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Arguments about police discipline and accountability

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See also: Arguments related to policing and police collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

This page tracks arguments about police discipline and accountability. Information about this topic areas in relation to police CBAs in the 50 states and 100 largest U.S. cities by population can be found on Ballotpedia's Police CBA Dashboard.

This page tracks the following arguments about police discipline and accountability:

Arguments supporting calls for more discipline and accountability for police officers

Argument: More technology, such as body-worn cameras, make police more accountable

This argument states that implementing more technology into police work will lead to more efficient and fair policing. Technological advances, such as surveillance and body-worn cameras (BWCs), can leave lasting and positive impacts on police culture and operations. Implementing more technology will also promote fairness and equality in policing.

  • Scholars Christopher S. Koper, Cynthia Lum, James J. Willis, Daniel J. Woods, and Julie Hibdon analyzed the effectiveness of police technologies in bettering departments and conduct and how to best implement these practices. The authors wrote, “[W]e investigated many of the social, organizational, and behavioral aspects of implementing police technologies in this study for the National Institute of Justice. Our goals were to more fully understand technological changes in policing and make recommendations for optimizing the use of technology in policing. Using a multimethod approach in four large agencies (both urban and suburban) that included officer surveys, field observations, extensive interviews and focus groups, and experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations, we investigated the uses and impacts of several information, analytic, surveillance, and forensics technologies that are central to everyday police functions (e.g., IT and mobile computing, crime analysis, and license plate readers). This approach allowed us to examine how these technologies affected police—in intended and unintended ways—with respect to operations, management, agency structure, culture, efficiency, effectiveness, citizen interaction, and job satisfaction. At the same time, we also tried to assess how various aspects of police organizations, culture, and behavior shape the uses of technology—and hence its impacts.”[1]
  • Law professor I. Bennett Capers argued that in order to make policing fair and unbiased, there should be more investment in policing, not less. To deracialize policing, greater technology should be implemented, such as surveillance technology. This will help move society closer to egalitarian, race-free policing, and to the goal of true equality before the law. Capers wrote, “[I]f we truly care about making policing egalitarian and fair to everyone, then that could mean more policing, not less. It advocates harnessing technology, including surveillance technology, to help deracialize policing. This turn to technology will not be cost free. Indeed, one cost will be the redistribution of privacy. This cost, especially to those who already enjoy a surfeit of privacy, might seem great. But even greater should be the possibility that technology can move society closer to egalitarian, race-free policing, and to the goal of true equality before the law.”[2]
  • Professor Michael D. White argued, "The available research offers support for the evidentiary benefits of body-worn camera systems. Several of the empirical studies (Plymouth and Renfrewshire/Aberdeen studies) indicate that body-worn cameras assist in the resolution of citizen complaints against police officers. Findings also suggest that bodyworn cameras may reduce the likelihood that citizens will file untruthful complaints (Plymouth and Renfrewshire/Aberdeen studies)."[3]

Claim: BWCs increase accountability, even among officers who are not personally wearing the BWCs

This claim states that BWCs increase accountability by officers getting accustomed to being on surveillance. Proponents of this claim posit that if police officers are used to their actions being recorded, they will be less likely to engage in misconduct or behave inappropriately.

