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Cantwell v. Connecticut

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Supreme Court of the United States
Cantwell v. Connecticut
Reference: 310 U.S. 296
Term: 1940
Important Dates
Argued: March 29, 1940
Decided: May 20, 1940
Outcome
Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed
Majority
Chief Justice Charles E. HughesJames C. McReynoldsHarlan F. StoneOwen RobertsHugo Black • Stanley F. Reed • Felix FrankfurterWilliam O. DouglasFrank Murphy

Cantwell v. Connecticut is a case that was decided on May 20, 1940, by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to states and prohibited them from passing laws that infringed on religious freedom (before the Fourteenth Amendment's passage, the First Amendment only restrained Congress).[1][2]

The case concerned (1) a Connecticut law that required religious solicitors to obtain a license from the state secretary of the public welfare council and (2) the state's ability to convict peaceful religious solicitors of inciting a common-law breach of the peace. The Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the Connecticut Supreme Court, holding that the First Amendment, as incorporated to the states under the Due Process Clause, prohibited states from (1) distinguishing religious solicitation from other types of solicitation for the purpose of licensing and (2) prosecuting peaceful religious advocates for incitement.[1][2]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Jehovah's Witness Newton Cantwell and his sons were arrested in a Catholic neighborhood after playing a phonograph recording critical of Catholocism that angered two pedestrians. The Cantwells were convicted of soliciting without a license and inciting a common-law breach of the peace. The Cantwells appealed the convictions.
  • The issue: Did the legal bases for Connecticut's conviction of the Cantwells violate their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment, as incorporated under the Due Process Clause, rendered the laws and convictions unconstitutional.

  • Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision explicitly applied First Amendment free exercise protections to restrain state governments through the incorporation doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice Owen Roberts argued, "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."

    Background

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    Connecticut law at the time of the Cantwells' convictions required all solicitors to obtain a license from the state secretary of the public welfare council and specify whether the solicitation was for religious or other purposes. The secretary could deny applications under the law depending on the perceived legitimacy of the purpose of the solicitation.[1][2]

    Jehovah's Witness Newton Cantwell and his sons were arrested in a Catholic neighborhood after playing a phonograph recording critical of Catholocism that angered two pedestrians. The Cantwells were convicted of soliciting without a license and inciting a common-law breach of the peace.[1][2]

    The Cantwells appealed the convictions up to the Connecticut Supreme Court, claiming their actions were protected under the First Amendment. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, and the Cantwells appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.[1][2]

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on March 29, 1940. The case was decided on May 20, 1940.[1][2]

    Decision

    The Supreme Court decided 9-0 that the First Amendment, as incorporated to the states under the Due Process Clause, prohibited the state from distinguishing religious solicitation from other types of solicitation for the purpose of licensing and from prosecuting peaceful religious advocates for incitement.[1][2]

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Justice Owen Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amemndment applied First Amendment religious protections to states and prohibited them from infringing on religious freedom. Consequently, while the state could regulate solicitation, the state's differentiation of religious solicitation for licensing purposes was unconstitutional. Likewise, the state could not prosecute the Cantwells under the common law for inciting a disturbance of peace because their speech was protected and did not threaten bodily harm.

    We hold that the statute, a construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. [Footnote 3] The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts -- freedom to believe and freedom to act.

    ...
    The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.
    ...
    Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner's communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in question.[2][3]

    Impact

    The Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell was the first to expand First Amendment free religious exercise protections to restrain state governments through the incorporation doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court during the first half of the 20th century decided a number of cases that partially incorporated First Amendment rights. Cantwell was a noteworthy part of the process through which the Supreme Court eventually fully incorporated the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment and prevented states from enacting laws that violated those right.[4]

    Previously, cases like Gitlow v. New York (1925), Near v. Minnesota (1931), and DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) incorporated freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of assembly and petition to the states through the Due Process Clause. Later, Everson v. Board of Education (1947) incorporated First Amendment protections against religious establishment to the states.[4]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes