Heckler v. Chaney
 | |
| Heckler v. Chaney | |
| Reference: 470 U.S. 821 | |
| Term: 1984 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: December 3, 1984 Decided: March 20, 1985 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion reversed | |
| Majority | |
| William Rehnquist • Chief Justice Warren Burger • William Brennan • Byron White • Harry Blackmun • Lewis Powell • John Paul Stevens • Sandra Day O'Connor • Thurgood Marshall | |
Heckler v. Chaney is a 1985 United States Supreme Court case about whether an administrative agency's decision not to engage in enforcement proceedings was subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court ruled that such agency refusals were not subject to judicial review unless a statute stated otherwise.[1][2]
Why it matters: The ruling established a presumption against review of agency inaction that limited the scope of judicial review. At the same time, the court held that agency inaction was subject to judicial review if the agency expressly adopted a policy that amounted to an abdication of statutory responsibilities. Harvard law professor Cass R. Sunstein praised the decision as an example of courts making the review of agency inaction available if inaction violated statutory constraints. Attorney Jentry Lanza said that the case led courts and scholars to disagree about what kinds of inaction amounted to violations of statutory responsibilities.[1][3][4]
Background
| Administrative State |
|---|
 |
| Read more about the administrative state on Ballotpedia. |
Prisoners petition FDA
Prisoners sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to intervene because the execution drugs had not been approved for that purpose. They argued that the drugs might not induce the quick and painless death intended by authorities and that their use violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The petition claimed that the FDA had to "approve the drugs as safe and effective for human execution before they could be distributed in interstate commerce." The FDA Commissioner refused either to require new warning labels for the drugs or to seize the drugs from prisons claiming that the FDA had the discretion to decline enforcement activities.[1]
United States District Court: FDA inaction unreviewable
The prisoners sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the court sided with the FDA, holding that "decisions of executive departments and agencies to refrain from instituting investigative and enforcement proceedings are essentially unreviewable by the courts." The court claimed that nothing in the FDCA limited the enforcement discretion of the FDA or made it reviewable.[1]
D.C. Circuit: Administrative Procedure Act allows review of agency inaction
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court. The D.C. Circuit argued that all agency decisions are generally reviewable according to the arbitrary or capricious test. The court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act only prevents judicial review of agency actions "committed to agency discretion by law." The majority argued that an FDA policy statement allowed the court to review the agency's refusal to act in the case. The case then came before the U.S. Supreme Court "to review the implausible result that the FDA is required to exercise its enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs that are 'safe and effective' for human execution."[1]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on December 3, 1984. The case was decided on March 20, 1985.[1]
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling with a 9-0 vote. The majority opinion was written by Justice William Rehnquist.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the majority, Justice William Rehnquist reversed the D.C. Circuit after he interpreted relevant sections of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He ruled that the law in question did not allow judicial review of the FDA's choice not to carry out requested enforcement actions. The opinion states that it leaves "to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable."[1]
Rehnquist disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's application of precedent from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, which involved an agency's affirmative act of approval instead of a refusal to take requested action. He cited Vermont Yankee and argued that the APA supports a presumption against judicial review in cases where agencies refuse to take enforcement steps. The opinion argues that judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement was also generally unsuitable because agencies have to balance a number of competing factors when they face potential violations of rules. Agencies must decide:[1]
- Whether a violation has occurred
- Whether agency resources are best spent on that violation or a different one
- Whether the agency will likely succeed if it acts
- Whether the requested enforcement action fits overall agency policy
- Whether the agency has enough resources to take action at all
Rehnquist goes on to compare agency decisions not to take enforcement actions with the broader concept of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion refers to the power of prosecutors not to take cases to court when presented with the facts of potential wrongdoing.[1]
The court also held that "the presumption [against judicial review] may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." According to the opinion, Congress could set priorities and direct agencies to pursue certain cases.[1]
Concurring opinions
Justice William Brennan wrote a concurring opinion listing instances when nonenforcement decisions made by agencies would be subject to judicial review.[1]
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote another concurring opinion disagreeing with the majority's announcement of a presumption of unreviewability for agency decisions not to take enforcement actions. He joined the judgment but argued that "the problems and dangers of agency inaction are too important, too prevalent, and too multifaceted to admit of a single facile solution under which 'enforcement' decisions are 'presumptively unreviewable.'[1]
Presumption against review of agency inaction
A 2018 Northwestern University Law Review article by attorney Jentry Lanza said that "agency decisions to refuse enforcement were presumptively unreviewable" after Chaney. Yet, the court held that agency inaction could be subject to review if its general policy was "so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities." The article said this exception to the presumption of unreviewability has led courts to differ "in how they interpret what amounts to reviewable abdication."[4]
Harvard law professor Cass R. Sunstein argued that the Chaney decision "made clear that judicial review of agency inaction is available when the agency's enforcement decision violates statutory constraints." He approved what he saw as a "trend in the direction of judicial review of agency inaction" even if the U.S. Supreme Court did not review the FDA's inaction in Chaney. Sunstein argued that "[t]he rise of the modern regulatory state results in large part from an understanding that government 'inaction' is itself a decision and may have serious adverse consequences for affected citizens."[3]
See also
- Supreme Court of the United States
- United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
- Administrative Procedure Act
- Ballotpedia's administrative state coverage
- Arbitrary-or-capricious test
- Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
- Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 JUSTIA, "Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)," accessed October 23, 2018
- ↑ Oyez, "Heckler v. Chaney," accessed October 23, 2018
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Cass R. Sunstein, "Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney," University of Chicago Law Review 653 (1985), accessed December 15, 2018
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Jentry Lanza, "Agency Underenforcement As Reviewable Abdication," Northwestern University Law Review 112 (2018), accessed December 15, 2018
