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Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce

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Supreme Court of the United States
Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce
Term: 2023
Important Dates
Argued: January 17, 2024
Decided: June 28, 2024
Outcome
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded
Vote
6-3
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Samuel Alito • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Clarence Thomas • Neil Gorsuch
Dissenting
Elena Kagan • Sonia Sotomayor • Ketanji Brown Jackson

Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce is a U.S. Supreme Court case decided 6-3 on June 28, 2024, challenging the scope of the Chevron derence doctrine and its application by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to uphold the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) interpretation of a federal fishery law. The Supreme Court overruled the 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.

The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on January 17, 2024, during the court's October 2023-2024 term. The case was consolidated with Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which was decided with a vote of 6-2. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was recused from that case.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. 2. Whether the phrase “necessary and appropriate” in the MSA augments agency power to force domestic fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of federal observers they must carry."[2]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 to overrule the 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The court vacated and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Why it matters: The court’s decision in the case overturned Chevron deference in the federal courts—a principle that compelled federal courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear statute that Congress delegated to the agency to administer. The court held that it is up to federal courts to clarify ambiguous statutes, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

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    • Judicial deference
    • Nondelegation
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    See also: Chevron deference

    The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) requires fishing vessels for herring to carry federal monitors on board and requires vessel owners to pay for certain monitors. Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC–owners of fishing vessels for herring–challenged the agency’s regulatory authority to enact the requirement. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island argued that the rule was within the agency’s regulatory authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.[3]

    The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which upheld the lower court’s ruling, arguing “that the rule is a permissible exercise of the agency's authority and is otherwise lawful.”[3]

    The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in the October 2023-2024 term.

    What is Chevron deference?

    Chevron deference is a doctrine of judicial deference that compels federal courts, in reviewing a federal government agency's action, to defer to the agency’s construction of a statute that Congress directed the agency to administer. The original, two-step Chevron process was first outlined in the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court opinion for Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Click here to learn more about Chevron deference.

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ 1. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. 2. Whether the phrase “necessary and appropriate” in the MSA augments agency power to force domestic fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of federal observers they must carry.

    [4]

    		”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Outcome

    The court ruled 6-3 to overrule the 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. It vacated and remanded the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rulings.

    Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson as it pertains to Relentless. Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of Loper Bright.[1]

    Opinion

    Opinion of the court

    Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, overruling the court’s 1984 decision in Chevron. Roberts argued that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to determine whether agencies acted within their statutory authority:[7]

    “ Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided. Despite reshaping judicial review of agency action, neither it nor any case of ours applying it grappled with the APA—the statute that lays out how such review works. Its flaws were nonetheless apparent from the start, prompting this Court to revise its foundations and continually limit its application. It has launched and sustained a cottage industry of scholars attempting to decipher its basis and meaning. And Members of this Court have long questioned its premises.[4] ”


    Roberts concluded:[7]

    “ Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry. And when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it. But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.[4] ”

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, arguing that another reason to overturn Chevron is because it violates the separation of powers:[7]

    “

    I write separately to underscore a more fundamental problem: Chevron deference also violates our Constitution’s separation of powers, as I have previously explained at length. … And, I agree with JUSTICE GORSUCH that we should not overlook Chevron’s constitutional defects in overruling it.* Post, at 15–20 (concurring opinion). To provide ‘practical and real protections for individual liberty,’ the Framers drafted a Constitution that divides the legislative, executive, and judicial powers between three branches of Government. Perez, 575 U. S., at 118 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Chevron deference compromises this separation of powers in two ways. It curbs the judicial power afforded to courts, and simultaneously expands agencies’ executive power beyond constitutional limits.[4]

    		”


    Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a separate concurring opinion, arguing that the decision to overturn Chevron aligns with stare decisis:[7]

    “

    Turning now directly to the question what stare decisis effect Chevron deference warrants, each of these lessons seem to me to weigh firmly in favor of the course the Court charts today: Lesson 1, because Chevron deference contravenes the law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act. Lesson 2, because Chevron deference runs against mainstream currents in our law regarding the separation of powers, due process, and centuries-old interpretive rules that fortify those constitutional commitments. And Lesson 3, because to hold otherwise would effectively require us to endow stray statements in Chevron with the authority of statutory language, all while ignoring more considered language in that same decision and the teachings of experience.[4]

    		”

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson as it pertains to Relentless. Kagan argued against the decision to overturn Chevron, contending that deference to agency interpretation is necessary to fill the gaps of ambiguous statutes:[7]