  • Professor Barak Ariel and colleagues argued, “[R]epeated and systematic exposure to a stimulus that elicits deterrence can increase accountability, even when the stimulus has vanished. Our officers learned, by their repeated exposure to the surveillance effect of the cameras, what normative or appropriate reactions are, even when they were no longer under surveillance. This may be true for officers who once wore BWCs and no longer do (through the process of random assignment), or officers in the department who did not take part in the experiment (e.g., neighborhood police teams, special victim support units, etc.). We argue that that BWCs affect entire police departments through a process we label contagious accountability. Perhaps naively, we find it difficult to consider alternatives to the treatment effect beyond the panopticonic observer effect when the reduction in complaints is by nearly 100%. Whatever the precise mechanism of the deterrence effect of being watched and, by implication, accountability, all officers in the departments were acutely aware of being observed more closely, with an enhanced transparency apparatus that has never been seen before in day-to-day policing operations. Everyone was affected by it, even when the cameras were not in use, and collectively everyone in the department(s) attracted fewer complaints.”[4]
  • Michael White wrote that a perceived benefit of BWCs is that, “Body-worn cameras have a civilizing effect, resulting in improved behavior among both police officers and citizens. Several of the empirical studies have documented substantial decreases in citizen complaints (Rialto, Mesa, Plymouth, and Renfrewshire/Aberdeen studies) as well as in use of force by police (Rialto) and assaults on officers (Aberdeen). There is also anecdotal support for a civilizing effect reported elsewhere.”[3]
  • White continued that another perceived benefit of BWCs is, “Body-worn cameras provide opportunities for police training. ... There is anecdotal evidence from the UK Home Office guide (Goodall 2007) regarding the use of the technology in police training, and there is one report of a U.S. police department (Miami) doing so (Local 10 2013).”[3]

Argument: General baseline mechanisms are needed to prevent repeated misconduct

This argument states that commonplace practices and protocols are needed throughout law enforcement departments to prevent repeated misconduct. Proponents of the argument say having these practices will prevent law enforcement officers across jurisdictions from committing offenses.

  • A report published by Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force says, “Chicago’s police accountability system is broken. The system is supposed to hold police officers accountable to the people they serve and protect by identifying potential misconduct, investigating it and, when appropriate, imposing discipline. But at every step of the way, the police oversight system is riddled with legal and practical barriers to accountability.”[5]
  • Professors Christi L. Gullion, Erin A. Orrick, and Stephen A. Bishopp wrote, “Thus, understanding which predictors affect the timing between uses of force can assist agencies in providing officers enhanced supervision, training, and mentoring as opposed to waiting for the outcome of an internal affairs investigation or a more serious incident to occur. This can inform the design of accountability tools such as early intervention (EI) systems and their thresholds (i.e., the number of uses of force in a certain time frame) for identifying at-risk officers. Finally, insight into the factors affecting the timing between uses of force can assist police agencies with providing timely, appropriate, and tailored interventions for officers with recurring use of force.”[6]
  • Professor Samuel Walker wrote, “Data collection on traffic stops has emerged as the principal strategy of civil rights leaders and groups for eliminating racial profiling. The implicit assumption underlying this strategy is that systematic data will both document the existence of racial profiling and provide the basis for corrective action. Data collection represents an alternative to other reform strategies. These alternatives include (1) exhortation, in the sense of a formal prohibition of discrimination, through official policy and/or public statements by chief executives, (2) improved recruitment, training and supervision of officers, and (3) interpreting the Fourth Amendment to prohibit the use of race as a proxy for suspected criminality.”[7]
  • Walker continued, “[A]n EW [early warning systems] approach not only resolves the central problem related to interpreting traffic stop data but also provides practical direction for police managers seeking to correct improper officer performance.”[7]
  • The Council on Criminal Justice wrote in a 2021 report on police reform, “Duty-to-intervene and mandatory reporting policies are important accountability mechanisms that can prevent harm to community members, identify officers whose behavior may warrant intervention by superiors, and change ‘them against us’ policing culture.”[8]
  • According to the Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform, “[C]ivilian payouts for police misconduct must be restructured. Indemnification will be eliminated, making the officer responsible, and requiring them to purchase professional liability insurance the exact same way that other occupations such as doctors and lawyers do. This would give insurance companies a strong incentive to identify the problem officers early, to raise their rates just the way that insurance companies raise the rates on a bad driver or a doctor who engages in malpractice. In this regard, the cost of the insurance policy would increase the more misconduct an officer engaged in. Eventually, the worst officers would."[9]
  • Walker wrote, “[A]n EIS ('early warning system') is a potentially vital tool for transforming the culture of a police department and a key to ensuring the continuity of accountability-related reforms. The EIS has emerged in recent decades as a powerful police accountability tool—providing a data driven process for identifying officers with performance problems and for making informed decisions about interventions needed to correct officer performance problems.”[10]

Argument: Current police oversight practices insufficiently hold officers accountable for misconduct

This argument states that the current mechanisms jurisdictions use for police oversight are failing to hold officers who engage in misconduct accountable. This entails departments not giving officers the proper punishment for their misconduct (i.e. suspension, decertification, criminal prosecution, etc.), leading to repeated offenses.

