Cohens v. Virginia

![]() | |
Cohens v. Virginia | |
Reference: 19 U.S. 264 | |
Term: 1821 | |
Important Dates | |
Argued: February 18, 1821 Decided: March 5, 1821 | |
Outcome | |
Borough Court of Norfolk affirmed | |
Majority | |
Chief Justice John Marshall • William Johnson • H. Brockholst Livingston • Thomas Todd • Gabriel Duvall • Joseph Story Absent: Bushrod Washington |
Cohens v. Virginia is a case decided on March 5, 1821, by the United States Supreme Court that primarily concerned the court's jurisdiction to hear disputes related to criminal cases under state law if questions of federal law or constitutional rights were involved. The Supreme Court asserted its power to decide such cases under Article 3, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution and argued sovereign immunity for states under the Eleventh Amendment did not apply because the Constitution granted the court authority to adjudicate such topics. The Supreme Court then upheld the decision of the local court, holding that a Virginia state law prohibiting out-of-state lottery ticket sales did not conflict with a federal law creating a national lottery in the District of Columbia.[1]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court asserted its authority to hear disputes related to criminal cases under state law if questions of federal law or constitutional rights were involved. Writing for the court, Chief Justice John Marshall argued that if constitutional federal laws were the law of the land, the Supreme Court should have the power to review potentially conflicting state laws under Article 3, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution.[2]
Background
Leading up to the case, Virginia law prohibited the sale of lottery tickets from outside the state. Congress had established a national lottery, which the municipal government of the District of Columbia administered.[2]
Philip and Mendes Cohen owned a firm that sold tickets for the national lottery in Norfolk, Virginia. Local officials charged the brothers under the state's law on June 1, 1820. A local court convicted the Cohens and fined them $100.[2]
The brothers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, claiming the federal law establishing the national lottery allowed for ticket sales in Virginia, in accordance with the Supremacy Clause. The lawyers for the state of Virginia argued the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment to decide the case.[2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on February 18, 1821. The court released its decision regarding its jurisdiction March 2, 1821, and released its decision upholding the local court's ruling on March 5, 1821.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-0 (with Justice Bushrod Washington absent) that Article 3, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution granted the Supreme Court jurisdiction in criminal state cases that involved questions of federal laws or rights. After establishing its jurisdiction, the court held Virginia's out-of-state lottery law was not void under the federal law establishing the national lottery.[1]
Opinion
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the court, argued that the Constitution gave the federal judiciary jurisdiction in any cases related to matters of the Constitution or federal law, regardless of the parties involved. He said:
“ | That the United States form, for many and for most important purposes, a single nation has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are one, and the government, which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes, her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared that, in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The Constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire -- for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate. In a government so constituted, is it unreasonable that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the legislature? That department can decide on the validity of the Constitution or law of a State, if it be repugnant to the Constitution or to a law of the United States. Is it unreasonable that it should also be empowered to decide on the judgment of a State tribunal enforcing such unconstitutional law? Is it so very unreasonable as to furnish a justification for controlling the words of the Constitution? We think it is not. We think that, in a government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of government, in making all its departments supreme so far as respects those objects and so far as is necessary to their attainment. The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the Constitution or laws of the United States is, we believe, essential to the attainment of those objects.[1][3] | ” |
With the Supreme Court's jurisdiction established, Marshall affirmed the lower court's decision and asserted Virginia's law prohibiting the sale of out-of-state lottery tickets did not conflict with the national law establishing the national lottery. The national law, he held, was directed at the District of Columbia alone and did not supersede Virginia's law in a manner that would permit the Cohen brothers to sell national lottery tickets in Norfolk.
“ | In inquiring into the extent of the power granted to the Corporation of Washington, we must first examine the words of the grant. We find in them no expression which looks beyond the limits of the City. The powers granted are all of them local in their nature, and all of them such as would, in the common course of things, if not necessarily, be exercised within the city. The subject on which Congress was employed when framing this act was a local subject; it was not the establishment of a lottery, but the formation of a separate body for the management of the internal affairs of the City, for its internal government, for its police. Congress must have considered itself as delegating to this corporate body powers for these objects, and for these objects solely. In delegating these powers, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the mind of the legislature was directed to the City alone, to the action of the being they were creating within the City, and not to any extraterritorial operations. In describing the powers of such a being, no words of limitation need be used. They are limited by the subject. But, if it be intended to give its acts a binding efficacy beyond the natural limits of its power, and within the jurisdiction of a distinct power, we should expect to find, in the language of the incorporating act, some words indicating such intention. Without such words, we cannot suppose that Congress designed to give to the acts of the Corporation any other effect beyond its limits than attends every act having the sanction of local law when anything depends upon it which is to be transacted elsewhere.[1][3] | ” |
See also
- Nondelegation doctrine
- Separation of powers
- The Taft Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Justia, "Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)," accessed June 7, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Google Books, "John Marshall: Definer of a Nation," accessed June 7, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
|
Federalism court cases, Eleventh Amendment Federalism court cases, sovereign immunity