Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
 | |
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. | |
| Reference: 509 U.S. 579 | |
| Term: 1992 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 30, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit vacated and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Harry Blackmun • Byron White • Sandra Day O'Connor • Antonin Scalia • Anthony Kennedy • David Souter • Clarence Thomas • Chief Justice William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens | |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a United States Supreme Court case that recognized what kind of scientific testimony would be admissible in federal court following the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence.[1][2] The court ruled that expert witnesses must provide scientifically valid reasoning that applies to the facts of the case for their testimony to be admissible in court.[1] This case arose when the parents of two children with serious birth defects sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the birth defects developed because of an anti-nausea medication marketed by the company. The parents of the afflicted children cited eight experts who contested the results of previous studies that had concluded that the medication did not pose a risk of birth defects.[1]
Why it matters: The ruling established the Daubert standard for admissible scientific evidence. That standard governs how judges evaluate scientific testimony given by expert witnesses and requires scientifically valid reasoning that applies to the facts of the case at hand. Lawyers file hundreds of Daubert motions every year to try and get trial judges to exclude testimony from expert witnesses based on questionable scientific methods. Judges must weigh the scientific validity of evidence in order to decide whether to allow juries to hear it.[1][3][4][5]
Legal scholars disagree about whether to apply the Daubert standard to scientific evidence used by administrative agencies during the regulatory process. Some scholars claim that Daubert scrutiny would keep what they describe as junk science from influencing public policy decisions. Other scholars contend that applying Daubert to agencies risks allowing judges to make policy choices left to the discretion of those agencies. Click here for more information.[6][7]
Timeline
The following timeline details key events in this case:
- June 28, 1993: U.S. Supreme Court decision announced
- March 30, 1993: Oral argument
- December 20, 1991: The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's ruling
- December 14, 1989: The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
Background
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The case
The parents of two children with serious birth defects sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the birth defects developed because of an anti-nausea medication marketed by the company. Extensive statistical studies conducted on humans did not show that the medication was a risk factor for human birth defects. The parents of the afflicted children cited eight experts who contested the previous studies. The experts looked at animal studies, chemical analyses and an unpublished re-analysis of the statistical human studies and argued that the medication could cause birth defects.[1]
The District Court ruled in favor of the Merrell Dow company based on expert testimony about published scientific literature on the subject. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court and cited Frye v. United States to say that the testimony offered in favor of the parents' position was inadmissible because it was not "generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community." The Ninth Circuit's decision was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.[1]
Frye standard
Before Daubert, many lower courts applied the Frye test to questions about whether certain scientific evidence was admissible in a trial. The Frye test required admissible evidence to come from a scientific principle or discovery that was "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Following the 1923 Frye decision, there were many debates about the merits of the test and how to apply it to developing scientific discoveries in a legal setting.[1]
Question presented
| Question presented: What is the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial?[1] |
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on March 30, 1993.[1]
Audio
A recording of the oral argument is available here.
Transcript
Transcript of the oral argument:[8]
Outcome
The unanimous Supreme Court decided to vacate and remand the lower court's ruling. The majority opinion was written by Justice Harry Blackmun. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that Justice John Paul Stevens joined.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, passed by Congress, overturned the Frye standard for determining what kind of scientific evidence was admissible in a court. Citing Rule 702, the Court held that Congress spoke directly to the question in the Daubert case:[1]
| “ | 'If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.'
|
” |
Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced Frye, the Court articulated limits on purportedly scientific evidence. In the Court's view, admissible scientific evidence had to be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and amount to more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Further, Rule 702 requires that admissible scientific evidence be relevant to the fact in question in a case. In the face of fears that their ruling would protect irrational pseudoscience, the Court argued that "vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."[1]
Other opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part from the judgment. He agreed with the Court that the Frye standard for scientific evidence did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. He disagreed with the Court's decision to offer general observations about the rules because he thought the observations were vague and abstract. Instead, he would rather let future cases resolve any further questions.[1]
Impact
Following the decision in Daubert, some scholars have argued that its standards for expert testimony should apply to the administrative process. In a law review article re-published in 2016, lawyers Paul S. Miller and Bert W. Rein argued that Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "require federal courts reviewing administrative actions to enforce the same 'gatekeeper' standards as those courts now require when reviewing a trial court's treatment of scientific and technical evidence." Miller and Rein went on to say they "see no reason why 'junk science' or unreliable technical information should provide legally adequate support for an agency's decision in any type of administrative action, and recent decisions show increasing judicial support for that position."[6]
Other scholars reject the application of a regulatory Daubert standard. David E. Bernstein argued in a 2015 law review article that "requiring inexpert judges to police regulatory science used by expert agencies is very different from requiring inexpert judges to police the testimony of adversarial experts" presented to juries. Bernstein also claimed that [j]udicial interference in scientific decision making by agencies risks having judges making not just evidentiary determinations about the quality of evidence presented, but intertwined policy decisions outside the scope of judicial authority." Finally, he claimed that the speculative nature of risk assessments requires a different test than the Daubert standard, which was meant to remove speculation from courtrooms.[7]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 JUSTIA, "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)," accessed September 5, 2018
- ↑ Oyez, "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," accessed September 5, 2018
- ↑ Wex, "Daubert Standard," accessed October 25, 2018
- ↑ American Bar Association, "10 Tips for Posturing Your Case for Successful Daubert Challenge," accessed October 25, 2018
- ↑ USLegal, "Daubert Motion," accessed October 25, 2018
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Touro Law Review "'Gatekeeping' Agency Reliance on Scientific and Technical Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process," Paul S. Miller and Bert W. Rein, March 2016
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 George Mason Law Review, "What to Do About Federal Agency Science: Some Doubts About Regulatory Daubert," David E. Bernstein, 2015
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States," March 30, 1993
- ↑ Internal citations and quotations have been omitted
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