  • The Chicago Police Accountability Task Force wrote, “Chicago’s police accountability system is broken. The system is supposed to hold police officers accountable to the people they serve and protect by identifying potential misconduct, investigating it and, when appropriate, imposing discipline. But at every step of the way, the police oversight system is riddled with legal and practical barriers to accountability.”[5]
  • Funded by the National Institute of Justice, researcher Peter Finn wrote, “There has been a considerable increase in the number of procedures involving citizen oversight of police implemented by cities and counties in the 1990s. However, many of these procedures have had a troubled history involving serious—even bitter—conflict among the involved parties. Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation is designed to help jurisdictions that may decide to establish—or wish to improve—an oversight system to avoid or eliminate these battles. At the same time, the publication can help oversight planners understand and choose among the many options available for structuring a citizen review procedure. Finally, current oversight staff and volunteers may find it useful to review the publication as a way of learning more about the field.”[11]
  • Law professor David A. Harris wrote, “[W]e must have a stronger approach to Fourth Amendment compliance, whether the exclusionary rule stays in place or not. Assuming the Supreme Court does not abrogate the rule, we should anticipate that police conduct will certainly be no better than what Gould and Mastrofski revealed; if the rule goes, compliance will likely fall. This would constitute a loss: a loss to citizens, who would see their constitutional rights trod upon rather than honored, and a loss to society as a whole, as the disrespect shown to the law by police misconduct delegitimizes our legal and law enforcement system."[12]
  • Harris continued, “[T]he proper conclusion seems not to be that we can do without the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, but rather that the exclusionary rule needs significant bracing up if we want our police officers to follow Fourth Amendment rules. I propose that this come in the form of measures that follow the path of police accountability: new methods of increasing police compliance with rules that have met with significant success in the last fifteen years.”[12]
  • University of Virginia Law Professor Barabara Armacost wrote, “Police officers shoot an unarmed man or woman. The victim’s family and community cry out for someone to be held accountable. In minority communities, where a disproportionate number of officer-involved shootings occur, residents suspect that racial animus and stereotypical assumptions about “dangerous black men” played a part. Citizens seek accountability by filing lawsuits and demanding criminal prosecutions. They are usually disappointed: the majority of police-involved shootings are deemed ‘justified’ by police investigators and courts, and no criminal charges are brought. If so, this is the end of the inquiry under current legal standards and there is no accountability. There is also no legal reason to ask why the shooting occurred and how it could have been prevented. This Article argues that the current accountability paradigm is hindering genuine progress in decreasing the number of police-involved shootings, including those motivated by racism. We need to look beyond the limited time frame embraced by the current legal standard and view police-involved shootings as organizational accidents. Borrowing lessons learned from the aviation and healthcare fields, this Article urges a prevention-first approach that applies systemic analysis to what are systems problems. In these sectors, investigations of tragic accidents employ Sentinel Event Review, a systems-oriented strategy that looks back to discover all the factors that contributed to the event and looks forward to identify systemic reforms that could mitigate the chance of recurrence. The goal is to create systemic barriers that make it more difficult for sharp-end actors to err or misbehave. I am not arguing that individual police officers should escape responsibility for their actions. But our current relentless focus on accountability—while an understandable human reaction—has become the enemy of prevention in the very communities that need it most.”[13]
  • Law professor Nino Monea wrote about Police Officer Standard and Training (POST) bodies and their impact on discipline arguing, "Yet punishment is rare. Reviewing every integrity bulletin in 2022 for Arizona’s POST, for instance, reveals only a single instance of an officer being punished for excessive force—and it only resulted in a 40-hour suspension. Either Arizona’s peace officers are extraordinarily peaceful, or its POST does not do much to address excessive force.“[14]
  • Monea continued, "But perhaps the deeper problem this Article underscores is the lack of cases. Each POST has only a few dozen published cases per year in states that have over 10,000 uniformed officers. If every case that went before each POST resulted in revocation, fewer than one percent of officers would be affected. Even if we assume most police officers are serving honorably, this system is not catching every bad actor. Local departments are still the front line for setting high standards and holding officers to them.”[14]

