precedent that courts could not impose additional procedural requirements on agencies, they could only evaluate existing procedures. Furthermore, judicial review could only concern itself with the agency's success or failure to conform to the established procedures, it could not invalidate an action simply because the court was "unhappy with the result reached."
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 U.S. Supreme Court 1980 The court held that the Truth in Lending Act required deference to rational lawmaking by the Federal Reserve Board.
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 U.S. Supreme Court 1980 Justice Marshall’s dissent said that the court’s opinion opened it up to criticism that it only invokes deference when it agrees with the substance of an agency action.
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 U.S. Supreme Court 1981 The court said that the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act has been given deference by the court because the Department of Justice played a role in drafting the legislation.
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 U.S. Supreme Court 1981 The court held that giving federal courts jurisdiction does not give them the authority to formulate federal common law.
United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 U.S. Supreme Court 1981 Justice White’s dissent said that the court’s analysis substituted its own views of what is proper for the reasonable views of the agency about the meaning of an agency regulation and of statutory provisions.
Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 672 F.2d 990 United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 1982 The court held that the extent a court is obliged to respect an agency's interpretation of its own governing statutes is a function of Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular statute at issue.
Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d 778 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 1982 The court quoted Constance and held that when Congress delegates full responsibility to an agency to implement a statute, but provides little guidance on how the governing statute should be interpreted, that Congress intends courts to consider agency views on questions of law closely related to their expertise.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 U.S. Supreme Court 1983 The court quoted Vermont Yankee, saying that courts can't set aside agency actions simply because they are unhappy with the result reached. It also held that courts must be deferential when agencies make predictions within their area of special expertise working at the frontiers of science.
City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 2nd Circuit 1983 The court held that agencies need only to consider reasonable policy alternatives.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 U.S. Supreme Court 1983 The ruling endorsed the hard look review application of the arbitrary-or-capricious test. Hard look review lets courts require that agencies make reasonable policy choices, explain their behavior in a detailed manner, and consider policy alternatives to the ones they choose.
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 U.S. Supreme Court 1984 The case is famous for establishing the extent to which a federal court, in reviewing a federal government agency's action, should defer to the agency’s construction of a statute that the agency has been delegated to administer. This principle is commonly known as Chevron deference.
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 U.S. Supreme Court 1985 The court held that if Congress clearly expressed an intent contrary to the agency then courts must enforce the will of Congress.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 U.S. Supreme Court 1985 The ruling established a presumption against review of agency inaction that limited the scope of judicial review. At the same time, the court held that agency inaction was subject to judicial review if the agency expressly adopted a policy that amounted to an abdication of statutory responsibilities.
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 U.S. Supreme Court 1986 The court articulated a presumption of reviewability of statutory questions.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 U.S. Supreme Court 1986 The court pointed to a decision in 1789 made by members of Congress who were also framers of the Constitution as weighty evidence of constitutional meaning.
Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 D.C. Circuit 1986 The ruling acknowledged a dispute over whether agency interpretations articulated during litigation constituted “agency positions” for the purposes of Chevron.
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176 6th Circuit 1986 The executive order in question did not confer rights judicially enforceable in litigation.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 U.S. Supreme Court 1987 The court held that courts may use traditional tools of statutory construction to supplant agency interpretations of congressional intent with judicial interpretation.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 U.S. Supreme Court 1988 Scalia wrote in a concurring opinion that the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was the government’s most authoritative interpretation of the APA.
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413 U.S. Supreme Court 1988 Held that a judge's first job facing questions of pure statutory construction is to try and determine congressional intent using traditional tools. If those tools reveal congressional intent then regulations at issue must be fully consistent with the court's interpretation of the statute.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 U.S. Supreme Court 1989 The court held that the law did not require the Forest Service to conduct a worst-case analysis when issuing a special use permit.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1471 D.C. Circuit 1990 The court held that agencies only need to consider reasonable policy alternatives, not every conceivable alternative in an environmental impact statement.