    “

    This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly complete regulatory statutes. It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor will have to fill. And it would usually prefer that actor to be the responsible agency, not a court. Some interpretive issues arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or technical subject matter. Agencies have expertise in those areas; courts do not. Some demand a detailed understanding of complex and interdependent regulatory programs. Agencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not. And some present policy choices, including trade-offs between competing goods. Agencies report to a President, who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls; courts have no such accountability and no proper basis for making policy. And of course Congress has conferred on that expert, experienced, and politically accountable agency the authority to administer—to make rules about and otherwise implement—the statute giving rise to the ambiguity or gap. Put all that together and deference to the agency is the almost obvious choice, based on an implicit congressional delegation of interpretive authority. We defer, the Court has explained, ‘because of a presumption that Congress’ would have ‘desired the agency (rather than the courts)’ to exercise ‘whatever degree of discretion’ the statute allows.[4]

    		”

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Commentary

    Pre-decision commentary

    Senator Kevin McCarthy (R) argued in a statement that the Supreme Court should overturn Chevron deference to restore the separation of powers, according to The Washington Examiner:[8]

    “ As part of our Commitment to America, House Republicans pledged to hold Washington accountable. The Chevron framework makes it easier for unelected bureaucrats to weaponize federal regulations against the American people. The Court should rein in the power of unelected bureaucrats and restore the separation of powers.[4] ”


    Adam White, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, published an article in January 2024 arguing that deference allows for major policy changes between administrations which, in his view, creates uncertainty:[9]

    “ The courts must do their own constitutional job, and in a way that best helps the other branches to do their own constitutional jobs. There may be room for some judicial deference to agencies as they work out the precise meaning of a vague law, at least when the law is new, but eventually the courts must settle the question. A law’s meaning cannot remain perpetually unsettled.[4] ”


    SCOTUSblog analyst Amy Howe wrote about oral argument in the Loper Bright and Relentless cases and observed a split in the justices' opinions on the cases:[10]

    “ The court’s three liberal justices expressed support for keeping the doctrine in place. Justice Elena Kagan repeatedly suggested that federal agencies, with their scientific and technical expertise, are better suited than courts to resolve ambiguities in a federal statute. … But Justice Brett Kavanaugh saw Chevron’s deference to agencies differently. Chevron, he complained, ‘ushers in shocks to the system every four or eight years when a new administration comes in’ and implements ‘massive change’ in areas like securities law, communications law, and environmental law.[4] ”


    Law professor Nicholas Bagley published an article in January 2024 in The Atlantic arguing that a decision to overturn Chevron deference will make agencies more cautious in issuing actions which he argues will make them ineffective:[11]

    “ [Agencies] lose [in court] so regularly, and for such a wild and whirling array of reasons, that the outcome of a lawsuit, from their perspective, looks pretty random. No matter how many pages they spend defending their rule or how carefully they conduct their legal analysis, they may still lose, and often for reasons that strike experts in the field as idiosyncratic or baffling. … In the face of uncertainty, [agencies] survive by channeling their energies into activities that won’t provoke litigation—which is to say, activities that won’t ruffle anyone’s feathers.[4] ”


    Law professor Jody Freeman outlined in an interview with The Harvard Gazette what she viewed as potential ramifications of overturning or limiting Chevron deference:[12]

    “ For nearly 100 years, Congress has delegated power to expert agencies to regulate our modern economy, set and enforce public health standards, protect consumers, and much more. Those tasks necessarily and unavoidably require agencies to make legal determinations when Congress has left gaps to fill. If the court overturns Chevron, it will have aggrandized its own power at the expense of Congress, the administrative state, and the president, and thrown critical day-to-day decisions necessary to implement scores of federal statutes to the federal judiciary.[4] ”

    Post-decision commentary

    Jeff Turrentine, contributing author to the Natural Resources Defense Council, wrote an article opposing the decision to overturn Chevron arguing:[13]

    “

    Now the Supreme Court has reopened the door for federal judges to decide how executive-branch agencies should go about their daily business whenever Congress has used ambiguous language, which, it should be noted, isn’t always unintentional. Sometimes Congress is purposefully inexplicit in order to give the subject-area experts space to decide how best to implement a regulation. For example, an agency made up of occupational safety specialists should already be well equipped to decide how to handle the technical, nuts-and-bolts aspects of imposing workplace protections—rules about equipment usage, say, or the need for periodic employee rest breaks—without the meddling of judges. And given the complexity of weather patterns, EPA scientists are better equipped than judges at determining how much a state should curb its air pollution in order to protect people living in other states downwind. … The federal court system is huge—and the roughly 850 judges who sit on the lower courts are a philosophically and ideologically diverse bunch, to say the least. And as the judicial appointments process has become increasingly partisan, the range of these judges’ views has gotten even wider. Ending Chevron deference is tantamount to throwing a dart at a lower-court dartboard…and hoping for the best.[4]

    		”


    Danielle Fugere, President and Chief Counsel for You Sow, a shareholder representative organization, argued that the decision to overturn Chevron made America less democratic, stating:[14]

