Munn v. Illinois
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| Munn v. Illinois | |
| Reference: 94 US 113 | |
| Term: 1877 | |
| Outcome | |
| Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Joseph Bradley • Nathan Clifford • David Davis • Ward Hunt • Noah Haynes Swayne • Morrison Waite | |
| Dissenting | |
| Stephen Johnson Field • William Strong | |
Munn v. Illinois is a case decided on March 1, 1877, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 7-2 that states may regulate the use of private property when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good.[1]
Why it matters: The court's opinion allowed state governments to regulate private industries that affect the public interest. Justice Waite argued in the majority opinion that the right to property does exist, but that states may regulate property in cases where regulation of property becomes necessary for the public good. He cited a legal doctrine of public property and argued that property, "when clothed with a public interest ... ceases to be juris privati only."[2] To learn more about the legacy of the case, click here.
Background
In 1871 the Illinois State Legislature set a maximum rate that private companies could charge for the storage and transport of agricultural products. A Chicago grain firm, Munn and Scott, was found guilty of violating the maximum rate requirement but appealed the conviction, claiming that the Illinois regulation was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. Munn argued that the protection of the right to property under the due process of law was protected by the Fifth Amendment, incorporated into the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.[3]
A state trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state of Illinois, finding that the state government had the authority to regulate grain storage in this instance because grain storage had a significant effect on the public.
Oral argument
Oral argument was conducted on January 13 and January 17, 1876. The Supreme Court decided the case on March 1, 1876.
Decision
The court voted 7-2 to affirm the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. Justice Morrison Waite wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Joseph Bradley, Nathan Clifford, David Davis, Ward Hunt, Noah Haynes Swayne, Samuel Freeman Miller.
Justice Stephen Johnson Field wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice William Strong.[2]
Opinion
Majority opinion
Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice Morrison Waite held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the state of Illinois from regulating charges for grain storage.[2]
Justice Waite agreed that the right to property was protected under the Fifth Amendment, incorporated into the states in the Fourteenth Amendment:
| “ | The Constitution contains no definition of the word 'deprive,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine its signification, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the effect which usage has given it, when employed in the same or a like connection.
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” |
However, Justice Waite held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the State of Illinois from regulating charges for grain storage facilities because a citizen forfeits the right to do whatever he wishes with his property when he enters civil society:[2]
| “ |
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. 'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.' [4] |
” |
Justice Waite ruled that although grain storage was private property, Munn's grain elevators ceased to be juris privati because price gauging could have significant effects on the state market:
| “ |
Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested. 'New Jersey Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank', 6 How. 382. Their business is, therefore, 'affected with a public interest,' within the meaning of the doctrine which Lord Hale has so forcibly stated. But we need not go further. Enough has already been said to show that, when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to public regulation. It remains only to ascertain whether the warehouses of these plaintiffs in error, and the business which is carried on there, come within the operation of this principle. [4] |
” |
Dissenting opinion
Justice Stephen Johnson Field wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice William Strong. Justice Field argued that the majority's opinion was subversive to property rights:
| “ |
The principle upon which the opinion of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference, and is in conflict with the authorities cited in its support. [4] |
” |
Justice Field argued that the right to property was protected from state regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the grain storage facility owned by Munn and Scott did not cease to be private property, according to precedent regarding private property. Field argued that the majority opinion presented the danger of allowing all sorts of private property to be declared public property, and property owners abused by governmental authority:
| “ | But it would seem from its opinion that the court holds that property loses something of its private character when employed in such a way as to be generally useful. The doctrine declared is that property 'becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large;' and from such clothing the right of the legislature is deduced to control the use of the property, and to determine the compensation which the owner may receive for it. When Sir Matthew Hale, and the sages of the law in his day, spoke of property as affected by a public interest, and ceasing from that cause to be juris privati solely, that is, ceasing to be held merely in private right, they referred to property dedicated by the owner to public announced, the legislature may which was granted by the government, or in connection with which special privileges were conferred. Unless the property was thus dedicated, or some right bestowed by the government was held with the property, either by specific grant or by prescription of so long a time as to imply a grant originally, the property was not affected by any public interest so as to be taken out of the category of property held in private right. But it is not in any such sense that the terms 'clothing property with a public interest' are used in this case. From the nature of the business under consideration—the storage of grain—which, in any sense in which the words can be used, is a private business, in which the public are interested only as they are interested in the storage of other products of the soil, or in articles of manufacture, it is clear that the court intended to declare that, whenever one devotes his property to a business which is useful to the public,—'affects the community at large,'—the legislature can regulate the compensation which the owner may receive for its use, and for his own services in connection with it. | ” |
Field ended his dissent by arguing that if the majority opinion is sound law then no protection of property is safe, thus endangering the principles of republican government:
| “ | If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the principles upon which our republican government is founded, or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against such invasion of private rights, all property and all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature. ... the doctrine which allows the legislature to interfere with and regulate the charges which the owners of property thus employed shall make for its use, that is, the rates at which all these different kinds of business shall be carried on, has never before been asserted, so far as I am aware, by any judicial tribunal in the United States. | ” |
Legacy
The court's opinion in this case allowed state regulatory power to extend to private industries that affect the public interest. According to Justice Waite's opinion, grain storage facilities were subject to state regulation and maximum charges because they served some public use. Furthermore, Justice Waite declared that even though Congress is granted control over interstate commerce, a state could take action in the public interest without impairing federal control.[3]
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Munn v. Illinois, decided March 1, 1877
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Justia, Munn v. Illinois, decided March 1, 1877
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Britannica, Munn v. Illinois, accessed July 26, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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