Pension Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 U.S. Supreme Court 1990 The court held that agency action cannot be set aside every time a court can point to an arguably relevant statutory policy that was not explicitly considered because a large number of agency decisions might be open to judicial invalidation.
Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211 U.S. Supreme Court 1991 The court held that agencies have broad discretion in determining how best to handle related, yet discrete issues in terms of procedures and priorities and need not solve every problem before it in the same proceeding.
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 U.S. Supreme Court 1992 The court held that a prisoner did not need to exhaust the Bureau of Prisons' administrative procedure before appealing to the court system for relief noting that the Bureau did not bring any special expertise to bear on the dispute.
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 U.S. Supreme Court 1992 The court held that judges must presume that a legislature says what it means in statutes.
United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 U.S. Supreme Court 1992 The court interpreted the apportionment clause of the U.S. Constitution as delegating to Congress the power to resolve problems of fractions when allocating representatives among the states.
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 U.S. Supreme Court 1993 The court quoted McCarthy v. Madigan to hold that congressional intent as seen in the Administrative Procedure Act is the basis for deciding whether courts have the discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement.
Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 U.S. Supreme Court 1993 The court held that consistent agency positions are a factor when deciding how much weight to give their position.
Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 D.C. Circuit 1993 The court held that executive orders devoted to internal management of the executive branch that do not create private rights are not subject to judicial review.
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 U.S. Supreme Court 1995 The court held that redistricting plans made under the Voting Rights Act were subject to strict scrutiny by judges.
Auer v. Robbins, 518 U.S. 452 U.S. Supreme Court 1997 The case established the principle known as Auer deference, which requires federal courts to give deference to how executive agencies interpret ambiguities in their own regulations.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 U.S. Supreme Court 1997 The court held that early laws provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of constitutional meaning.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 194 F.3d 130 D.C. Circuit 1999 The court held that the arbitrary and capricious standard deems agency actions presumptively valid providing the action meets a minimum rationality standard.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 U.S. Supreme Court 2000 The court created an exception to Chevron deference for extraordinary cases that provide reasons to hesitate before assuming implicit delegations of power from Congress to an agency.
Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F. 3d 728 9th Circuit 2000 The court found the executive agency's legal interpretation unpersuasive and held that principles of statutory construction required the judges to reject the agency's argument.
Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 U.S. Supreme Court 2001 The court held that judges recognize congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations of a statute with extreme care. It also held that Chevron does not apply when deference to an agency interpretation would raise serious constitutional problems.
United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218 U.S. Supreme Court 2001 The ruling narrowed the scope of application for Chevron deference to agency regulations and adjudicatory actions. Additional agency actions, such as other rulings, guidance, or policy statements, were relegated to consideration under Skidmore deference.
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 U.S. Supreme Court 2001 The court affirmed the language of the Clean Air Act instructing the EPA administrator to promulgate NAAQS based solely on concerns of public health, and not of economic cost. The court also reaffirmed the intelligible principle test and held that those limiting principles must come from Congress, agencies could not limit themselves when power had been delegated unconstitutionally.
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 U.S. Supreme Court 2002 The court held that the agency interpretation of a statute fell within its lawful interpretation authority.
Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 U.S. Supreme Court 2002 The decision showed that courts may interpret ambiguous statutes in a way that allows other decisionmakers to exercise discretion.
Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 D.C. Circuit 2004 The court upheld an FAA regulation against arbitrariness challenge under the good cause exception to notice and comment rulemaking.
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 U.S. Supreme Court 2005 Justice Thomas wrote in a concurring opinion that he would be open to overturning precedents interpreting the federal question statute in an appropriate case with better evidence of the original meaning of the text of the statute.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 U.S. Supreme Court 2005 The court held that agencies could overrule judicial opinions by issuing new reasonable interpretations of statutes they administer.
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 U.S. Supreme Court 2007 The court held that statutory terms may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 U.S. Supreme Court 2007 The court ruled that a federal agency does not have the discretion to cite policy preferences as a reason for refusing to regulate certain issues under its purview.
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 2nd Circuit 2007 The court held that the EPA was not allowed to use cost-benefit analysis to determine the content of certain regulations.
Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007 The court held that Congress may expressly or implicitly delegate authority to interpret statutes to agencies.
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 U.S. Supreme Court 2008 The court found that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not adequately consider whether serious harm could follow if an electricity contract remained in force.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 U.S. Supreme Court 2009 The ruling is an example of the U.S. Supreme Court applying Chevron deference to a question about agency interpretations of law. The majority deferred to the EPA's determination that the Clean Water Act allowed it to consider site-specific cost-benefit variances to a broader set of regulations.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 U.S. Supreme Court 2009 The court upheld a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy change under arbitrariness review saying that changes do not need to be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt the initial policy.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 U.S. Supreme Court 2009 The court considered factors in favor and against stare decisis.
Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870 9th Circuit 2009 The case is an example of an agency facing uncertainty: How to count the size of a lizard population to determine whether it was a threatened species.
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d. 1144 D.C. Circuit 2011 The court applied hard look review to an SEC rule and vacated it on the grounds that the SEC did not conduct adequate cost-benefit analysis before issuing the rule.
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit 2011 The court said that it applies Chevron when agencies properly exercise interpretive power delegated by Congress expressly or implicitly.
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 U.S. Supreme Court 2011 Held that when an agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its action that bears some relationship to relevant statutory facts or factors.
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 U.S. Supreme Court 2011 The court set the bounds of when Congress may let a non-Article III entity determine factual issues.
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50 U.S. Supreme Court 2011 Scalia concurrence discusses concerns about Auer deference and its potential violation of separation of powers.
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 U.S. Supreme Court 2012 The court held that Auer deference did not apply retroactively when it would impose a potentially massive liability on a regulated party for conduct that occurred before the agency announced its interpretation of the statute.
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 U.S. Supreme Court 2012 The decision showed that a court may deem statutory language in various ways to preserve a law's constitutionality.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 U.S. Supreme Court 2013 The ruling established that the scope of Chevron deference extends to questions about whether agencies have authority under relevant statutes. The court held that federal courts should defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of their own authority when the statutes they interpret are ambiguous. The majority rejected a distinction between jurisdictional questions and other questions related to how agency's use their authority under law. The dissent argued that the opinion expanded the power of the administrative state and signaled that some justices might be willing to limit the Chevron doctrine.
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. 597 U.S. Supreme Court 2013 Justice Scalia called for the court to reconsider Auer deference.
Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S.Ct. 1584 U.S. Supreme Court 2014 The court held that the D.C. Circuit failed to accord deference to the EPA's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the Clean Air Act.
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 U.S. Supreme Court 2014 The court held that judges skeptically review newfound claims of unheralded power over a large portion of the economy discovered in long-standing statutes.
White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 U.S. Supreme Court 2014 The court held that agency actions are presumptively valid if they meet a minimum rationality standard.
Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 U.S. Supreme Court 2014 Justice Scalia cited King James I in his concurring opinion attached to the court's denial of certiorari.
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 The court held that supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution requires judges to defer to federal law when state and federal law are in conflict and does not confer a private right of action without Congressional approval.
Center for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588 D.C. Circuit 2015 The court held that it liberally defers to agency findings of fact, ensures that agency policy judgments are neither arbitrary nor irrational, and sustains legally permissible agency interpretations of authorizing statutes.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 The court held that Chevron does not apply to questions of great economic and political significance.
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 The court disagreed with the government's interpretation of an immigration statute regarding deportable offenses.
Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 The court observed that Chevron deference requires agencies to operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation and determined that the EPA had strayed far beyond those bounds when it read a statute to mean that it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants.
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 Scalia reiterated the historical justification for Chevron deference in his concurring opinion. He wrote that Chevron's rules might not conform to the APA, but that they did comply with the long history of judicial review of agency action.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 U.S. Supreme Court 2015 The court argued that nondiscrimination laws could be read to prohibit actions that result in disparate impacts instead of just those actions motivated by discriminatory intent.
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __ U.S. Supreme Court 2016 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion expressing constitutional concerns with Chevron.
Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 579 U.S. __ U.S. Supreme Court 2016 The court held that judges should not give agency interpretations of statutes Chevron deference when agency procedures are defective.
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3d 1142 10th Circuit 2016 Then-Judge Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion challenging Chevron deference precedents.
Hicks v. Colvin, 214 F. Supp. 3d 627 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky 2016 The court said that jurists have begun to ask with good reason whether Chevron violates separation of powers principles.
Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F. 3d 263 3rd Circuit 2017 Judge Jordan wrote in a concurring opinion that U.S. Supreme Court judicial deference doctrines require judges to ignore their own best judgment about how to construe statutes even though judges have the duty to say what the law is.
Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 D.C. Circuit 2017 A concurring opinion by Laurence Silberman called for a more rigorous inquiry during Chevron step two.
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. U.S. Supreme Court 2017 The court rejected a request to review Auer deference.
Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F. 3d 527 D.C. Circuit 2017 Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote a concurring opinion that said there was an Article III renaissance emerging in response to judges abdicating their duty in the name of Chevron.
BNSF Railway Company v. Loos U.S. Supreme Court 2019 Justice Neil Gorsuch argued in his dissenting opinion that the rationale used by the majority and the fact that BNSF ignored the precedent suggested that the Chevron doctrine had less force than in the past.
Kisor v. Wilkie U.S. Supreme Court 2019 The case upheld the U.S. Supreme Court precedents that established Auer deference while placing clear limitations on which regulatory interpretations qualify for deference.
Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board U.S. Supreme Court 2021 The decision allows courts to review agency decisions not to reopen cases, which expanded the definition of final agency actions open to judicial review.
West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Supreme Court 2022 The Supreme Court formally applied the major questions doctrine for the first time to limit a broad congressional delegation of authority to the EPA.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce U.S. Supreme Court 2024 The Supreme Court ruled to overturn the Chevron deference doctrine, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.

See also

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Yale Law Journal, "The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation," Aditya Bamzai, February 2017
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Cases
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner • A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States • Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp • Auer v. Robbins • Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council • Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe • Federal Trade Commission (FTC) v. Standard Oil Company of California • Field v. Clark • Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation • Humphrey's Executor v. United States • Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha • J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States • Lucia v. SEC • Marshall v. Barlow's • Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency • Mistretta v. United States • National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius • National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning Company • National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. • Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan • Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation • Skidmore v. Swift & Co. • United States v. Lopez • United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. • Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board • Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council • Wayman v. Southard • Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service • Whitman v. American Trucking Associations • Wickard v. Filburn • Wiener v. United States
Terms
Adjudication (administrative state) • Administrative judge • Administrative law • Administrative law judge • Administrative state • Arbitrary-or-capricious test • Auer deference • Barrier to entry • Bootleggers and Baptists • Chevron deference (doctrine) • Civil servant • Civil service • Code of Federal Regulations • Codify (administrative state) • Comment period • Compliance costs • Congressional Record • Coordination (administrative state) • Deference (administrative state) • Direct and indirect costs (administrative state) • Enabling statute • Ex parte communication (administrative state) • Executive agency • Federal law • Federal Register • Federalism • Final rule • Formal rulemaking • Formalism (law) • Functionalism (law) • Guidance (administrative state) • Hybrid rulemaking • Incorporation by reference • Independent federal agency • Informal rulemaking • Joint resolution of disapproval (administrative state) • Major rule • Negotiated rulemaking • Nondelegation doctrine • OIRA prompt letter • Organic statute • Pragmatism (law) • Precautionary principle • Promulgate • Proposed rule • Publication rulemaking • Regulatory budget • Regulatory capture • Regulatory dark matter • Regulatory impact analysis • Regulatory policy officer • Regulatory reform officer • Regulatory review • Rent seeking • Retrospective regulatory review • Risk assessment (administrative state) • Rulemaking • Separation of powers • Significant regulatory action • Skidmore deference • Statutory authority • Substantive law and procedural law • Sue and settle • Sunset provision • Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions • United States Code • United States Statutes at Large
Bibliography
Agencies
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