Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago
 | |
| Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago | |
| Reference: 166 U.S. 226 | |
| Term: 1896 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: November 6, 9, 1896 Decided: March 1, 1897 | |
| Outcome | |
| Supreme Court of Illinois reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Henry Brown • Stephen J. Field • Horace Gray • John Marshall Harlan • Rufus Peckham • George Shiras • Edward White | |
| Dissenting | |
| David Brewer | |
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago was decided on March 1, 1897, by the U.S. Supreme Court, which incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The case concerned an Illinois law that permitted the city of Chicago to condemn a corporation's land for a street expansion project and compensate the company with one dollar. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Illinois Supreme Court's decision and ruled the one-dollar sum did not amount to just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.[1]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The ruling was the first to make a clause from the Bill of Rights binding on state governments through the Due Process Clause.[2]
Background
Legal background
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At the time of the dispute, Article 2, Section 13, of the Illinois state constitution provided that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law. The fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to the use for which it is taken."[3]
Further, a provision under Article 5 of the Illinois general statutes stated that "the city council shall have power, by condemnation or otherwise, to extend any street, alley or highway over or across, or to construct any sewer under or through any railroad track, right of way or land of any railroad company (within the corporate limits); but where no compensation is made to such railroad company, the city shall restore such railroad track, right of way or land to its former state, or in a sufficient manner not to have impaired its usefulness."[3]
Case background
On October 9, 1880, the city of Chicago announced by ordinance a plan to widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street. This plan required the city to cross through parcels of land owned by individuals as well as "certain parts of the right of way" in Chicago owned by the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Company, which was a corporate entity in the state of Illinois. Ten years later, on November 12, 1890, a petition was filed in Cook County circuit court "for the condemnation of the lots, pieces, or parcels of land and property proposed to be taken or damaged for the proposed improvement, and praying that the just compensation required for private property taken or damaged be ascertained by a jury." The individual property owners and the railroad were named defendants in the city's petition.[3]
Following civil proceedings, a jury set fixed amounts of just compensation for each of the individual owners, but "fixed one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company in respect of those parts of its right of way described in the city's petition as necessary to be used for the purposes of the proposed street."[3]
Upon receiving the one-dollar amount, the railroad company moved for a new trial, but the motion was overruled. The jury's award was made final and executed. The Supreme Court of Illinois later affirmed the judgment on appeal.[3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was conducted on November 6 and November 9, 1896.[1]
Decision
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois was reversed.[3]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice John Marshall Harlan said the railroad claimed a violation by the city of Chicago under the Fourteenth Amendment's protections of due process, but that the city claimed due process was satisfied in giving the railroad the opportunity to be heard during a proceeding prescribed by the Illinois Constitution and Illinois law.[3][1]
Following this review, Harlan provided the context of the case: "It is therefore necessary to inquire at the outset whether 'due process of law' requires compensation to be made or secured to the owner of private property taken for public use, and also as to the circumstances under which the final judgment of the highest court of a state in a proceeding instituted to condemn such property for public use may be reviewed by this court."[3][1]
Justice Harlan argued that, while the state's constitution did not deprive the railroad of any right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the amendment was applicable to "all the instrumentalities of the state - to its legislative, executive and judicial authorities." Thus, any agency or actor acting under state authority was bound by the Fourteenth Amendment.[3][1]
Harlan proceeded to reject the city's claim that due process was satisfied by virtue of the railroad being given a proceeding to challenge the city's actions, saying "in determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to form."[3][1]
Justice Harlan quoted the court's opinion in Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U.S. 97, 102): "Can a state make anything due process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the states is of no avail, or has no application, where the invasion of private rights is effected under the forms of state legislation."[4] Justice Harlan continued, "The same question could be propounded, and the same answer should be made, in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent with the requirement of due process of law."[3]
Was just compensation a necessary element of due process?
In contextualizing the issue of due process in this way, Justice Harlan argued that just compensation for the taking of private property by a state actor was critical to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and said the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the case:[3]
| “ |
If compensation for private property taken for public use is an essential element of due process of law as ordained by the fourteenth amendment, then the final judgment of a state court, under the authority of which the property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the state, within the meaning of that amendment ... In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the state or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the state is a denial by that state of a right secured to the owner by that instrument. [5] |
” |
Was the railroad justly compensated?
Justice Harlan proceeded to consider whether the railroad was justly compensated in accordance with the Illinois' courts decisions:
| “ |
...in the present case ... the state court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and being under a duty to guard and protect the constitutional right here asserted, the final judgment ought not to be held to be in violation of the due process of law enjoined by the fourteenth amendment, unless by its rulings upon questions of law the company was prevented from obtaining substantially any compensation. [5] |
” |
Justice Harlan referenced that the Supreme Court of Illinois held that when a city council, under the Illinois law passed on April 10, 1872, extends a street across either railroad tracks or right of way, that "it does not condemn the land of the railroad company nor prevent the use of the tracks and right of way."
Based on this interpretation, Justice Harlan agreed with the Supreme Court of Illinois that "the land as such was not taken, the railroad company was not prevented from using it, and its use for all the purposes for which it was held by the railroad company was interfered with only so far as its exclusive enjoyment for purposes of railroad tracks was diminished in value by subjecting the land within the crossing to public use as a street."
As such, "the company is to be compensated for the diminution in its right to use its tracks caused by the existence and use of the street."
Finding that this amount of compensation would indeed be negligible, that the rights of the company were relatively unimpeded in this dispute, and that the company was indeed justly compensated for the land taken, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois.[3]
Dissent
Writing alone in dissent, Justice David Brewer agreed with the majority that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections of due process included just compensation for public takings of private property and that, accordingly, a state court's judgment on these issues also must be brought under federal court adjudication.
For Justice Brewer, the issue was that, having agreed on these points, the court failed to actually provide just compensation in this case.[6]
| “ |
It is disappointing, after reading so strong a declaration of the protecting reach of the fourteenth amendment, and the power and duty of this court in enforcing it as against action by a state by any of its officers and agencies, to find sustained a judgment, depriving a party - even though a railroad corporation - of valuable property without any, or at least only nominal, compensation ... It is no answer to say that the company only uses this piece of ground for its tracks and the passage of its trains, and may still use it in the same way. It is not the present use, but the possibilities of use, which determine the value of property ... These propositions seem to me so absolutely clear that the mere statement of them ought to carry conviction. And after a declaration by this court that a state may not, through any of its departments, take private property for public use without just compensation, I cannot assent to a judgment which, in effect, permits that to be done. [5] |
” |
Impact
The court's opinion marked the first time that a provision of the Bill of Rights, here the provision of just compensation for the taking of private property (see also: eminent domain), was made binding on state governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant portion of the clause said, "...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The court decided that to deny certain liberties would deny due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.[2]
The Supreme Court's practice of making certain provisions of the Bill of Rights binding on state governments through the Due Process Clause is known as incorporation. Thus, when the Supreme Court makes a protection from the Bill of Rights binding on a state, the court is said to have incorporated that right to state governments.[2]
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 Justia, "Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago," accessed June 2, 2016
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Cornell Law School, "Incorporation Doctrine," accessed July 20, 2022
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago," decided March 1, 1897
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Davidson v. City of New Orleans, decided October 1, 1877
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Cite error: Invalid
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