"The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference" by Jonathan Siegel (2018)
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"The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference" (2018) is a working article as of May 2018 by American law professor Jonathan R. Siegel that aims to put forth a defense of Chevron deference within a constitutional framework. Siegel specifically seeks to defend Chevron deference from the claim that the deference regime violates Article III of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in the courts. He also addresses other contemporary critiques of Chevron, including arguments that the deference regime facilitates bias in favor of agencies and violates the nondelegation doctrine.[1]
Author
Jonathan R. Siegel
Jonathan R. Siegel is an American law professor. As of May 2018, Siegel held the title of F. Elwood and Eleanor Davis Research Professor of Law at George Washington University. Prior to joining the George Washington University faculty in 1995, Siegel worked as a member of the appellate staff for the U.S. Department of Justice and as a law clerk for Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. According to his faculty profile page on the George Washington University website, Siegel's primary areas of interest are civil procedure, federal jurisdiction, administrative law, and intellectual property.[2]
Below is a summary of Siegel's education and career:[2]
- Academic degrees:
- B.A., Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- J.D., Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut
- Law professor and legal scholar
- Former practicing attorney and law clerk
Chevron and its critics
- See also: Chevron deference
Siegel opens the paper by presenting contemporary arguments against Chevron deference—a principle in administrative law that compels federal courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that they administer. The first argument, championed by Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch as well as certain members of Congress, claims that Article III of the Constitution vests judicial power in the courts and, therefore, prohibits courts from deferring to agency interpretations of statutes.[1]
The second argument, backed by Columbia law professor Philip Hamburger, contends that Chevron deference violates the Constitution's Due Process Clause by "requiring judges to exercise systematically biased judgment in favor of the government," according to Siegel's analysis.[1]
Lastly, Seigel identifies an argument supported by Cornell professor Cynthia Farina, who claims that Chevron deference violates the nondelegation doctrine by permitting Congress to delegate legislative power to administrative agencies and concentrating authority in the executive branch.[1]
Defense of Chevron
Interpretation
Siegel argues that judges do not shrink from their constitutional responsibility to interpret the law by adhering to Chevron deference. Instead, Siegel claims that the interpretation of a statute as a delegation of authority to an administrative agency still constitutes an exercise of judicial interpretation:[1]
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Forms of delegation
Siegel makes a comparison between constutitional delegations of authority to Congress and congressional delegations of authority to administrative agencies to support his defense of Chevron deference. He draws on the Census Clause and the Apportionment Clause as the grounds for his comparison:[1]
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Other critiques
- See also: Nondelegation doctrine
Siegel devotes the remainder of the article to addressing Hamburger and Farina's earlier critiques. Regarding Hamburger's claim of judicial bias, Siegel argues that "no one would claim that courts are unconstitutionally showing bias in favor of agencies ... The agencies have the advantage simply because courts will necessarily permit the agencies to exercise the power conferred on them by statute." Siegel further claims that while Farina's contention that Chevron deference violates the nondelegation doctrine may have some merit, it does not demonstrate that Chevron results in negative consequences:[1]
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See also
- Ballotpedia's administrative state coverage
- Chevron deference
- Separation of powers
- Nondelegation doctrine
Full text
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 Social Science Research Network, "The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference" 2018
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 George Washington University, "Jonathan R. Siegel," accessed May 17, 2018
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.