"Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History" by Ann Woolhandler (1991)

What is deference in the context of the administrative state? Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here. |
Administrative State |
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Five Pillars of the Administrative State |
• Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
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Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History (1991), a law review article by Ann Woolhandler, is about how 19th century courts gave varying amounts of deference to agency decisions because they wanted to promote commerce and they had a limited view of federal agency duties.[1] Woolhandler disagrees with scholars who claim that the 19th century U.S. Supreme Court almost always deferred to administrative actions.[1] She also argues that there might not be a simple and ideal balance of power between agencies and courts on which to build administrative law.[1] Throughout the paper, Woolhandler uses three forms of judicial review to analyze how deferential the court was in different situations.
Author
Ann Woolhandler
Ann Woolhandler became a faculty member of the University of Virginia School of Law in January 2002.[2] She previously taught law at Tulane University, Harvard, Boston University, and the University of Cincinnati.[2]
The following is a summary of Woolhandler's education:[2]
- J.D., Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., 1978
- B.A., Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1975
Introduction
- See also: Judicial deference
Woohandler begins her article arguing that her historical survey has practical consequences for contemporary administrative law cases. She summarizes the point in the following way:[1]
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She argues that courts exercised some delegated lawmaking power during the 19th century and up until the U.S. Supreme Court "transferred significant lawmaking authority from the courts to the agencies" in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984).[1]
Three Models of Judicial Review
Woolhandler describes three potential approaches to judicial review of actions taken by the other branches of government: de novo, res judicata, and error.[1] She uses these models throughout her article to examine different court precedents to see how courts chose whether to defer to agency decisions.
- 1) De novo review: Under this model, Woolhandler argues that "courts accord no finality to administrative determinations of law or fact. Instead, they redetermine all issues of law and fact that executive officers have previously determined."[1] In addition, she argues that power flows to judges and juries who review administrative actions in a de novo system.[1]
- 2) Res judicata: Under this model, Woolhandler argues that "courts accord finality to the decisions of administrative officers on issues of both law and fact."[1] She adds, "[T]he judiciary treats determinations of the executive branch as it would treat decisions of a court in a separate court system. Judicial review under a res judicata model thus focuses on "jurisdictional" issues; if the original decision maker had jurisdiction to decide the issue, the earlier decision is given conclusive effect and is upheld. Because courts accord increased deference to executive decisions under this res judicata model, more fact finding and lawmaking power rests in the executive than under the de novo model."[1]
- 3) Error review: Woolhandler argues that this model is an approximate midpoint between the de novo and res judicata systems.[1] With an error review system, reviewing courts act "acts as an ordinary appellate court would act toward a trial court. A court would accord deference to agency fact-findings under the error model, but would conduct de novo review of issues of law."[1]
Conclusion
After examining several cases throughout the 19th century, Woolhandler concludes that changing legal, political, and economic trends led courts to change how much deference to grant agency decisions.[1] She argues that "the judicial desire to promote commerce was also a significant and probably more determinative" factor for courts deciding whether to defer to agency decisions than the question of whether agencies were administering privileges or infringing upon rights.[1]
See also
- Ballotpedia's administrative state coverage
- Separation of powers
- Administrative Procedure Act
- Judicial deference: a timeline
- Taxonomy of arguments about judicial deference
- Scholarly work related to judicial deference to administrative agencies
Court cases:
Full text
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 Administrative Law Review, "Judicial Deference to Administrative Action," 1991
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 University of Virginia School of Law, "Ann Woolhandler," accessed May 29, 2019
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.