Wickard v. Filburn
 | |
| Wickard v. Filburn | |
| Reference: 317 U.S. 111 | |
| Term: 1942 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: May 4, 1942 Reargued: October 13, 1942 Decided: November 9, 1942 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States District Court reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Hugo Black • William Douglas • Felix Frankfurter • Robert H. Jackson • Frank Murphy • Stanley Reed • Owen Roberts • Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone | |
Wickard v. Filburn is a case decided on November 9, 1942 by the United States Supreme Court. It involved a farmer who was fined by the United States Department of Agriculture and contested the federal government's authority to regulate his activities. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of a United States District Court, holding that the farmer's activities were within the scope of Congress' power to regulate because they could have an effect on interstate commerce by affecting national wheat prices and the national wheat market.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
In brief: During the 1940-41 growing season, Roscoe Filburn, owner and operator of a small farm in Ohio, grew a larger crop of wheat than had been allotted to him by the United States Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The department assessed a fine against Filburn for his excess crop. Filburn refused to pay the fine and sued Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard, arguing that his farming activities were outside the scope of the federal government's authority to regulate and further that the department had violated his constitutional right to due process.
Why it matters: In this case, the Supreme Court assessed the scope of Congress' authority to regulate economic activities under the commerce clause contained in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which reads in part: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The court held that this power includes the authority to regulate activities that take place within a state if those activities affect interstate commerce and even if the activities do not meet a particular definition of commerce.
Background
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended on May 26, 1941, directed the United States Secretary of Agriculture to set an annual limit on the number of acres available for the next crop of wheat. Acreage would then be apportioned among states and counties and eventually to individual farms. These provisions were intended to limit wheat surpluses and shortages and the corresponding rises and falls in wheat prices. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture was also directed by the law to implement a national quota on wheat marketing in the event that the total wheat supply in one year would exceed what the act defined as the domestic consumption and export of a normal year by 35 percent or more.[2][1]
Roscoe Filburn, the owner and operator of a small farm in Montgomery Country, Ohio, planted and harvested a total of 23 acres of wheat during the 1940-41 growing season, 11.9 acres more than the 11.1 acres allotted to him by the government. He harvested 239 bushels more than he was originally allotted for that season. Under the terms of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Filburn was assessed a penalty for his excess wheat production at a rate of 49 cents per bushel, a total fine of $117.11. Filburn refused to pay the fine and filed a lawsuit in federal district court against U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard and several county and state officials from Ohio.[2][1]
Filburn claimed that in a typical year, he would sell some of his wheat crop, use some as feed for his poultry and livestock, use some to make flour for home consumption, and keep the rest for seeding his next crop. His lawsuit argued that these activities were local in character and outside the scope of Congress' authority to regulate. According to the majority opinion in this case by Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, Filburn "sought to enjoin enforcement against himself of the marketing penalty ... [and] sought a declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act, as amended and applicable to him, were unconstitutional because not sustainable under the Commerce Clause or consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."[2][1]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on May 4, 1942, and again on October 13, 1942. The case was decided on November 9, 1942.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 8-0 in favor of Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard and the other government officials named in the case. Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Frank Murphy, Stanley Reed, and Owen Roberts.[1]
During the time that the case was reargued and decided, there was a vacancy on the court, left by the resignation of Justice James Byrnes on October 3, 1942.[8]
Opinions
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Opinion of the court
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Robert H. Jackson cited the Supreme Court's past decisions in Gibbons v. Ogden, United States v. Darby, and the Shreveport Rate Cases to argue that the economic effect of an activity, rather than its definition or character, is decisive for determining if the activity can be regulated by Congress under the commerce clause contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Jackson wrote:[2]
| “ | The Court's recognition of the relevance of the economic effects in the application of the Commerce Clause ... has made the mechanical application of legal formulas no longer feasible. Once an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be 'production,' nor can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect.' ... Whether the subject of the regulation in question was 'production,' 'consumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us. ... But even if appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'[9] | ” |
| —Justice Robert H. Jackson, majority opinion in Wickard v. Filburn (1942)[2] | ||
Justice Jackson argued that despite the small, local nature of Filburn's farming, the combined effect of many farmers acting in a similar manner would have a significant impact on wheat prices nationally. Thus, Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce includes the authority to regulate local activities that might affect some aspect of interstate commerce, such as prices:[2]
| “ | That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. ... It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices. ... The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices.[9] | ” |
| —Justice Robert H. Jackson, majority opinion in Wickard v. Filburn (1942)[2] | ||
Justice Jackson wrote that the government's authority to regulate commerce includes the authority to restrict or mandate economic behavior:[2]
| “ | It is said, however, that this Act, forcing some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for themselves, is an unfair promotion of the markets and prices of specializing wheat growers. It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the regulated, and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation, we have nothing to do.[9] | ” |
| —Justice Robert H. Jackson, majority opinion in Wickard v. Filburn (1942)[2] | ||
Justice Jackson's opinion also dismissed Filburn's challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act on due process grounds:[2]
| “ | The statute is also challenged as a deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment, both because of its regulatory effect on the appellee and because of its alleged retroactive effect. The court below sustained the plea on the ground of forbidden retroactivity, 'or, in the alternative, that the equities of the case as shown by the record favor the plaintiff.' An Act of Congress is not to be refused application by the courts as arbitrary and capricious and forbidden by the Due Process Clause merely because it is deemed in a particular case to work an inequitable result. ... That appellee is the worse off for the aggregate of this legislation does not appear; it only appears that, if he could get all that the Government gives and do nothing that the Government asks, he would be better off than this law allows. To deny him this is not to deny him due process of law.[9] | ” |
| —Justice Robert H. Jackson, majority opinion in Wickard v. Filburn (1942)[2] | ||
Impact
In this case, the Supreme Court assessed the scope of Congress' authority to regulate economic activities under the commerce clause contained in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. This section reads in part: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that this power includes the authority to regulate activities that take place within a state if those activities affect interstate commerce and even if the activities do not meet a particular definition of commerce.[6][7][5][3]
The Institute for Justice, a nonprofit law firm that advocates for limited government, described the effects of the decision in Wickard v. Filburn in the following way:[3]
| “ | There is now no distinction between 'interstate' and 'intrastate' commerce to place any limits on Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to micromanage economic life. In the 70 years between Wickard and NFIB v. Sebelius in 2012, the Supreme Court found only two narrow laws to lie beyond Congress' constitutionally enumerated powers.[9] | ” |
| —Institute for Justice, "Wickard v. Filburn (1942)"[3] | ||
The ruling in Wickard featured prominently in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez (1995), which struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and curtailed Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
See also
- Article I, United States Constitution
- Federalism
- Court cases related to federalism
- Gibbons v. Ogden
- United States v. Lopez
- National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and majority opinion (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Oyez, "Wickard v. Filburn," accessed November 14, 2017
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Justia, "Wickard v. Filburn," accessed November 14, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Institute for Justice, "Wickard v. Filburn (1942)," accessed November 17, 2017
- ↑ Legal Information Institute, "Wickard v. Filburn," accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 U.S. ConLawpedia (Georgia State University), "Wickard v. Filburn (1942)," accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Casebriefs, "Wickard v. Filburn," accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Casebriefs, "Wickard v. Filburn," accessed November 27, 2017
- ↑ The Green Papers, "Justices of the United States Supreme Court (by Term of Court)," updated October 2, 2017
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
