City of Boerne v. Flores
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| City of Boerne v. Flores | |
| Reference: 521 US 507 | |
| Term: 1997 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: February 19, 1997 Decided: June 25, 1997 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Clarence Thomas • John Paul Stevens • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Anthony Kennedy • William Rehnquist • Antonin Scalia | |
| Dissenting | |
| Stephen Breyer • David Souter • Sandra Day O'Connor | |
City of Boerne v. Flores was a case decided 6-3 on June 25, 1997, by the United States Supreme Court holding that the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) violated the Fourteenth Amendment by substantially burdening state and local governments. The court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision found that the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act that aimed to protect interests in religious freedom to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause and that Congress cannot substantially burden the free exercise of religion upon states. To read more about the impact of City of Boerne v. Flores, click here.
Background
In the historic district of Boerne, Texas, St. Peter's Catholic Church had become too small for its congregation. Patrick F. Flores, the archbishop of San Antonio, applied for a permit in 1993 to expand the church to allow for a larger congregation. The San Antonio city council denied the permit due to a city ordinance that sought to preserve the historic district where the church was located. Flores filed suit against the city, arguing that the denial of the permit violated the 1 993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which states that a “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” The act was applicable to both the federal and state governments.
The RFRA was passed three years after the court case Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), in which the Supreme Court held that a state could deny unemployment benefits to members of a Native American Church who had been terminated by their employers because they ingested peyote for cultural purposes. The court in this case found that laws that are not biased toward a specific religion may be applied by the respective government entity. Congress passed the RFRA in response to the case, making it harder for state and local governments to override religious freedoms. To extend RFRA to state governments, Congress relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s fifth section, which designated Congress with the power to enforce due process before depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, and equal protection under the law.
A federal district court in Texas ruled in favor of Boerne, holding that the RFRA was unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision by finding the act constitutional. The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of certiorari.[2][3]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on February 19, 1997. The case was decided on June 25, 1997.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-3 to reverse the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia joined the opinion of the court except in Part III-A-l. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion with Justice Scalia. Justice Antonin Scalia also wrote his own concurring opinion in part. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen Breyer, and David Souter each wrote dissenting opinions.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Chief Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the court, argued that the RFRA contradicts the Constitutional principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance by substantially burdening state governments:[2]
| “ | The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith. Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry. [4] | ” |
| —Anthony Kennedy, majority opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores[2] | ||
Concurring opinions
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that the RFRA violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by granting governmental preference for religious entities:[2]
| “ | In my opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a 'law respecting an establishment of religion' that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.[4] | ” |
| —John Paul Stevens, concurring opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores[2] | ||
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, criticizing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's interpretation of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), arguing there is no historical evidence to support that the Court should be the entity deciding local zoning laws:[2]
| “ | The issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome of those concrete cases. For example, shall it be the determination of this Court, or rather of the people, whether (as the dissent apparently believes, post, at 547) church construction will be exempt from zoning laws? The historical evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the people.[4] | ” |
| —Antonin Scalia, concurring opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) and arguing it misinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause:[2]
| “ | The Court's analysis of whether RFRA is a constitutional exercise of Congress' § 5 power, set forth in Part III-B of its opinion, is premised on the assumption that Smith correctly interprets the Free Exercise Clause. This is an assumption that I do not accept. I continue to believe that Smith adopted an improper standard for deciding free exercise claims.[4] | ” |
| —Sandra Day O'Connor, dissenting opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores[2] | ||
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, concurring in part with Justice O'Connor's dissent that Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith should be reconsidered. He delineated from O'Connor's opinion by arguing it may be necessary to consider the question of whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize Congress to enact the RFRA.[2]
Justice David Souter, authored a dissenting opinion, arguing against the precedential value of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith when deciding City of Boerne v. Flores and the applicability of the RFRA against state and local governments.[2]
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
City of Boerne v. Flores established the precedent that Congress may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions and that the RFRA overly restricts states' freedom to enforce ordinances in a manner which they deem most appropriate.[1][2]
See also
- The Rehnquist Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
- Federalism
- Free Exercise Clause
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "City of Boerne v. Flores," accessed September 19, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 Justia, "City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)," accessed August 29, 2022
- ↑ Britannica, "City of Boerne v. Flores," accessed September 20, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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