Arguments opposing calls for more discipline and accountability for police officers

Argument: More technology, such as BWCs, does not make police more accountable

This argument states that implementing more technology into police work does not improve police accountability. More technology, such as BWCs, would require large investments which proponents of this argument claim would not be effective for improving accountability and could put officers' safety at risk.

  • Professor Barak Ariel and colleagues wrote, “We have two main results. First, there was no overall discernible effect of using BWVs on police use of force. Second, cameras increased the likelihood of an officer being assaulted during a shift compared to not wearing the cameras.”[15]
  • Ariel et al. continued, “First, (yet unevidenced) is the idea that with an ‘objective’ record of events, officers feel more able (or compelled) to report instances when they are assaulted. Second, officers may be less assertive (‘toned down’) because of monitoring, and this could make them more vulnerable to assault. (Officers sometimes deal with people who would very much like to do them – and others – harm.) Third, the strongest results for assaults against police came from the smallest studies – these may be atypical results driven by small sample variation. Fourth, the role of officer discretion is not clear and we will explore this further in a subsequent article. Finally, increased assaults against police may also be a corollary of the decreased use of force in some instances. Whereas police may have taken a tit-for-tat approach – using force when assaulted as a form of ‘natural justice’ – cameras may inhibit the reactive use of force and give officers the impetus and/or confidence to report the incident. The question about the reason for the increased assaults is not something that can be left to debate and must be scrutinised empirically.”[15]

Argument: Police departments should not use punitive sanctions to deter police misconduct

This argument states that police departments should not use punishment, also known as punitive sanctions, as a method of preventing police misconduct.

  • Professors Christopher J. Harris and Robert E. Worden argued that officer discipline does not deter future misconduct and punitive sanctions can have a counterproductive impact. Harris and Worden wrote, “On the whole, the results of this study suggest that sanctions do not deter misconduct and, worse, prompt more misconduct. Whether the findings from this one agency also hold in other agencies, and through what perceptual and cognitive mechanisms sanctions are connected to behavior, are questions that demand further empirical inquiry. For the present, however, these results cast some doubt on the efficacy of systems of police discipline in controlling police behavior. When patterns of lenient punishments for police misconduct are revealed, we react with dismay partly because we count on police discipline as an important mechanism in preventing misconduct. But our examination of a system that provides for sanctions that are demonstrably punitive - and which are known by the rank and file as punitive - indicates that sanctions have counterproductive effects on misconduct.”[16]
  • Former Police Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Darrel W. Stephens wrote, “There is significant dissatisfaction with the discipline approach: it is predominantly punishment oriented, it takes an excessive amount of time, many decisions are overturned on appeal, and the entire process leaves one with a sense that there should be a better way to help officers stay within the boundaries of acceptable behavior and learn from the mistakes made in an increasingly difficult and challenging job.”[17]
  • Law professor Nino Monea argued, "Although this Article argues bad officers should not be allowed to escape punishment, the reverse is also true: No officer should be punished unless they actually committed misconduct. Yet sometimes, officers are unjustly punished."[14]

Claim: Early intervention systems and only infrequently used formal discipline mechanisms create the best system for addressing police misconduct long term

This claim states that the most effective method for addressing police misconduct is through early intervention systems and low levels of discipline. Proponents of this claim argue that harsher and more punitive sanctions are ineffective at addressing misconduct, whereas early intervention systems work with police officers to address mistakes and move forward.

