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Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

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Supreme Court of the United States
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh
Term: 2022
Important Dates
Argued: February 22, 2023
Decided: May 18, 2023
Outcome
Reversed
Majority
Clarence Thomas • Chief Justice John Roberts • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Ketanji Brown Jackson

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 18, 2023, during the court's October 2022-2023 term. The case was argued before the court on February 22, 2023. The court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a 9-0 ruling, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The issue: The case concerned internet service providers' liability under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (1996). Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The questions presented: "1. Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and "regularly" works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services knowingly provided substantial assistance under Section 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more "meaningful" or "aggressive" action to prevent such use.
    2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific "act of international terrorism" that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333."[2]
  • The outcome: Despite showing that the defendants were aware that they could have done more to remove ISIS-related content and affiliated users from their platform, the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants intentionally provided aid or participated in the Reinia attack.[1]


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    In 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov—affiliated with the organization the Islamic State (IS)—shot and killed 39 people at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey, including Nawras Alassaf, a Jordanian citizen.[3][4]

    The plaintiffs in this case—Mehier, Lawrence, Sara, and Dimana Taamneh—are relatives of Alassaf. They filed a lawsuit against internet service providers and platforms Twitter, Google, and Facebook in U.S. district court, the Northern District of California. They alleged that the providers aided and abetted IS' growth, as the group used the platforms for recruitment, messaging (i.e. threats and propaganda), and to terrorize civilians. They asserted that IS would not be what it was without the free communications platforms the companies provided. Their complaint alleged that the providers were directly liable under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and that they concealed their support. The providers moved to dismiss the case. The district court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conspiracy to commit an act of international terrorism or for aiding and abetting such an act, and that the direct liability claims failed to properly allege cause. The court dismissed the claims and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[3][4]

    Section 2333, Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)

    In the petition for a writ of certiorari, Twitter, Inc. asked the court to review Section 2333(a) and (d)(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which states:[4][5]

    “ (a) Action and Jurisdiction.—

    Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees. ...

    (d) Liability.— ...
    (2) Liability.— In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of the date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.[6]

    		”

    Section 230, Communications Decency Act (1996)

    In the petition for a writ of certiorari, Gonzalez asked the court to review Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, which states:[4]Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name cannot be a simple integer. Use a descriptive title

    “ (c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material

    (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker

    No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.[6]

    		”

    Ninth Circuit opinion

    On appeal from the Northern District of California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the plaintiffs did demonstrate Google, Twitter, and Facebook's legal liability for aiding and abetting under the ATA. Writing for the majority, Judge Morgan Christen wrote:[3]

    “ This opinion addresses three separate appeals. The Gonzalez appeal concerns claims for both direct and secondary liability against Google. In that case, the district court granted Google's motion to dismiss, concluding that most of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims were barred pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), and that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims failed to adequately allege proximate cause. The Taamneh and Clayborn appeals concern claims for secondary liability against Google, Twitter, and Facebook. In both of these cases, the district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a secondary liability claim under the ATA.


    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude the district court in Gonzalez properly ruled that § 230 bars most of the Gonzalez Plaintiffs’ claims, and that the Gonzalez Plaintiffs failed to state an actionable claim as to their remaining theories of liability asserted pursuant to the ATA. In Taamneh, we conclude the district court erred by ruling the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA. The district court did not reach § 230 immunity in Taamneh. In Clayborn, we conclude the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead their claim for aiding-and-abetting liability. We therefore affirm the judgments in Gonzalez and Clayborn, and reverse and remand for further proceedings in Taamneh.[6]

    		”


    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ 1. Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and "regularly" works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services "knowingly" provided substantial assistance under Section 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more "meaningful" or "aggressive" action to prevent such use.
    2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific "act of international terrorism" that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333.[6]     		”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[7]




    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    In a 9-0 opinion, the court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Despite showing that the defendants were aware that they could have done more to remove ISIS-related content and affiliated users from their platform, the plaintiffs did not show that the defendants intentionally provided aid or participated in the Reinia attack.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “

    [T]he nexus between defendants and the Reina attack is far removed. As alleged by plaintiffs, defendants designed virtual platforms and knowingly failed to do “enough” to remove ISIS-affiliated users and ISIS related content—out of hundreds of millions of users worldwide and an immense ocean of content—from their platforms. Yet, plaintiffs have failed to allege that defendants intentionally provided any substantial aid to the Reina attack or otherwise consciously participated in the Reina attack—much less that defendants so pervasively and systemically assisted ISIS as to render them liable for every ISIS attack. Plaintiffs accordingly have failed to state a claim under §2333(d)(2). [6]

    		”
    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion.

    In her concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote:[1]

    “

    I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that today’s decisions are narrow in important respects... the Court’s view of the facts—including its characterizations of the social-media platforms and algorithms at issue—properly rests on the particular allegations in those complaints. Other cases presenting different allegations and different records may lead to different conclusions. [6]

    		”
    —Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Related cases

    October term 2022-2023

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2022-2023

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 3, 2022. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[9]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Supreme Court, "TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH ET AL.," May 18, 2023
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 U.S. Supreme Court, "QP REPORT 21-1496 TWITTER, INC. V. TAAMNEH," October 3, 2022
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Gonzalez v. Google LLC, decided June 22, 2021
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 U.S. Supreme Court, "Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh CONDITIONAL PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI," filed May 26, 2022
    5. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, " 18 U.S. Code § 2333 - Civil remedies ," accessed October 6, 2022
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    7. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," argued February 22, 2023
    8. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," argued February 22, 2023
    9. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload," accessed January 24, 2022
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