Pointer v. Texas
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| Pointer v. Texas | |
| Reference: 380 US 400 | |
| Term: 1965 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 15, 1965 Decided: April 5, 1965 | |
| Outcome | |
| Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Earl Warren • Hugo Black • William Douglas • Tom Clark • John Harlan • William Brennan • Potter Stewart • Byron White • Arthur Goldberg | |
Pointer v. Texas is a case decided 9-0 on April 5, 1965, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that state criminal proceedings that do not allow a defendant to cross-examine a witness violate the right to confrontation outlined in the Sixth Amendment. The court's decision incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reversed the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in Pointer v. Texas incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation against the states. The court found that state criminal proceedings that deny a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a witness in court violate the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation. To read more about the impact of Pointer v. Texas click here.
Background
Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-Eleven food store and robbed the manager, Kenneth Phillips, of more than $300 on June 16, 1962. Pointer fled the store and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection When police arrived, they conducted a search of Pointer and found eighty-one dollars in his billfold and sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe.[2]
The police arrested Bob Granville Pointer and another man named Lloyd Earl Dillard. The state charged the two men with robbing Kenneth Phillips by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, which violated Texas law. Neither defendant had a lawyer at trial. Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. During a preliminary hearing, each defendant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, Kenneth Philips. Pointer declined.[2]
At the trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying any role in the robbery and swearing he was not in the 7-Eleven store at the time the crime took place. To discredit Pointer, the state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony because he had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return for the trial. The defense objected to the use of the transcript, claiming that including such evidence violated Pointer's right to confrontation. The trial judge overruled the objection because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing and chose not to cross-examine Kenneth Philips. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's appeal that the use of the transcript violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.[2]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on March 15, 1965. The case was decided on April 5, 1965.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 9-0 to reverse the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the court, with Justices John Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Arthur Goldberg writing concurring opinions.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the court, argued that the right to confrontation was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Black asserted that, in federal court, the case would have violated Pointer's privilege of confrontation:[2]
| “ | Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against petitioner at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circumstances affording petitioner through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, its introduction in a federal court in a criminal case against Pointer would have amounted to denial of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Since we hold that the right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him must be determined by the same standards whether the right is denied in a federal or state proceeding, it follows that use of the transcript to convict petitioner denied him a constitutional right, and that his conviction must be reversed.[3] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in Pointer v. Texas[2] | ||
Concurring opinions
Justice John Harlan wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that the right to confrontation is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty outlined in the Due Process Clause. He delineated from the majority opinion by arguing that the right to confrontation was applicable to the states through a different constitutional approach than the Sixth Amendment:[2]
| “ | For me, this state judgment must be reversed because a right of confrontation is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 302 U. S. 325, reflected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment independently of the Sixth.
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” |
| —John Harlan, concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas[2] | ||
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion similar to Justice Harlan's. He also disagreed that the Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation was applicable to the states. Instead, he found that the state had violated Pointer's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process:[2]
| “ | I join in the judgment reversing this conviction, for the reason that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to cross-examine, through counsel, the chief witness for the prosecution. But I do not join in the Court's pronouncement which makes 'the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him . . . obligatory on the States.' That questionable tour de force seems to me entirely unnecessary to the decision of this case, which I think is directly controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'[3] | ” |
| —Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas[2] | ||
Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that there are certain basic rights that should not be violated by either federal or state governments:[2]
| “ | I adhere to and support the process of absorption by means of which the Court holds that certain fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are made obligatory on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Although, as this case illustrates, there are differences among members of the Court as to the theory by which the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental liberties of individual citizens, it is noteworthy that there is a large area of agreement, both here and in other cases, that certain basic rights are fundamental -- not to be denied the individual by either the state or federal governments under the Constitution.[3] | ” |
| —Arthur Goldberg, concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Pointer v. Texas incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation against the states. The case established the precedent that state courts cannot deny a person the opportunity to cross-examine a witness.[1][2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Pointer v. Texas," accessed August 29, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 Justia, "Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)," accessed August 29, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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