Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation

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What is deference in the context of the administrative state?

Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here.

Supreme Court of the United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.
Reference: 572 U.S. __
Term: 2013
Important Dates
Argued: December 10, 2013
Decided: April 29, 2014
Outcome
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion reversed and remanded
Majority
Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Chief Justice John Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan
Dissenting
Antonin Scalia • Clarence Thomas


Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation is a 2014 United States Supreme Court case in which the court upheld an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule in part by relying on Chevron deference. The EPA rule had set emission reduction standards for upwind states based on air quality standards in downwind states. The court held that the EPA made the rule using a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the Clean Air Act.[1][2]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: The EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (Transport Rule) required the cost of emissions reductions to be a factor when determining how upwind states could meet the pollution reduction requirements of the Clean Air Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the Transport Rule.
  • The issue: Whether the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to require that the cost of reducing emissions be a factor when designing emissions-reduction plans for upwind states that pollute downwind states. Whether states must have an opportunity to design their own emission reduction plans after the EPA calculates their interstate pollution obligations.
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling. It held that the EPA cost considerations were permissible, workable, and equitable interpretations of the law and that the Clean Air Act does not require the EPA to allow states to file implementation plans after their obligations have been quantified.[1]


    • Why it matters: The ruling is an example of the U.S. Supreme Court applying Chevron deference, which determines when federal courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes that Congress gives them to administer.[1]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • April 29, 2014: U.S. Supreme Court decision announced
    • December 10, 2013: Oral argument
    • June 24, 2013: U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear case
    • March 29, 2013: Petition filed with U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 24, 2013: The D.C. Circuit vacated EPA transport rule

    Background

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    The case

    The Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act targets air pollution emitted in one state but causing harm in other states. The provision requires states to prohibit sources of pollution from emitting air pollutants that contribute significantly to downwind states being unable to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA adopted the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (Transport Rule) following the Good Neighbor Provision. The Transport Rule calls for a consideration of costs when determining the emission reductions upwind states must make to improve air quality in polluted downwind states.[1]

    The DC Circuit vacated the Transport Rule. It held that the Good Neighbor Provision requires the EPA to consider how physically and proportionately responsible an upwind state is for downwind state pollution and not how much emissions reductions would cost. It also held that the EPA must give states a reasonable opportunity to allocate their own emissions budgets before creating a federal emission reduction plan for them. The case then came before the U.S. Supreme Court.[1]

    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "1. Whether the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenges on which it granted relief.

    2. Whether States are excused from adopting SIPs prohibiting emissions that 'contribute significantly' to air pollution problems in other States until after the EPA has adopted a rule quantifying each State’s interstate pollution obligations.

    3. Whether the EPA permissibly interpreted the statutory term 'contribute significantly' so as to define each upwind State’s 'significant' interstate air pollution contributions in light of the cost-effective emission reductions it can make to improve air quality in polluted downwind areas, or whether the Act instead unambiguously requires the EPA to consider only each upwind State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem."[3]

    Oral argument

    Oral arguments were held on December 10, 2013.[1]

    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[4]

    Transcript

    • Transcript of the oral argument:[5]

    Outcome

    The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling with a 6-2 vote. The majority opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.[1] Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Samuel Alito was recused from the case.

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council and held that the D.C. Circuit failed to accord deference to the EPA's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The majority reversed the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.[1]

    “ Turning to the merits, we hold that the text of the statute supports EPA’s position. As earlier noted, the CAA sets a series of precise deadlines to which the States and EPA must adhere. Once EPA issues any new or revised NAAQS, a State has three years to adopt a SIP adequate for compliance with the Act’s requirements. Among those requirements is the Act’s mandate that SIPs “shall” include provisions sufficient to satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision. [...]


    The D.C. Circuit, however, found an unwritten exception to this strict time prescription for SIPs aimed at implementing the Good Neighbor Provision. Expecting any one State to develop a 'comprehensive solution' to the 'collective problem' of interstate air pollution without first receiving EPA’s guidance was, in the Court of Appeals’ assessment, 'set[ting] the States up to fail.' The D.C. Circuit therefore required EPA, after promulgating each State’s emission budget, to give the State a 'reasonable' period of time to propose SIPs implementing its budget.

    However sensible (or not) the Court of Appeals’ position, a reviewing court’s 'task is to apply the text [of the statute], not to improve upon it.' Nothing in the Act differentiates the Good Neighbor Provision from the several other matters a State must address in its SIP. Rather, the statute speaks without reservation: Once a NAAQS has been issued, a State 'shall' propose a SIP within three years, and that SIP 'shall' include, among other components, provisions adequate to satisfy the Good Neighbor Provision.[6][1][7]

    		”

    Addressing the issue of whether the Good Neighbor Provision requires upwind states to reduce emissions following a proportional formula based on downwind pollution, Ginsburg deferred to EPA conclusions:[1]

    “ We conclude that the Good Neighbor Provision delegates authority to EPA at least as certainly as the CAA provisions involved in Chevron. The statute requires States to eliminate those 'amounts' of pollution that 'contribute significantly to nonattainment' in downwind States. Thus, EPA’s task is to reduce upwind pollution, but only in 'amounts' that push a downwind State’s pollution concentrations above the relevant NAAQS. As noted earlier, however, the nonattainment of downwind States results from the collective and interwoven contributions of multiple upwind States. The statute therefore calls upon the Agency to address a thorny causation problem: How should EPA allocate among multiple contributing up-wind States responsibility for a downwind State’s excess pollution? [...]


    Should the Agency allocate reductions proportionally (10 ppb each), on a per capita basis, on the basis of the cost of abatement, or by some other metric? The Good Neighbor Provision does not answer that question for EPA. Cf. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 860 ('[T]he language of [the CAA] simply does not compel any given interpretation of the term ‘source.’'). Under Chevron, we read Congress’ silence as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from among reasonable options. See United States v. Mead Corp.

    Yet the Court of Appeals believed that the Act speaks clearly, requiring EPA to allocate responsibility for reducing emissions in 'a manner proportional to' each State’s 'contributio[n]' to the problem. Nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision propels EPA down this path. Understandably so, for as EPA notes, the D.C. Circuit’s proportionality approach could scarcely be satisfied in practice.[8][1][7]

    		”


    Dissenting opinions

    Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He called the EPA's Transport Rule an "undemocratic revision of the Clean Air Act" that substituted agency preferences for what he held that the text required. He read the Good Neighbor Provision to require states to "shoulder burdens in proportion to the size of their contributions, not in proportion to the ease of bearing them." The opinion concludes by citing precedent from ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri that said "[r]egardless of how serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to address, . . . it may not exercise its authority 'in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.'"[1]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 JUSTIA, "Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P., 572 U.S. ___ (2014)" accessed October 4, 2018
    2. ↑ Oyez, "Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation," accessed October 4, 2018
    3. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari," March 2013
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.," argued December 10, 2013
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. Transcript of Oral Argument," argued December 10, 2013
    6. ↑ Internal citations and quotations have been omitted
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    8. ↑ Internal citations and quotations have been omitted
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