    “

    The Supreme Court is made up of nine life-tenured, unelected lawyers. By contrast, administrative agencies are subject to oversight by the elected branches and regulated through public notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Court’s decision makes clear that the Supreme Court views agencies’ flexibility and expertise in highly specialized areas as flaws.[4]

    		”


    Foley Hoag, a climate action law firm, predicted the effects of the Chevron doctrine's overturn on the regulatory environment, arguing:[15]

    “

    In the long term, this decision likely hamstrings the federal government’s ability to quickly address pressing and fast-changing issues, including climate change, but also across the full scope of federal authority, such as with health or safety regulations. It will make agencies less nimble in enacting new regulations in response to new problems and information. Meanwhile, Congress remains as gridlocked as ever, so legislation is unlikely to fill the gap in the near future.[4]

    		”


    U.S. Chamber of Commerce CEO and President Suzanne Clark issued a statement supporting the decision to overturn Chevron, contending:[16]

    “

    "Today’s decision is an important course correction that will help create a more predictable and stable regulatory environment. The Supreme Court’s previous deference rule allowed each new presidential administration to advance their political agendas through flip-flopping regulations and not provide consistent rules of the road for businesses to navigate, plan, and invest in the future. The Chamber will continue to urge courts to faithfully interpret statutes that govern federal agencies and to ensure federal agencies act in a reasonable and lawful manner."[4]

    		”


    Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) argued that overturning Chevron restored Congressional lawmaking authority, stating:[17]

    “

    After 40 years of Chevron deference, the Supreme Court made it clear today that our system of government leaves no room for an unelected bureaucracy to co-opt this authority for itself. The days of federal agencies filling in the legislative blanks are rightly over.[4]

    		”


    In a press release, the New Civil Liberties Alliance contended that overturning Chevron returned the Constitutional power to clarify statutory ambiguity to Article III courts, writing:[18]

    “

    Concurring opinions discussed two core constitutional problems with Chevron deference … First, employing such deference abandons a judge’s duty to provide independent judgment. Second, when a federal court defers to an agency’s legal interpretation, the litigants opposing that agency—like the fishermen opposing NOAA in Relentless—do not have their case judged by an impartial adjudicator, which violates the core constitutional promise of due process.

    The government claimed Chevron upholds Congress’s power to delegate policy decisions to Executive Branch agencies, but the Court ruled that a gap or ambiguity in a statute confers no statutory authority to agencies. Rather, interpreting ambiguity in a statute is a legal action constitutionally reserved for Article III courts, which have that expertise.[4]

    		”


    Impact

    See also: Chevron deference

    The decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce overturned the Chevron doctrine in the federal courts. The court’s decision holds that federal courts can no longer defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and instead are required to rely on the court’s interpretations.

    Chief Justice John Roberts clarified in the majority opinion that the court’s ruling would not impact previous uses of Chevron. Roberts wrote, “the Court does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite the Court’s change in interpretive methodology.”[7][19]

    October term 2023-2024

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2023-2024

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 2, 2023. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[20]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 SCOTUSblog, "Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce," accessed October 26, 2023
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "RELENTLESS, INC., et al., v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al., - PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI," accessed October 28, 2024
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Casetext, "Relentless, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Commerce," March 16, 2023
    4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued January 17, 2024
    6. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued January 17, 2024
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Supreme Court of the United States, "Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al." June 28, 2024
    8. ↑ The Washington Examiner, "McCarthy calls on Supreme Court to 'rein in' administrative state in upcoming case," July 25, 2023
    9. ↑ AEI, "Chevron Deference vs. Steady Administration," January 24, 2024
    10. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Supreme Court likely to discard Chevron," January 17, 2024
    11. ↑ Yale Journal on Regulation, "The Cowering State," January 25, 2024
    12. ↑ The Harvard Gazette, "'Chevron deference' faces existential test," January 16, 2024
    13. ↑ National Resource Defense Council, “The Supreme Court Ends Chevron Deference—What Now?” July 1, 2024
    14. ↑ As You Sow, "As You Sow Response to the Supreme Court Overruling Chevron v. NRDC, Reshaping Federal Regulatory Authority,” July 1, 2024
    15. ↑ Foley Hoag, “CHEVRON IS OVERRULED: Supreme Court Abandons Key Regulatory Precedent,” July 1, 2024
    16. ↑ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber President and CEO Suzanne P. Clark: Chevron Deference Ruling is an “Important Course Correction," July 1, 2024
    17. ↑ NBC Connecticut, Chevron doctrine overturned: Republicans, big business praise Supreme Court decision,” July 1, 2024
    18. ↑ NCLAlegal.org, “In Landmark Victory for Civil Liberties, NCLA Persuades Supreme Court to Overturn Chevron Deference,” July 1, 2024
    19. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Supreme Court strikes down Chevron, curtailing power of federal agencies," June 28, 2024
    20. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed January 24, 2022
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