  • Stephens continued, “The best situation for a police department, its employees and the community is to create an environment in which the formal disciplinary process to deal with employee mistakes and misconduct is both the last option and the one least used. Creating that environment requires the department’s leadership to pay close attention to several essential elements that play central roles in an effectively managed organization.” This includes the hiring process, training, clear expectations, effective supervision, performance standards and review, complaint reception and investigative procedures, technology, and the code of silence. Stephens also argued that characteristics that contribute to an effective disciplinary process include early intervention at the lowest level, fair and consistent application of discipline, behavioral focus, timely processes, and transparency.[17]
  • Professors Emily Owens, David Weisburd, Geoffrey P. Alpert, and behavioral scientist Karen L. Amendola argued, "Police officers who are actively engaged with the public can reduce crime through general deterrence and by arresting criminals. Nevertheless, excessive discretionary arrests and the use of force by officers can reduce public trust in the police. To date, there is scant evidence as to how police departments can successfully train officers to balance enforcement and public trust in the field. Through our study, we demonstrate that a relatively minor supervisory intervention may cause substantive changes in how police and citizens interact with each other."[18]

Argument: Police officers are held accountable for misconduct by current oversight and disciplinary practices

This argument states that police officers are held accountable for misconduct through the oversight and disciplinary practices currently used by police departments throughout the United States. Proponents of this argument claim that additional interventions such as the exclusionary rule are not necessary because police officers are already held to an appropriate standard of accountability.

  • In the 2006 Supreme Court case Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Antonin Scalia authored an opinion against the use of the exclusionary rule in a knock-and-announce case. Justice Scalia wrote, “Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. Even as long ago as 1980 we felt it proper to ‘assume’ that unlawful police behavior would ‘be dealt with appropriately’ by the authorities, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733-734, n. 5 (1980), but we now have increasing evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. There have been ‘wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police officers.’ S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950-1990, p. 51 (1993). Numerous sources are now available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime for internal discipline.”[19]

Arguments about discipline and accountability for police officers

Argument: Police organizational culture has a role in creating and perpetuating police violence

This argument states that police culture has a role in creating and perpetuating violence by failing to punish officers accused of misconduct and make organizational changes, such as more robust misconduct procedures and better-outlined officer expectations, that would result in accountability and better relations with the public.

  • Law professor Barbara E. Armacost wrote, “Punishing individual cops will not cure the problem of police violence if systemic features of the police organization permit, sanction, or even encourage the officers' violent behavior. Like the individual-specific explanations that police departments offer for the misbehavior of their members, current remedies are inadequate to the extent that they ignore or undervalue institutional and organizational factors.”[20]
  • When discussing police culture, the Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform wrote, “We believe there must be a fundamental reconceptualization of both the mission of police and the culture in which that mission is carried out. Policing can be about respecting individuals and not using force. It is an ethical approach to policing that requires incentives positive outcomes rather than deficits that rewards citations and force.”[9]
  • Scholars George Wood, Daria Roithmayr, and Andrew V. Papachristos argued, “[P]olice misconduct, like deviance more generally, is a networked phenomenon. Beyond individual bad apples and bad institutions, officer networks appear to play an important role in the emergence and possibly even persistence of misconduct.”[21]
  • Law professor Kate Levine wrote, “Police organizations pressure officers to ‘move on’ without questioning actions they have taken, and to ‘contain risk.’ According to Armacost, these pressures ‘escalate[] [interactions] and reduce[] the possibilities for preventing harm. In other words, police organizations’ complexity and tight coupling means that they are particularly susceptible to system errors and that back-end, individual-blame solutions are particularly unlikely to prevent future errors from happening. This is particularly true because such individual solutions prevent larger systemic reflection or review.”[22]

Argument: Procedures for determining discipline must be fair and consistent

This argument posits that police departments should have clear policies and procedures for determining discipline. Proponents of this argument claim that procedures should include a standardized process for weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in disciplinary decisions.

  • The Chicago Officer of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report in 2022 recommending changes to the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) disciplinary process to promote what the OIG refers to as fairness and consistency: "The current system for investigating allegations of misconduct by CPD members, recommending discipline, challenging that discipline, and finally implementing discipline is a complex one governed by numerous policies and procedures, involving multiple agencies and actors. The system is not adequately transparent to those involved or to the public. Without clearer policies and standards to govern decision making and inter-agency coordination, the system as it currently functions risks procedural inconsistency and unfairness in the formulation of disciplinary recommendations and in Police Board reviews of issued discipline; absent adequate procedural controls or guidelines for developing disciplinary recommendations, sanctions imposed on CPD members might be arbitrary and unconstrained, fundamentally undermining the legitimacy of and public confidence in the disciplinary system. There are important changes that the agencies can make both unilaterally and coordinately to materially improve the consistency and fairness of the process by which CPD members are disciplined."[23]

Argument: Disciplinary decisions should be determined on a case-by-case basis

This argument posits that disciplinary cases should be considered on a case-by-case basis and disciplinary recommendations should consider all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors.

  • The New Paltz, New York, police department published a notice outlining its discipline matrix, which aligns with its CBA to provide guidance on disciplinary standards. The notice outlined potential mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in disciplinary matters including, but not limited to, prior disciplinary history, the training and expertise of the respondent, the motivation for the action, and the nature of the event: "Given the complexity of some events and significant permutations across fact patterns, it is not possible to predetermine the outcome or the relative weights of potential aggravating and mitigating factors for every disciplinary matter. In select areas of misconduct, presumptive penalties for common aggravating factors are delineated, but even in these cases, there may be additional aggravating factors or mitigating factors that bear upon the ultimate penalty recommendation."[24]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ↑ U.S. Department of Justice, "Realizing the Potential of Technology in Policing," 2015
  2. ↑ North Carolina Law Review, "Race, Policing, and Technology," 2017
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 U.S. Department of Justice, "Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras," 2014
  4. ↑ Criminal Justice and Behavior, "'Contagious Accountability': A Global Multisite Randomized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police," 2017
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Police Accountability Task Force, "Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust between the Chicago Police and the Communities they Serve," 2016
  6. ↑ Crime & Delinquency, "Examining the Risk of Recurring Use of Force Incidents Among Newly Hired Police Officers," 2021
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Justice Research and Policy, "Searching for the Denominator: Problems with Police Traffic Stop Data and an Early Warning System Solution," 2001
  8. ↑ Council on Criminal Justice, "The Path to Progress Five Priorities for Police Reform," 2021
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform, "A Better Path Forward for Criminal Justice," 2021
  10. ↑ Saint Louis University Public Law Review, "Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure," 2012
  11. ↑ U.S. Department of Justice, "Citizen Review of Police," 2001
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 University of Pittsburgh School of Law, "How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce - or Replace - The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule," 2009
  13. ↑ Ohio State Law Review Journal, "Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of Prevention?" 2019
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 SSRN, "A Tale of Two Committees: Comparing Police Officer Standard and Training (POST) Bodies," 2023
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 European Journal of Criminology, "Wearing body cameras increases assaults against officers and does not reduce police use of force: Results from a global multi-site experiment," 2016
  16. ↑ Crime & Delinquency, "The Effect of Sanctions on Police Misconduct," 2014
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 National Institute of Justice, "Police Discipline: A Case for Change," 2011
  18. ↑ Criminology and Public Policy, "Can You Build a Better Cop?" 2018
  19. ↑ U.S. Supreme Court, "Hudson v. Michigan," 2006
  20. ↑ The George Washington Law Review, "Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct," 2004
  21. ↑ Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, "The Network Structure of Police Misconduct," 2019
  22. ↑ Washington University Law Review, "Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts," 2021
  23. ↑ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Fairness and Consistency in the Disciplinary Process for Chicago Police Department Members," 2022
  24. ↑ New Palz Police Department, "New Paltz Police Department Discipline Matrix," accessed September 25, 2024
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